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THE UBJECT OF THIS THESIS IS TO DEVELOP AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
IN WHICH TO ANALY~E THE EFFECTS_OF_~EGULATION AND LOCATION ON 
RETAIL SERVICE STATION PETROL SALES. 
The political leaders of most countries in the world today 
will attempt to ensure the stable,~ independent and secure 
growth of their economies. Oil, whether being produced or 
consumed, will have an undoubted effect'on their strategies. 
This is particularly true of South Africa, which imports all 
its crude oil from an ostensibly hostile world. Powerful 
government controls regulate all aspects of the oil industry, 
right through to final consumption. Retail service stations, 
the subject of this thesis, are no exception. They are affected 
by government propagated barriers to entry, price controls, 
restrictions on selling hours and restrictions on location, 
inter aZ.ia ... all in an avowedly free enterprise econo.my. 
Additional important factors help to shape the service stations 
as a unique economic entityo Their customers, according to 
* one writer, buy petrol as a rent to use their cars. It is 
an "inconvenience" good. Consequently, locational convenience 
takes on a special importance. 
Part I is essentially a descriptive analysis of the South 
African service stations. First, their emergence during this 
century is outlined. Next, the different types are categorised, 
and their position vis-a-~is other bodies in the economy is 
summarised. A "general scenario" is followed by a closer 
examination of their pricing structure, demand curves, cost 
curves, departments, and relations with the supplying oil 
companies. 
. .. /. . ... 
* Levitt, (1962) 
(ii} 
Part II provides the theoretical framework for the thesis. 
A new "purchasing model" is developed in which the money cost 
of petrol, the costs of travelling, and the benefits, both 
from the petrol and from all other factors, interact to deter-
mine when and where a customer will visit a service station. 
The literature on shopping models is then examined. The 
unique characteristics of retail petrol customers as seen in 
the purchasing model, to a large extent guide the development 
of "deterrence" and "attraction" sectors for a suitable gravity 
model. 
Next, a survey of the literature on the emerging theories of 
regulation is made. It is seen that no theory yet exists 
which can consistently explain the emergence and degre~ of 
various governmental regulations. However, the peculiar 
characteristics of the South African oil industry suggest a 
new approach, and this is developed into a new theory. The 
essence of this theory is that regulations will be promulgated 
in order to benefit those who have a hand in their formation 
and implementation. A regulation will come into existence 
if the sum of a variety of benefit measures to this ''decision 
group" exceeds the sum of a variety of cost measures. 
Part.III consists of the empirical testing of several hypo-
theses. Computer programmes are developed for both the 
locational and regulatory models .. First, the importance of 
convenience of location to service station customers is 
illustrated. The effect of deterrence (ie. the various 
travelling costs) on customer allocation to service stations 
is then examined, and there is a description of the total 
market and its component sales areas. The nature of the 
competition within and betwe~n these sales areas is examined 
in detail. It is shown how the total market is made up of 
many small sales areas, and nearly all competition between 
service stations is within these sales areas, rather than 
between them. 
. I ... 
(i.i.tl 
The oil companies are likely to find the locational mtidel 
a useful tool in their market area sales predictions, when 
varying the numbers or characteristics of service stations. 
The details of a slightly different model which will likely 
be cheaper for them to set up are also provided. 
On the regulatory side, the first task was to illustrate the 
high degree of governmental control in the industry. The 
predictive ability of the new theory was then tested against 
existing service station·regulations, with positive results~ 
A dominant factor in the regulatory scenario is the desire of 
the government to maintain a high level of involvement in 
policy making throughout the South African oil industry. 
** Stigler 1 s interest group theory (the most widely accepted 
regulatory the~ry) is shown to be generally inapplicable for 
South Africa's petroleum regulations. Rather, a series of 
government objectives, the most important of which are security 
of supply and protection of local energy industries, are the 
main forces shaping these government controls. 
Lastly, it is shown how the consumer (particularly the private 
consumer) is paying substantially above world market prices 
for petroleum products in South Africa. In a test area, the 
average consumer had to travel more than 75% further than he 
would have had to under a free market situation, in order to 
purchase them. 
* * * * * * * 
** Stigler, (1971). 
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1 · INTRODUCTION~ LIMITS)· THESIS· OUTLINE AND CONCLUSIONS 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
(1) 
1 .1. 1 Most of the vast body of research that has been 
conducted into the oil industry has been completed outside 
South Africa, and most of it investigates either various 
technical aspects of the industry, or its "upstream"{l) 
segments. Relatively little work has been published on 
downstream oil marketing operations - most of the research 
that has been completed is the jealously guarded competi-
tion between the OC. There is also a tendency to regard 
such operations as falling under the heading of "general 
business" and· therefore not worthy of separate analysis. 
An objective of this thesis is to prove the protagonists 
of such a view wrong. 
1.1.2 It is correct to regard RSS as competitive 
businesses; it may also be correct to analyse their 
activities in selling tyres, batteries, accessories and 
soft d~inks using the same tools that would be used to 
analyse their competitors. However, an examination of 
RSS activities in selling petrol define them as a unique 
species in the busin~ss world. 
1.1. 3 A tremendous number of factors affect RSS petrol 
sales and profits. The objective of this thesis is to 
examine two of the most important: the effects of the 
location of an RSS; and the effects of a plethora of 
governmental regulations controlling them. At first 
glance these two factors seem relatively unrelated, but 
it will be seen by the end of this study that this two-
pronged a~proach allows a comprehensive descriptiori of the 
economic environment in which the RSS opera~e. 
. I .... 
"Upstream" refers to activities concerning supply resources. A 
marketing company in SA would conside.r all aspects of its crude supply 
as upstream. "Downstream" refers to marketing operat~ons, primarily 
to th~ final customer. 
2 
i .1.4 · The purpose of this' work is not to provide an up 
to date ready reference of profitable locations i~ SA, nor 
.to provide a legalistic review of the current regulations 
affecting RSS. Rather, the tools for the analysis of. 
location and regulation will be developed, and the reader 
will be provided with a framework in which to tackle his· 
own specific problems. It will be necessary to test 
several hypotheses empirically; the results will attempt 
to validate the tools that have been developed, and support 
the particular framework in which the RSS have been placed 
in this thesis. 
1'.2 LIMITS 
1.2.1 This section outlines the constraints within which 
the thesis itself was completed. Firstly and obviously, 
the title of the thesis closely directs the areas to be 
researched. Petrol is sold by the OC in SA in a number 
of markets. (See Ch. 3) - This study will concentrate 
on the largest of the petrol markets: retail. RSS sell 
a number of products (see 3.7), however only petrol sales 
will be examined. There are numerous factors which affect 
the petrol sales of any RSS; the ~esearch will be confined 
however, to 
regulation. 
wi 11 not be 
an examination of location and government 
Important areas affecting RSS sales which 
examined in depth ·include: 
a) The effects of differences in the quality of staff 
between RSS (particularly differences in management 
qua 1 i ty) . 
b) The results of variations in management and personnel 
techniques. 
c) Various technical aspects of the RSS, such as the building 
design, equipment used, and pump layout. 
. I ... 
3 
d) Certain "accounting" and financi~l aspects of the 
RSS such as debt, credit and liquidity levels~ and 
profitability ratios.< 2) 
e) Relations between the RSS and the OC will be examined, 
but only in the context of the thesis title. The· 
effects of tie types (see 3.2), OC strategies, OC · 
assistance and OC finance are largely ignored. 
f) The different types of RSS (see 3.2) and their 
profitability. 
g) The effects of 11 economic" factors, such as interest 
rates, credit, taxes, labour costs and quality, and 
other costs such as those in Appendix 14. 
1 .2.2 There are additional limits aside from those dictated 
by the thesis title. The time and money available probably 
represented that of a typical 11 Masters" student. The 
research could also have profitably delved into certain 
"sensitive" areas. Chapters 3 and 7 explain how the National 
Supplies Procurement Act, and the Petroleum Products Act pro-
hibit the disclosure of a wide range of information.( 3 ) 
There is one area in particular which it was not possible to 
investigate because of this restriction: a multiple regression 
using petrol sales volumes aggregated by region (e.g. Cape Town, 
or Cape Province, or RSA) as the dependent variable; and 
factors discussed in 3.8.2 such as population, car registrations, 
COL index, ca.r engine sizes, petrol price, etc etc, as the 
independent variables. Such a regression would have revealed 
much about the nature of the demand curves faced by typical RSS. 
1 .2.3 An interesting phenomenon observed in many urban areas 
is the existence of "high concentration areas" of RSS. This 
concept is discussed in 6. 10, but no empirical work has been 
done, because of the widespread sampling that would be required. 
. I . 
(2)see Sizer (1969), Ch.4. 
())Penalties of up to R2 000 or two years or both are provided for. 
4 
1 .2 .. 4. A final constraint within which the work was 
completed was that of data accuracy. At times t~lephone 
conversations, radio broadcasts or newspapers have .been 
the sole source of information. 
, 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE AND CONCLUSIONS 
1 .3.1 The thesis first reviews the history of the petrol 
industry in SA. The evolution of the RSS, and the 
important· developments in the petrol marketing industry 
are examined; by the end of the chapter the reader is 
already aware of the importance of government controls 
in shaping the character of the industry. 
1 .3.2 Chapter 3 describes the RSS in greater detail, 
providing a grounding for the remainder of the thesis. 
It opens by giving statistics which help place the RSS 
in perspective in the economy. There is then a discussion 
on the different categories of RSS, and the institutions · 
and groups with which the RSS react are summarised. This 
background is used for a description of the 11 general 
scenario 11 of RSS operations in RSA 
1 .3.3 It is important to note that there are certain 
peculiar economic characteristics of the RSS which dis-
tinguish them from the firms of other industries. Chapter 
3 continues by introducing some of these differences in the 
form of an examination of the petrol pricing structure; 
the important influen~es of the OCs (effectively whole-
salers) in the petrol marketing environment; and an 
estimate of the importance of economies of scale (based 
on an RSS sample). Further differences are highlighted 
by the chapter when factors affecting the demand curves 
of RSS are examined, and estimates of certain demand 
elasticities are made. The chapter also contains .a short 
analysis of the RSS as a multi-department firm, and a 
section on the cyclical nature of RSS sales. 




1 .3.4 The objective of Chapter 4 is to develop the approach 
to the analysis of location and market areas used in part 
III of the thesis. It opens by describing certain peculiar 
·characteristics of the RSS customers (as opposed to 11 general 11 
shopping customers} and developing new concepts to describe 
them - search, frame, hunger, additional visiting distance 
( A V 0 } an d RSS " a tt r a c t i o n s " en a b 1 e t h e de v e 1 o p me n t o f a 
model to describe the circumstances in which a customer 
will purchase petrol. This 11 hunger cycle" model is not 
empirically tested in the thesis. Rather, it provides a 
useful means of approaching the development of an RSS 
locational model. 
1 .3.5. The uses, and historical development of mathematical 
shopping models are then reviewed.( 4 } The "Huff", and 
11 intervening opportunities~~ (IO} models evolve as the most 
likely approaches to the construction of an RSS model. 
These two models are then derived again using Wilson's 
11 maximum entropy" approach. This allows it to be shown 
that two apparently different models may be derived using 
the same technique, depending on the definition of customer 
deterrence used. A third measure of customer deterrence, 
distance to next opportunity, is also discussed. 
1.3.6 By this stage it will be clear that the 11 general" 
shopping models reviewed so far in Ch.4 are not entirely 
adequate for the special requirements of RSS. There is 
a discussion on the needs of an RSS model, and new measures 
of customer deterrence and "attract~on" are developed. 
The chapter closes by_ describing certain problems encountered 
in setting up the RSS model! indexing, calibration, and 
external interaction. 
1 .3.7 Chapter 5 provides a review of existing regulatory 
theory, and it develops a new theory of regulation in which 
to analyse the effects of the government on RSS in SA. 
The chapter opens with a picture of some of the concepts 
, . I 
Note that it is shopping location 1 rather than industrial location 




·and problems involved in regulatory theory, and a summary 
of the various costs of regulating. Next, the (sometimes 
conflicting) theories of regulation are reviewed. At the 
end of this review it is apparent that there is no generally 
accepted theory of regulation( 5 ) which will reasonably· 
consistently provide positive empirical results. 
1.3.8 The Decision Group (DG) Goal regulatory theory is 
developed in Chapter 5.( 6 ) In essence, it suggests that 
a proposed regulation will be implemented if the DG believes 
that the contributio~s it makes towards all its goals 
exceeds the various costs of that regulation throughout 
the economy. This new th~ory is particularly applicable 
to the SA oil industry, because the SA government has some 
powerful and clear goals it wishes to achieve when it 
implements petroleum regulations - it was probably this 
fact that sowed the seeds of the DG-goal approach. 
Lastly, Chapter 5 assesses the ability of each of the 
existing theories in explaining RSS~C regulation. 
1.3.9 Chapter 6 is the first of the empirical chapters· 
(part III). It opens by outlining the areas to be 
examined- i.e. many of the propositions and concepts 
developed in Chapters 3 and 4. The computer model 
developed for the chapter is described in detail, along 
with the limits and assumptions under which it is operated, 
and the method of setting it up to cover the study area. 
1.3.10 The first hypothesis is an evaluation of the 
importance of locational convenience to customers. The 
effect on an RSS's sales when all factors other than loca-
tion are "neutralised" is e~amined. Sales decreases rang-
ing from 0,1% to 53,0% were obtained depending on the method 
of "neutralisation" used, and the RSS involved. One can 
conclude that convenience of location is an extremely 
' important factor in the determination of an RSS's sales. 
. I 
Stigler's (1971) "Economic. Theory of Regulation" is the most widely 
accepted. 
The reader may find this chapter simpler if the word "government" is 
substituted for DG. 
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1 .3.11 The results of the second hypothesis again confirm 
the-importance of customer deterrence in determining an 
RSS'~ sales. An increase in the average deterrence of 
one RSS (the others remaining constant) caused a more than 
proportionate decrease in sales; the majority of customers 
lost were on the 11 periphery" of its market area. ( 7) 
1 .3.12 The first two hypotheses have suggested that the 
typical market area covered by the survey's RSS is "small".(B) 
Small changes in deterrence will cause changes in patronage 
by peripheral customers. It is therefore logical for an 
RSS to direct its competitive activities at peripheral 
customers, if at all possible. These results support 
Tow~shend's description of the petrol industry as one in 
which: 
11 The total market is made up of thousands of small 
market areas where quantities sold are almost 
entirely independent of sales in contiguous areas. 
Local market areas consist of clusters of{~~alers 
in direct competition with one another". J 
1 .3. 13 An important conclusion derived from this description 
o f t h e R S S m a r k e t i s t h a t i f s e v e r a 1 c om p e t i to r s e x i s t w·i t h i n 
a given area any one of those RSS will have great difficulty 
in expanding sales beyond a certain volume, because of the 
importance of location to the customers being competed for. 
Economies of scale (discussed in 3.10) are th~refore pre-
cluded beyond a certain sales volume because they are offset 
by the costs of competing in peripheral areas. A corollary 
of this conclusion is that there will be a strong incentive 
in the industry to erect barriers to the entry of new RSS. 
. I ... 
(7 ) The hypotheses actually utilise the concept of sales area, rather than 
market area. (Defined in 6.0.1). 
(B) The RSS 1'n the · th " 'd t' 1" t f 3 2 It 1's v1'tal survey are 1n e res1 en 1a ca egory o . . 
to note that the market areas of "national route" RSS will be very large. 
Certain conclusions in this thesis will therefore not apply to this category. 






l.l.l4 The nature of the competition between·RSS is 
then· further examined in the third hypothesis. Townshend's 
idea of the RSS only being in competition with each ~ther 
when they are located in the same market areas is supported. 
This hypothesis examined the effect of a 50% increase in 
"attraction"(lO) of one RSS in the study area when the 
others were held constant. Once again it was shown that 
the further away customers are from an RSS, the more 
inconsistent becomes their patronage of it. Because loca-
tion is not a variable to the RSS, the components of 
"attraction" becomes. their tools of competition. When RSS 
are 11 Close" to each other(ll).the effects of varying 
"attraction~~ by one of them have substantial effects on the 
others located nearby. Because these RSS "close" to each 
other are in direct competition for the same customers, 
such RSS will have a strong incentive to reduce the number 
of competitors (and erect barriers to entry) in order to 
achieve considerable potential economies of scale. An 
important government regulation, the rationalisation plan, 
is designed to do this. The reader may ask why competition, 
(and not the rationalisation plan) is not able to limit'the 
number of RSS. The answer is that competition is restricted 
by a plethora of other government regulations. (Another 
reason is the high cost of 11 peripheral 11 competition mentioned 
above.) Some of these regulations ensure minimum RSS sizes 
and facilities< 12 ) (and therefore raise the average· cost 
structure of the RSS). Others restrict the tools of com-
petition, most importantly price competition. A free market 
would contain a number of small, low facility, lower cost 
RSS in locations convenient to smaller numbers of customers, 
in addition to many of the larger RSS that exist today.< 13 ) 
. I .... 
Attraction may be briefly defined here as all factors other than customer 
deterrence which affect the allocation of customers among RSS. 
This is obviously defined more rigorously in the hypothesis. 
Certain regulations require, for example, minimum workshop sizes. and a full 
time; qualified mechanic at nearly all RSS. Removal of such regulations 
would mean that a new type of "small" RSS would emerge. Because maximum 
profits would be achieved at lower vol-umes, more RSS could exist, and 
customer convenience would be greatly improved. (See Ch.8). 
" ••• average (RSS) throughput in SA is already the highest in the world, four 
times more than in the UK, for example." Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1975,P.93. 
The article also maintains that average SA mark-ups are among the lowest in 
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1.3.15 The .final result is that the typical SA RSS mar~et 
coritains fewer, larger RSS offering more facilities (and 
therefore with higher average cost), than an unregulated 
.market would. The average distances customers have to 
travel to reach RSS are considerably increased (8.3.45). 
1.3.16 Yet another effect of this considerable dampening 
of competition is the emergence of certain 11 high concentra-
tion areas 11 on the main roads in some national route towns 
and in the corridor roads into citie&. (See 6.10) 
1 .3.17 The fourth hypothesis examines the reallocation of 
customers among its competitors when an RSS is forced to 
close. The closest RSS have the greatest customer gains. 
However, when the RSS are "very 11 close to each other,{ 14 ) 
the importance of locational convenience to the repatronising 
customers is superceded by the other "attraction .. factors 
(i.e. customer deterrence is of primary importance in 
determining the allocation of customers only once a certain 
low level of deterrence has been passed for such customers. 
Up to that point, the "attraction" factors are more 
important). 
1 .3.18 This hypothesis also confirms the strong incentive 
to reduce numbers that the existing RSS will have. 
1.3. 19 The 11 attraction 11 factors of the RSS in the survey 
are examined in 6.8. Unfortunately~ the limited size of 
the survey limited the number of 11 attraction 11 components 
that could be simultaneously examined in the multiple 
regressions to three. The most important "attractive 
elements 11 that emerged were .the existence of an attractive 
amenity close to the RSS, such as a shopping centre, school, 
club, etc., and the level of customer service (a method of 
rating .service was constructed). 
. I ... 
(l4 ) Obviously defined more rigorously for the hypothesis. 
(15) 
1 0 
1.3.20 It is also shown that the composite "attraction" of 
each RSS has a good correlation with how far customers will 
go out of their way to visit it, measured by the concept of 
AVO. Indeed, AVO is virtually the definition of "attraction~~ -
see 6.8.6, 6.8.7. It was heartening to see a good correla-
tion (R2=0.94) between the AVOs derived from the customer 
survey, and the composite 11 attraction" variables calculated 
by the mode 1. 
1.3.21 Section 6.8 also discusses how the model•s results 
and the survey support the concepts of frame, search and 
habit.· Customers are portrayed as habitual, and unsearching. 
1 .3.22 It is apparent that the method of ana1ysis.in Ch. 6 
is costly, in terms of time and money. The details of a 
proposed RSS model that will be quicker and cheaper to set. 
up are provided in 6.9 and Appendix 9. The new model is 
proposed primarily for the OC, which would find it particular-
ly useful in identifying profitable locations, and the most 
suitable RSS types. The prime advantage from the OC point 
of view is that many already have the required input infor-
mation. 
1.3.23 Chapters 7 and 8 are concerned with an empirical 
analysis of government regulation of RSS. Chapter 7 
prepares the data required by the computer model in the 
final chapter. A list of the regulations governing the 
oil industry is provided, and the OG(lS) i; discussed and 
identified. The oG•s objectives are isolated and weighted. 
The procedure is then repeated for the RGs. Finally, the 
input matrices require~ by the model are set up. 
1.3.24 Chapter 8 opens with an outline of the hypotheses to 
be tested, and a description of the programme used for evalua-
tion by the new regulatory theory. The first hypothesis 
examines the degree to which the OG is able to effectively 
control the SA oil industry. One may conclude that the OG 
his a very high degree of control over all operations inside SA. 
. I ... 
Decision group (DG) is a concept developed for the new regulatory theory. 
Another is the relevant group (RG). 
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1.3.25. The second hypothesis involves an evaluation of 
each of the RSS regulations, in order to test the predictive 
ability of the regulatory model. Positive results were 
obtained for all existing regulations. In addition, a 
negative result was obtained when the proposal to remove 
an existing piece of legislation was run on the mod~l. 
From the results, it can be concluded that the DG has placed 
a high priority on minimising the policy power of the OCs in 
the industry, and propagating its own control over the 
industry. This transfer of control to the DG is desired by 
them for a number of reasons; the most important is the 
security of petroleum product supplies. Section 7.5 outlines 
t~e position of the OC in SA, in the framework of the DG's 
security and protection goals. While the international 
supply network, and the expertise possessed by the OC are 
still strongly desired by the DG, it is shown that SA is not 
nearly as lucrative an OC market as it was prior to 1973. 
1.3.26 In 6.1 it was asked to what extent the OCs have 
been able to manoeuvre themselves into a cartel position 
f 
in SA. By this point in the thesis it will be clear that 
there is little OC power in many important policy areas in 
the industry - especially around those variables that a 
monopolist would vary to maximise profits (price structures 
in different markets, and the competitive allocation of the 
various types of RSS over different markets by size Bnd 
number). The only concession to Stigler's (1971) theory 
of economic regulation is the government's rationalisation 
plan which is of benefit to both the OC and the RSS (and 
also to the DG, of course). 
1.3.27 At the end of the second hypothesis, a sensitivity 
analysis is run for ranges of several of the variables that 
were developed in Ch. 7. The object of this analysis is to 
gauge the extent that errors will have affected the second 
hypothesis. One may conclude from Table 8B that its results 
are generally valid. 
. I ... 
(16) 
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1 .3.28 The third hypothesis tests the assertation that 
competition in the oil industry (particularly between RSS) 
is restrained by the DG. It is shown that limits are 
placed on the important competitive variables of price, 
product quality and trading hours. lt is also shown that 
there are effective barriers to entry into the RSS market. 
A test area in Rondebosch contains five RSS - it is shown 
how the removal of oil industry regulations would probably 
result in more than eleven RSS locating in the same area 
(without allowing for the effects of increased competition). 
1.3.29 The fourth hypothesi£ e~amines SA petrol prices vis 
a vis world market prices. It is shown that the government 
will have a strong incentive to protect SA-owned/located 
petroleum refineries and SA energy industries such as coal, 
SASOL and nuclear power. It is also shown that high local 
petrol prices will provide it with a large tax base, and a 
means of attracting international DC to SA. Certain 
published information(l6) is used to show that SNs petrol 
prices are at least 71% above world market prices, and 
probably very much higher. 
1 .3.30 The last hypothesis tests the effects of government 
interference on petrol consumers. First, as has already 
been shown, consumers are paying substantially more than 
world market prices. Second, the results of the third 
hypothesis (11 instead of 5 RSS in the test area) are used 
-
as input for the locational model, to estimate the increase 
in average customer de~errence resulting from government 
regulation. Using a random "position" generator in the 
programme, the six "new" RSS were automatically assigned 
random positions 65 times. Average customer deterrence was 
calculated on each iteration. Depending on the method of 
weighting deterrence, it was concluded that average customer· 
deterrence has been increased by 76% or 79%. 
. . I ... 
See DuPlessis, (1976); and Holden and Holden, (1975). 
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1 .3;31. Third, it is shown that consumer convenience is 
inhibited by a. number of regulations promulgated u~der the 
National Supplies Procurement Act, and the Petroleu~ Products 
Act. ·These regulations, which have been termed ''consumption 
curbs", include restrictions on speeding, on the carriage 
and storage of petrol, and on RSS selling hours, fot 
example~ 
. I . . . 
.. - ..,.. -- -" ....,.._ -- ..... -...- ... ~. ~-~· ..... 
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2. HISTORY OF RSS IN·. SOUTH· . AFRICA 
2.1 BEFORE THE FIRST RSS.(l 7) 
(17) 
2.1 .1 Kerosine~ paraffin and lubricants have been sold 
in South· Africa since the beginning of the 1860s. 
The first Shell produc~ in South Africa were actually 
sold by a competitor, the Vacuum Oil Company (established 
in SA in 1897). It introduced Shell lubricants and 
paraffin in 1901, obtaining the product in drums from 
passing oil steamers from the East, and selling them to 
the public. 
2.1.2 In 1902 Julius Weil and Co. were appointed agents 
for South Africa, and they distributed through the local 
firm Niven, Mitchell and Cotts. In 1905 the 11 She11 11 agency 
was taken over by the Vacuum Oil Company of SA (which did 
little for Shell sales!) and in 1907 the Mitchell Cotts 
and William Cotts companies took over the agency. 
In 1912 the 11 Cotts" companies cut their link with Julius 
Weil & Co. in London, and became the South African represen-
tatives of the newly formed British Imperial Oil Company 
in London. In 1913, 4 000 cars were imported into South 
Africa, almost doubling the car population, and sales of 
"Shell Motor Spirit .. increased rapidly. Agencies and 
depots were established at the major centres, and the first 
travelling salesmen were introduced. 
2.1.3 Product distribution was crude by today•s standards, 
however. All product was ... packed .. (i.e. in tins or drums) 
ensuring high storage, handling and wastage costs. 
Customers purchased (mostly) non-returnable drums, and were 
required to dangerously and wastefully pour the product from 
them into their cars or machinery. 
. I ... 
The dearth of information on the history of South African RSS has necessitated 
a heavy reliance upon the work of Rosenthal, and upon personal interviews with 
the OCs. This in turn has meant that the chapter has concentrated to a large 
extent upon the Shell company. Fortunately, in an historical context, Shell 
has proved to be the most innovative of the SA ocs. 
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2.·1.4 Although facilities did not exist for·widespread bulk 
(as· opposed to packed) distribution at this stage, it was 
appreciated that bulk handling at the ports would have been 
a cost saver. In 1902 Rowbotham & Co. applied to the Port 
Elizabeth Municipality on behalf of 11 Shell" for a licence to 
store bulk paraffin. The same year the Durban branch of 
Mitch~ll and Cotts applied to erect bulk facilities in 
Durban, and it became a general policy to attempt to erect 
such storage at all the ports of entry. These applications 
however, were unsuccessful, because neither the municipalities 
nor the general public were convinced that these facili~ies 
were desirable or safe. 
2.1.5 The outbreak of war in 1914 affected sales severely, 
and also upset many of the administrative and communica-
tions procedures. There was a deterioration of the 
shipping delivery dates, and increased losses because of 
evaporation and poor quality controls. Tariffs and duties 
on oil products were increased to help pay for the war 
effort. The price of petrol rose to 5 shillings and sixpence 
a gallon in SA, and to as much as 10 shillings and sixpence 
a gallon in Rhodesia. 
2.1.6 In 1914 Shell purchased its first vehicle, primarily 
for its sales representatives. In the same year, the first 
bulk tanks in South Africa were installed in the Cape Town 
docks. Up to this date, all product had been handled in 
cases of 4 times 2 gallon tins. In 1914, 8 gallon drums 
were introduced, and soon afterwards the 40 gallon drums in 
which all products were distributed from the bulk ~torage, 
until the late 60s when bulk handling became more widely 
introduced. 
. I ... 
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2.2 THE EARLY RSS. 
2.2.1 In 1919 the first "filling site" was established 
in Cape Town, and in 1921 the first RSS (as we know them 
today) opened in Johannesburg (both Shell's). The concept 
was an American one. Cars drew up alongside a petrol 
pump,. and were supplied from underground storage. Free 
air and water w~re supplied, and petrol, oil, tyres and 
accessories were sold. By 1924, RSS were located in all 
the major centres, although the majority of petrol was still 
sold.in drums. 
2.2.2 In 1922 the first bulk lorry in SA was purchased and 
used by Shell in Durban. The 11 fleet 11 expanded slowly, and 
in the late 20s Shell had only one bulk lorry in the Cape. 
It was filled from drums at the Shell depot, and when the 
message was received that a petrol pump needed replenish-
ing, the truck would set off, hoping to be ahead of any 
competitors. 
2.2.3 In 1923 Shell had three sales representatives, two 
cars, and no advertising material. Prices varied con-
siderably; but had generally decreased from the wartime 
high by about one shilling per gallon. Petrol had an 
octane rating of around 60. In the late 20s, diesel 
fuel was introduced to SA~ Over the years, the price of 
petrol remained virtually constant, and in 1960 was only 
3 shillings 3~d./ gallon. 
2.2.4 In 1923 the first bulk rail truck was commissioned 
by the SA Railways to supply Johannesburg with motor spirit 
from Durban. The same year a tank installation was 
erected at Island View in Durban, and a tin-making plant 
was established there. Within a short period a total of 
six rail wagons had been imported, and the SAR refused to 
allow the OC to employ their own bulk transport on the same 
routes. There was considerable competition among the oil 
companies for the use of the rail fleet. By 1926, twelve 
rail tank cars were employed· by the SAR. 
. I ... 
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2.2.5 In 1930 the Motor Carrier Transportation_ Act was 
promulgated with the object of restricting private !oad 
transporters (and hence certain of the SAR 1 s competition). 
O~iginally, it put varying constraints upon the distances 
which delivery lorries were allowed to travel from their 
"home" depots, eg. 10 miles from the centre of Pietermaritz-
burg, and 30 miles from the centres of Johannesburg, Benoni 
and Pretoria. It was then amended to a uniform 48 km radius 
and in 1977, after long-standing pressure from the OC, was 
increased to an 80 km radius. 
2.2.6 During the early 30s, the price of petrol fell to 
1 shilling and seven pence per gallon at the coast, and in 
1932 during a price war this fell as low as lOd./gal. 
The number of RSS was increasing rapidly, although much product 
was still sold through general dealers and hotels. Even 
today, there are approximately 2 000 general dealers selling 
petrol and other petroleum products in the rural areas. 
2.2.7 In the late 20s and early 30s as the car population 
increased, many workshops discovered the selling of petrol 
to be a profitable adjunct. At first, it was common to 
have only one pump (and therefore represent only one OC), 
but as demand further increased, the multi-pump (and multi-
brand) RSS emerged in the 30s. 
2.2.8 In 1926 the Shell Company of SA Ltd. was registered 
in the UK, being the original British Imperial OC. 
A local head office was set up in Greenmarket Square, Cape 
Town. In 1929 Shell finally separated from the Mitchell 
Cotts company. 
. I ... 
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2.2.9 _In 1928, The Consolidated Petroleum CompBny, 
jointly owned by Shell and Anglo Persian (BP) took _over 
the marketing subsidiaries of Shell and Atlantic (BP) in 
SA.. In 1972, a trade equalisation exercise was conducted 
prior to the splitting of the Shell and BP consolidated 
operation in SA. Some 25% of Shell's business was trans-
f d t Bp . th' . (18} erre o 1n 1s exerc1se. 
2.3 THE SETTING OF TOOAY'S RSS ENVIRONMENT 
(18) 
2.3.1 In the early 1950s, only Shell, Mobil (formerly 
Stanvac}, Caltex and Atlantic were operating in SA. 
In 1954, BP took over the Atlantic refining company, and 
in 1959 commented marketing under the BP name. Total 
commenced marketing in SA in 1956, and were particularly 
strong in the agricultural and government contract sectors. 
Trek Petroleum was launched in 1968 with Shell and BP each 
having a 17,5% interest. This was primarily a strategic 
move with the object of containing competition (especially 
from the national marketer, Sasol} by setting up a locally-
owned OC. 
2.3.2 Esso re-entered the SA market in 1963 (having relin-
quished its former assets to Mobil at the Stanvac break-up} 
and concentrated upon the Reef and Durban areas. Today 
they are represented in most major centres, but because their 
activity has been constrained by the Retail Rationalisation 
plan (see below), and lack of distribution facilities and 
skilled manpower, their total market share is under 3%. 
. I ... 
A service company was established in 1967, owned equally by Shell and BP. 
Its object was to free the two companies of those functions not directly 
concerned with selling, and to reduce costs and improve efficiency by com-
bining these functions, such as finance, management, supplies, personnel, 
distribution and planning. This company was disbanded, and the companies 
went their own ways in 1976. 
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2.3.3 In 1956, Sasol commenced marketing. It is a wholly-
owned .subsidiary of the government-owned SA Coal, Oil and 
Gas corporation. By agreement with the government, Sasol 
petrol is sold at RSS tied to the OCs in most parts of the 
Transvaal and Northern Orange Free State. Sasol have a~reed 
with the industry that their petrol market share in SA and 
SWA will be limited to a maximum of 8,33%, As this figure 
has not been reached, and because Sasol is a government-
owned comp~ny, it is likely to grow considerably in the 
future. 
2.3.4 SONAREP entered SA in 1965, drawing products from 
their Lourenco Marques refinery. Lack of resources limited 
their market share to approximately 1%, mainly in the Trans-
vaal, and in 1972 they sold out to Mobil. 
2.3.5 Oth~r names such as Castrol, William Penns and 
Duckhams are confined to sales of lubricants only. 
2.3.6 In 1950, the Undue Restraint of Trade Act came into 
force. Its object was to eliminate the monopoly on the 
setting up of RSS that the OC had, by forcing the OC to 
supply an RSS that met certain minimum standards. (See 
c h. 7) . 
2.3.7 Another development starting in the early 50s was 
the strict control by municipalities and provincial adminis-
trations on the siting of RSS. Today, (aside from the 
Rationalisation Plan), the municipalities exert a major 
influence on RSS location. Various sites are allocated 
rights for general business, service stations and residence, 
or a combination of these rights, for example. The OC 
attempt to locate their RSS on the most profitable sites 
within these municipal constraints (and other constraints). 
This is also discussed inCh. 7. 
. I ... 
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2.3~8. In late 1950, Shell introduced the first 11 Solus 11 
RSS, ·i.e. introduced a contract with an RSS tying it 
exclusively to the Shell brand, in exchange for an 
~xclusive dealing rebate, and possibly additional 
financial assistance on favourable terms. In 1951, there 
was a scramble by the OC towards the solus system, which 
rapidly evolved from the complex multi-brand structure. 
Today there are very few multi-brand sites remainining. 
This signified the first clear emergence of the OC's retail 
markets, as opposed to the other classes of markets that were 
emerging, such as the distinct commercial, government, agri-
cultural, mining, industrial, civil engineering, aviation and 
fuel bunkering markets. The retail market is defined as 
consisting of those customers who are resellers 6f products. 
2.3.9 In 1964, a similar exercise was conducted by the OC 
in SA in the other classes of markets, with the object of 
securing the remaining 11 0pen 11 business by contracts, using 
the incentive of bulk discounts. This had the effect of 
integrating the classes of markets. (See 3.2). One OC, 
for example, had seven classes of markets during the earli 
60s, and three after this 11 Security of trade!' exercise. 
These three were retail (RSS only); agricultural, commercial 
and aviation; and mining, industrial and civil engineering. 
In 1973, this was reduced to two classes of market, consumer 
and retail, and today the distinction between these.two is 
becoming less clear as the resources employed in one market 
are frequently .. borrowed" by the other. 
2.3. 10 Up to the early 50s, all RSS were privately-owned. 
At this time, the OC began purchasing their own sites, and 
also leasing sites which thej then rented out again. 
Today, there are four distinct categories of sites: company-
owned, company-leased, dealer-owned and UROTA (See Ch. 3). 
~ I .. , 
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2.3.11 Other milestone~ in SA's oil industry development 
were:. 1953 - the first bulk supplies to farmers were 
introduced.. The OC lent tanks to the farmers, who were 
then supplied by bulk lorry. 1956 - the lubricant oil 
blending plant was opened in Durban. 1965 - the Durban-
Rand pipeline was opened. 
2.3.12 During the early 1960s, the OC became concerned 
about the rapidly increasing numbers of RSS in the country. 
Within the given market size, an increasing number of RSS 
meant that the average sales of each was becoming smaller. 
The OC and the Motor industries Federation (MIF) persuaded 
the government to control this proliferation within a 
rationalisation plan,( 19 ) which was formulated as an 
agreement rather than an act, to avoid the publicity and 
rigidity that might otherwise ensue. This plan is updated 
every five years (or more frequently if the minister dictates) 
at a meeting of the government, the OC and the MIF. It is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
. I . . . 
(l9 ) Financial Mail Survey of Oil Industry, P.47. 1st quarter, 1971. 
3. 
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CLASSifiCATION OF RSS·J· AND DESCRIPTION OF THEIR 
ENV I RONf~ENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 The· objective of this chapter is to introduce the 
RSS to the economist. It will. briefly describe several 
institutions concerned with the oil industry, the market 
and pricing structures, and certain features of the RSS 
cost and demand curves. This will provide a grounding 
for the locational and regulatory analyses of Parts II 
and III. 
3.2 THE RSS TYPES 
3.2.1 In 1973, there were 6 680 "}arages" in RSA, employing 
32 480 artisans and apprentices( 20 and 60 000 pump attend-
ants. ( 21 ) Of these garages, 4 250 sold petrol, and are · 
therefore defined as RSS for the purposes of this thesis. 
The typical RSS today has total sales ranging from R50 000 
through to R5m. The average fuel volume sold was approxi-
mately 1 200 cubic metres pa in 1973. ( 22 ) 
3.2.2 RSS are operated as competitive businesses. Their 
profits may be derived from a number of departments (see 3.7), 
with fuel sales typically earning up to 50%.(23 ) Petrol is 
supplied to the RSS by_eight OC in RSA, normally through a 
tied contract (see below}. All other supplies to the RSS are 
obtained by them on a competitive basis -- the tying of supplies 
of non-petroleum products with the RSS is prohibited,C 24 ) as 
with any other retailers in the economy. . I ... 
· 0 NPI Survey, 1973-4, P.l2 
(21) 
Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 1973, P. 894. 
(22) Ibid. 
(23) 
Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 1975, P,775.· 
(24} 
Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act. 
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3.2.3 ·A set of trading and profit and loss accounts, and 
a balance sheet are provided in Appendix 14 for the average 
SA non-company-owned RSS in 1970. The figures were ~btained 
by taking the totals for all non-company-owned RSS, and 
dividing by their number. 
3.2.4 Oil is regarded as a strategicalfy important commodity 
by the SA government. This importance contributes towards 
the following oil industry characteristics: 
a) There is constant surveillance by the government 
at all levels of the oil industry. The burden 
to provide information rests primarily on the OC. 
b) Many of the operations of the oil industry, especially 
at the "higher" end of the market, are secret. 
The National Supplies Procurement Act provides for 
penalties of up to R2 000 or two years or both, for 
the disclosure of a wide range of oil related 
statistics. The Petroleum Products Act provides 
for additional penalties. 
c) A range of regulations have been promulgated which 
give the government the legal right to almost complete 
con t r o 1 of the o il i n dust r y . ( See C h s. 7 , 8 ) . 
d) Alongside these "controlling~~ regulations, certain 
limited exemptions have been made from other Acts. 
For example, provision is made in the Regulation of 
Monopolistic Conditions Act for the OC to be able to 
11 tie" RSS fuel sales; and provision has been made for 
limited delivery exemptions from the Motor Carriers 
Transportation Act. 
The result is that the RSS are operating in a unique 
environment. Chapter 7 will concentrate upon these 
regulations. 
. I ... 
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3.2.5 .Jt is useful to classify RSS according to several 
critetia. Firstly, they may be grouped by their relation-
ship to their supplying OC. 
a) Company-owned RSS - all its assets are owned by an 
OC. Normally, such a site is leased to an operator, 
who operates it for his own account, paying the OC 
a 11 going-rate rental 11 • 
b) Company-leased RSS - this type of RSS exists when the 
OC holds the primary (head) lease. The OC will 
normally sub-lease to an operator, who again ~onducts 
the business for his own account, while paying the OC 
a 11 going-rate rental 11 •. 
These first two categories may be called 11 Com~any-controlled 
RSS 11 , because the OC has considerable influence over the 
operations•of such RSS, either through clauses in the 
contract, or because the Ot may refuse to renew the 
contract with the incumbent dealer when it expires (a 
typical contract period is 5-10 years). 
c) Dealer-controlled RSS. This is an RSS either owned by 
an operator, or one for which he holds the head lease. 
Such an operator has a greater security of tenure; 
\ 
and independence from the OC. 
d) Roster sites. This is a dealer-controlled RSS which 
no OC wishes to tie, either because it is uneconomic, 
or because they do not wish t6 deplete their rational-
isation plan quotas (see 7.2); Such an RSS then has 
th~~right, according to the rationalisation plan, to 
be supplied by an OC chosen at random by the govern-
ment. The OC so chosen has no obligation to such an 
RSS, other than to supply products at specified prices. 
e) Oil. ties. This is ncit actually an RSS, but rather is 
a garage or workshop which has contracted to buy oils 
from a single OC. Note that the rationalisation plan 
prohibits an oil tie at an RSS where petrol is tied. 
. I ... 
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3.2.6 .At the end of 1976, the total number of.RSS in RSA 





South African RSS Network by OC. 
Caltex Mobil BP Shell Total Sa sol Trek Esso 
943 939 827 820 513 - 207 Y I 
42 .39 40 33 46 - 21 13 
985 978 867 853 559 - 228 104 




3.2.7 A second useful classification of RSS may be made 
according to their locations. Firstly, all RSS could be 
inserted into one of the exclusive categOries~ 
a} High density residential area. 
b) Low density residential area. 
c) Central business district. 
d} Industrial area. 
e} Rural a rea. 
f} Special areas with expected future growth. 
3.2.8 Once the RSS has been classified as above, the 
additional options below could be appended:-
i} National or tourist·route. 
ii) White or non-white area. 
iii} Special amenity (eg. shopping centre, car park, 
station, sports ground, school, etc.} 
3.2.9 The last import?nt classification of RSS is by its 
selling departments. Certain RSS may, for example, have 
a franchise to ~ell new cars~ or they may sell used cars. 
Others may have a spares shop, or even a "general" shop. 
This is discussed in detail in 3.7. 
. I ... 
(2S) Fin~ncial Mail, 3rd quarter 1977, P.337. 
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3.3 RELATED INSTITUTIONS 
3.3.1 Diagram 3A illustrates the relationshi~s of ·the 
important institutions in the South African oil industry. 
The 11 central government 11 and the. OCs are the two most im-
portant institutions affecting the RSS, and are discussed 
in Chapter 7. One of the major hypotheses of this thesis 
is that it is the government (which includes state depart-
ments and public agencies), influenced by the various 
pressure groups within the economy, which primarily shapes 
the economic environment in which the RSS operate. 











MIF Motor Industries Federation 
AA Automobile Association 
MIC Motor Industries Council 
AHI Afrikaanse Handels Instituut 
NPI National Productivity Institute 
FCI Federated Chamber of Industries 
NAAMSA National Association of Automobile Manufacturers of SA 
. I ... 
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3.3.2 The MIF is a trade association, and an .entirely 
voluntary organisation. It has approximately 6 000 members 
in total (RSS, repair garages, car sellers etc.)! 26 )_ 
Traditionally, trade associations have provided services 
such as data collection, setting standards, public relations, 
education and other low profile activities. Many modern 
associations, however, are now standing between government 
and business, interpreting the actions of each for the other. 
The national director of the MIF is in weekly ·contact with 
the Department of Commerce, and he also serves on the Prime 
Minister's Economic Advisory Council. The MIF tends to be 
providing both the traditional and modern trade association 
services to its members, although, as some believe, not very 
effectively.( 2?) 
3.3.3 NAAMSA (instituted in 1935) is regarded as the mouth-
piece of th~ motor manufacturers, and it is also a research 
,and information centre. Its position has enabled it to 
become a voice in the oil industry. 
3.3.4 Various other bodies are in contact with the oil 
industry in their normal operations. The AA provides a 
small lobby for the RSS consumers, as well as an information 
and research centre. The MICs monitor employment by the 
RSS in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act. The NPI 
has been commissioned to study certain aspects of the oil 
industry.< 28 ) The AHI is a voluntary trade association of 
Afrikaans businessmen from commerce, industry, mining and 
finance. Its objective is to serve the interests of its 
7 000 members through the provision of information and advice, 
and by acting as a spokesman for them. It is usually con-
sulted by the government before new regulations are promul-
gated.<29) The FCI was formed in 1917 as a_single mouth-
piece to express the views of industry to government~ Its 
objective is the: 
./ 
(26 )According to Mr Meiring of the MIF, 13 Dec.78. He claims that 80% 
of RSS in SA are MIF members. 
(27) 
See G.R. Cross, (1972), P.82. 
(28) 
NPI survey, 1973-1974. 
<29 >standard Encyclopaedia of SA. 
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li promotion and protection of the int~rests of 
all manufacturers at a national level". (30). 
3. 3. 5 It is important to note that there are only three 
organisations in the private productive sector which have 
the privAlege of special access to the parliamentary lobby 
in Cape Town; they are the FCI, the AHI and the Chamber of 
Mines. At the local level, the AHI is made up of Sake-
kamers - groups which retain the AHI•s right of special 
access to parliament. 
3.4 GENERAL SCENARIO 
3.4.1 Each RSS in SA will be operating in its own best 
interests (the maximisation of profits, subject to their 
long term security) under varying degrees of control from 
the government, and from their supplying OC. It will be 
argued in part III that some of these constraints have 
been imposed in order to improve the profitability of th~ 
oil industry, particularly that of the OC. Their general 
effect is to inhibit competition between the RSS, and between 
the OC. 
3.4.2 An important characteristic of the RSS industry, which 
is primarily a result of the multiplicity of regulations 
controlling them, is that entry into the industry is highly 
restricted. The rationalisation plan (7.2) limits the 
number of RSS an OC may tie by imposing a quota upon each 
company. The few individuals who wish to open RSS upon 
their own initiative are not restricted in the same manner, 
because they have recourse to UROTA (7.2) which allows them 
to open an RSS providing that certain standards are main-
tained. The OC, selected by the government on a roster 
system, are obliged to supply such RSS. 
. . I ... 
(30) . . 
Standard. Encyclopaed1a of SA. 
{31) 
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3.4.3 The total market demand in SA consists of several 
thoUsahd small and sometimes overlapping sales areas 
( 6 . 0 . 1 ) • Quantities sold in .one sales area are almost 
entirely independent of sales in contiguous areas (6.7). 
Should th~re be more than one RSS in any one of these sales 
~reas, then the RSS within that area will be in competition 
with each other. The entry of a new RSS, or the expansion 
of sales of an existing one (ceteris paribus) can only be 
at the expense of others in the same sales area; their· 
actions will be interdependent (6.7). 
3.4.4 The price of petrol throughout SA is controlled. 
Where there are a number of RSS in the same sales area, 
there is therefore non-price competition between. them. 
This competition takes the form of each RSS attempting to 
differentiate both iself and its product from the others in 
its sales area. This will be done by advertising, and by 
variation of the products and services offered by each RSS. 
3.4.5 The products offered by all the RSS are virtually 
homogeneous. Competition between the different brands 
under a rationalised and price controlled situation (Ch.7) 
ensure~ that each of the three octane ratings of the 
different brands will be very similar. The different OC 
in fact acquire their fuels from the same refineries within 
the same areas; the addition of a small quantity of ''addi-
tive'' is the only factor differentiating one brand's ~etrol 
from the others. 
3.4.6 Sasol fuel, derived from coal and marketed in the 
S 1 1 (31)'. t' s 1 d t aso supp y area 1s an excep 1on. aso oes no own 
any RSS, but by an agreement with the, OC, it sells its petrol 
through the OC's RSS network within the Sasol supply area. 
It is often perceived by the public as an inferior petrol, 
probably because of its different smell and colour, and 
possibly performance. 
. I . . . 
Most parts of the Transvaal and northern Orange Free State. 
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3.4.7 It is important to note that there are no direct 
substitutes for petrol, lubricants and other petroleum 
fuels.( 3Z) If petrol prices rise, a motorist can only 
use less fuel, or change his mode of travel. Thus, there 
is an inelastic industry demand curve for petrol (See 3.9). 
Other causes of inelasticity are: the degree to which petrol 
is used in our everyday activities; and the fact that the 
total cost of all fuels represents only 4% of the average 
urban white, and 8% of the average urban black household's 
budget in RSA. (33 ) 









3.5.1 Details concerning the imports and sales of petroleum 
J 
fuels in South Africa are not published. However, it is 
estimated that during 1976, SA consumed 15-20 million tons 
(approximately 105-140m barrels) of cru9e oil( 34 ), with the 
best estimate possibly closer to 15 million tons.( 35 ) 
Assuming an average price of $12,70 per barrel in 1976 (Table 
78), this means SA paid Rl 330m for its crude oil imports.( 36 ) 
Between 1976 and 1978, OPEC increased crude oil prices by 
approximately 8%. Given that SA imported 115m barrels in 
1978,( 37 ) SA therefore paid Rl 575m for its crude oil imports. 
3.5.2 In 1976, petrols accounted for 5,2 million tons of sA•s 
crude oil imports. At 1978 crude prices, this represents 
. approximately R500m. 90% of the petrol produced from this 
crude is sold through RSS, of which 70-80% is taken by the 
private motorist} 38 ) The RSS petrol sales volume in 1977 
was approximately 5 500 million litres.( 39 ) 
Townshend, (1972), P.372. 
UNISA Bureau of Market Research, Nos. 58,65. 
Petroleum Economist, Feb. 78. P.S6. 
Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 1976, P.ll35. 
Petroleum Economist, Feb. 78. P.56. 
Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1979, P.469. 
Supra3 2rid ~uarter· 1976; P. 1135. . 










3.5.3 Prior to 1973, the growth of petrol sales in SA was 
. . (40) -
10%-12% p.a., during 1973 growth slowed to 8% p.a., 
and with the imposition of further oil conservation measures 
i·n 1974, the growth rate slowed to 5% p.a. in early 1975.( 41 ) 
This rate continued to fall, and in 1976 petrol sales did 
not grow. (42 ) In 1977, petrol sales fell. ( 43 ) In early 
1978, the Ministry of Economic Affairs estimated that petrol 
conservation measures had resulted in a 11 22% savings 11 .( 44 ) 
3.5.4 Note that the OC gross margin (see 3.5.8) has remained 
constant for the sixteen years up to June 1975, ( 45 ) when the 
OC were asked to bear ·0,4 c/1 from their agreed margin.( 46 ) 
In summary, therefore, the industry has changed from one with 
a revenue growth of 10-12% p.a. prior to 1973, to an industry 
whose revenue has declined by around 25% in 1976 because of 
this margin cut, and the sales volume fall. 
3.5.5 South Africa is divided into thirty-five grids for the 
purpose of pricing petrol around the country. These grids 
radiate outwards from the major coastal installations -
Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London, Mossel Bay and Cape 
Town. All petrol prices within a grid are uniform, but 
prices iise as the grids move inland. The price differences 
between grids are essentially based upon railage costs. 
3.5.6 Within each grid, different prices are applied to 
different sectors of the economy. Private motorists (i.e. 
the RSS prices) pay the most per litre in each case. 
. I ... 
Financial Mail, lst quarter 1976, P.923. 
Ibid_, 2nd quarter 1975, P.ll58. 
Ibid_, 2nd quarter 1976, P.ll35. 
Ibid_, 3rd quarter 19771 P.337. 
Ibid_, lst quarter 1978, P.7o. 
Ibid_, lst quarter 1976, P.923, and 4th quarter 1975, P.432. 




Lower prices are set by the Minister for agricultural 
users~ mines, commercial enterprises, certain aviation 
users, industry and civil engineering w~rks, and, of 
course, the government itself. All the larger contracts 
in these sectors negotiate rebates of varying sizes with 
the OC, in addition to their basic price advantages over 
the private sector. 
3.5.7 Table 38 illustrates the price of petrol since 1970 
and in Table 3C a partial breakdown of these prices is given. 
TABLE 38. SA Grid 1 98 Octane Petrol Prices 
Date of increase( 47 ) Current Price c/L( 47 ) COL index( 48 ) 1970 Price c/L 
June 1970 8,4 100,5 8,4 
April 1971 9 '1 105,2 8,7 
July 1972 9,4 113,2 8,3 
December 1972 . 9,6 117,4 8,2 
October 1973 11 '1 127,4 8,7 
February 1974 13,8 131 '1 10,5 
December 1974 14,5 147,3 9,8 
February 1975 16,5 150,4 11 ,0 
October 1975 19,6 162,4 12' 1 
April 1976 22,1 170,9 12,9 
January 1977 26 '1 183,8 14,2 
July 1978 27,2 219,8 12,4 
January 1979 30,3 228,4 13,3 
February 1979 36,3 229,7 15,8 
. I ... 
Date of increase, and current price obtained from the Argus newspaper, 
23/2/79. 
Cost of Living index, all items for SA, issued by the SA Department of 




TABLE 3C. Breakdown of 93 Octane Petrol ·Prices: 
Cents/litre 
DATE: 3/71 - 3/76 10/76 3/77 
Middle East f.o.b.: 1 ,3 cif ex refinery 10,6 10,6 11 ,9 
Freight & landing . 0,4 . 
Duties & levies . 3,2 Duties & levies 5,4 7,9 9,9 . 
OC margin . 1,7 OC margin 1 '7 1 , 7 1 '7 . 
RSS margin . 0,7 RSS margin 1 '17 1,17 1$6 . . 
SALES TAX - - -. 
Grid 1 price : 7,3 Grid 1 price 18,9 21,4 25,4 
RAILAGE . 1 '3 RAILAGE 2,2 2,7 2,7 . 
SALES TAX - - -
JOHANNESBURG PRICE: 8,6 JJHANNESBURG ffiiCE 21,1 24' 1 28,1 
Sources: Financial Mail, lq 1971, P.23s; lq 1976, P.923; 





















3.5.8 The government, through its control of the prices and operations 
of the oil industry {see Part III), is able to control the 
gross margins of the OC and the RSS. This control of margins 
is the simplest method of controlling the average profits of 
the OC and RSS (as opposed to a controlled rate of return on 
capital or assets employed). Gross margin {GM) control is 
relatively easy to administer and is relatively flexible and 
fast to change. Its prime advantage, however, is that it 
provides the OC with a strong· incentive to operate efficiently. 
In 5.6, Averch and Johnson's article illustrating the ineffic-
iency of a regulated rate of return based on capital employed 
is discussed. They show that under such circumstances, firms 
will maximise their profits by increasing the amount of 
capital in their resource mix above the socially opt~mal 
level. 
. I ... 
The SABC News, 15/3/79, quoted Minister Heunis, as saying the RSS gross 
margin has been increased to 2,51 c/L. 
I.I) -----....... 
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3.5.9 Under a controlled GM situation~ each OC will have 
the incentive to minimise its average costs~ and to maximise 
its sales (See 3.6). Table 3C shows how any RSS selling a 
l"itre of 93 octane petrol in Johannesburg will receive 30~6 
cents for it.( 50) Of this 30,6 cents, all but 1,86c is 
immediately earmarked for its costs. For the purposes of 
t~is analysis, it may therefore be said that the average and 
marginal r~venue to any RSS from the sale of a litre is 1,86c.(Sl 
Similarly, the average and marginal revenue to any OC from the 
sale of a litre of petrol is 1 ,415c. This will provide both 
the RSS. and the OC with pressures to simultaneously minimise 
costs and maximise sales. It will be seen in 3.10 that both 
the RSS and DC are operating on falling sections of their LAC 
d h f h 1 . . f 1 · .. t• (S 2 ) curves, an t ere ore ave po 1c1es o vo ume max1m1sa 1on . 
. DIAGRAM 3B. DC and RSS GMs. 


































OC SALES VOLUME ·-
Scale 2. 
RAN 0 
December 1978. Note that this. was .increased by 35% in February 1979 to 
2,51 c/L. 
The Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1975, P.93, maintains that the average 




3.5.10 Initially the government regulates petrol prices 
in Diagram 3B, so that the OC GM is 1,415 c/L, and the RSS 
. ' 
GM is 1,86 c/L. Each has the jurisdiction to operate as it 
wishes within those margins. For example, an OC (obviously) 
may not raise the line AB, but it may lower it if it wishes, 
and give a portion of its GM to the RSS. This is often done 
by the OC, by giving rebates to the RSS as a "reward 11 for 
achieving a certain sales volume. 
3.5. 11 It can be seen that the size of the downward movement 
of the line AB (i~e. the size of the rebate to the RSS), is 
a matter for OC decision, for each of the RSS tied to it. The 
primary factors affecting the size of this movement will be: 
(a) The competition between the OC for the tie with that 
particular RSS, particularly if it is profitable, and 
its contract is due for renewal. 
(b) It will be used as an incentive to the RSS to increase 
sales volumes. 
(c) It may be used for various marketing strategies. For 
example, if an OC expects a. site to be more profitable 
in the future, or if it wishes to increase its repre-
sentation in a particular area, it may increase .its 
RSS rebates. 
3.5. 12 The size of the rebate {the downward movement of AB) 
allowed by the OC to the RSS will depend upon the gains the DC 
believes it will receive. Assume the OC initially has a sales 
volume~OH at the GM level A. It will lower its own GM to C 
(and thus increase th~ RSS GM by an identical amount) if it 
believes that the increased sales "revenue" DIGH exceeds the 
revenue rebated to the RSS, AEDC. 
3.5.13 It is maintained(53 l that the average RSS GM in SA 
including rebates, is approximately 2,16 c/L. This makes 
an average rebate of 0,3 c/L. 
3.5.14 The government, through using the GM technique to con-
trol oil industry profits, is able to separate the effects of 
. I .... 
Financial Mail, 3rd quarter 1977, P.337. 
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cost changes exogenous to the OC and RSS from pressures within 
the SA industry. For example, if crude oil, or railage costs 
raise the costs of petrol by 1 c/L, the government can simply 
change the price of petrol by 1 c/L. OC and RSS profits will 
fall little, because of the inelastic industry demand curve (3.9) 
However, if OC and RSS profits were based on a % rather than 
absolute margin, these profits would normally increase along 
with a petrol price increase, It is interesting to note that 
with the price of petrol having increased at a rate of 20% each 
year since 1972, the MIF is· strongly in favour of a 10% profit 
margin for the RSS, rather than a fixed margin!{ 54 ) 
3.6 THE OC -- ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
l54l 
3.6. 1 Diagram 3C illustrates a typical OC -- it faces an in-
elastic demand curve DO (see 3.9) and operates on a downward 
sloping portion of its ATC curve (see 3.10). Its unrestrained 
equilibrium position would be at price P and sales volume Q. 
However, the government regulates price at Pr. The average and 
marginal revenue curves for that DC now become PrAD and PrABMR. 










Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 1976, P.ll35. 
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3.6.2 It can be seen that because of the downward sloping 
ATC curve and the regulated price, any rightward shift in 
·oo will result in an increase not only in absolute profits, 
but also profits per unit sold. Hence the proverbial 
volume maximisation policies followed by the OC. An 
additional incentive will be given to the industry as a 
whole to increase sales volumes, in that the industry GM 
remains constant, no matter what the ATC level. Thus it is 
likely that the industry would still wish to increase sales 
volumes even when the ATC is rising. (ie. for the industry 
the line Pr remains a constant level above ATC). 
3.6.3 A diagram similar to 3C could be developed to 
describe a typical RSS, and to explain the volume maxismising 
policies they adopt. 
3.6.4 An OC has several means of influencing the operations 
of an RSS tied to it. As already mentioned, its power 
over.company-owned and leased sites will be considerably 
greater than that over dealer-controlled sites. The most 
important of these areas are: 
(a) OC fuel deliveries to the RSS. A typical OC-RSS 
contract will provide for the payment in cash, 
or payment over a short (eg. 30 day) period for 
fuel delivered. It therefore becomes advantageous 
for an RSS to take more frequent, but smaller 
deliveries, especially as the OC pricing structure 
normally does not penalise an RSS for doing this 
(the OC will bear the cost of the more frequent 
deliveries). The frequency and size of deliveries 
therefore become a matter for negotiation between 
the OC and RSS. 
. I ... 
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b) Finance provided by the OC. In additio~ to the 
terms of payment for fuel deliveries, and the rents 
paid for company-leased/owned sites, an OC may pro-
vide finance to an RSS tied to it. Such finance may 
be in the form of advance monies (grants, loans or 
guaranteed finance such as rebates in advance on 
projected fuel sales). Advance monies are being 
used less frequently today. 
OCs may provide preferential lease or purchase terms 
for specific equipment, such as a car wash or spares 
counter. Note, however, that all finances provided 
by an OC, preferential or not, will be provided by the 
OC on the expectation that it will ultimately profit 
from increased sales. 
c) Information and advice are provided by the OC in a 
number of areas, both on a discrete and a contin~ous 
basis. Such advice will be given with the ultimate 
objective of benefitting the OC, but normally it will, 
of course, be of benefit to the RSS. Areas covered 
are setting up of the RSS (location, size, layout), 
visual manifestations (emblems, colour schemes, etc.), 
advertising and sales promotion, operating and merchand-
i~ing, investment analysis, accounting and general 
training. 
3.6.5 The OCs will have a strong incentive to maintain 
"orderly marketing'' among themselves, and among their tied 
RSS. It was illustrated above that each OC and RSS will 
have a strong incentive to maximise volumes. In addition, 
in Chapter 6 of this th~sis, it i~ shown that most RSS are 
operating in a competitive ''oligopoly" situation, and that 
p~ice or non-price competitive action by one RSS will be 
strongly felt by others operating in the same sales area. 
A cut .in selling price by one RSS will automatically involve 
its host OC, and will, therefore, often spread to other sales 
areas. 
. I . . . 
(55) 
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3.6.6 -Because there are only eight OC operating in SA, 
and b~cause of their strategic importance and close 
relationship with the government, all the parties will have 
a strong incentive to maintain 11 0rder1y marketing 11 , and 
avoid unrestrained competition which might disrupt the 
generally profitable environment. This is discussed in 
detail in part III. Essentially, there is a given "cake" 
or potentia 1 volume of fuel sa 1 es in the SA economy. 
Each OC will have the objective of getting the largest, and 
most profitable, slice of it. To do this, each could: 
a) Open as many new RSS as possible. However, this· 
would result in numerous low volume, high average 
cost RSS, and possibly decreased standards and 
service in the industry. 
b) Cut prices. 
c) Agree that all OC will limit the numbe~ of new RSS 
opened; and that certain standards of service will 
be maintained by all RSS. Competition is then 
concentrated upon obtaining the 11 best" of these 
limited numbers of RSS. 
The most effective method of limiting RSS numbers is 
to include the government in any such agreement, 
and this was therefore done. The primary costs, in 
the form of decreased convenience, are upon the 
consumer. (See Chapter 8). 
3.6.7 The petrol market shares of the OC have been 
estimated as follows:(SS) 
Caltex 17-191, Mobil 20%, BP 18-20%, Shell 18-19%, 
Total 12-13%, Sasol 7%, Trek 4-5%, Esso 3-5%, 
Sonarep 1-2% (Mobil-owned)·. 
. I ... 
Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 1976, P.l123. 
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,3.6.8 Typical OC objectives are likely to be: 
a) To maximise profitability of the existing RSS 
network. 
b) To increase the existing share of the market and 
maximise sales volumes. 
c) To emphasise cost efficiency and control (because 
of the fixed gross profit margin). 
d) To actively pursue rationalisation. 
e) To identify and secure the most profitable RSS for 
company ownership. 
Policies to achieve these objectives will typically be: 
a) To identify key undeveloped locations for the 
development of company-owned RSS, and to identify and 
obtain superior operators for company-owned RSS. 
b) To identify high growth areas for future RSS development. 
c) To disinvest the low profit RSS. 
d) To selectively convert dealer~controlled RSS into 
company-controlled. 
e) To identify and eliminate low profit products and 
areas (especially non-OC activities such as show rooms 
for car sales). 
f) To improve brand image. 
g) To provide profit producing facilities (eg. shops, 
restaurants) superior to those offered by competitors. 
h) To eliminate non-profitable financing to RSS. 
i) To maximise cash generation. 
j) To increase RSS sales volumes to above the industry 
average by giving them volume incentives. 
. I .... 
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3.7 THE DEPARTMENTS OF AN RSS 
3.7.1 Most RSS derive their profits not only from the 
sales of fuels, but also from several other 11 departments 11 • 
Typically, petrol sales will provide up to 50% of an RSSLs 
profits! 56 ) wit~ the balance of profits being earned by the· 
workshop, the sales of new and used vehicles, the sales of 
spares, a general shop, a car wash, a restaurant, or by 
some other type of business attached to the RSS. Certain 
RSS exist primarily on the profits from their fuel sales,( 57 ) 
whereas others have been known to use fuel sales as a 11 loss 
leader".(SB) 
3.7.2 Accurate accounts by department are not kept by many 
RSS; those that do keep them were not prepared to divulge 
profit figures. Table 3D, however, shows profit rates, 
and sales %s, by department for a sample of thirty-one 
garages in the NPI survey (Page 4). Note that most of the 
garages examined were 11 large 11 (t~tJenty-three had sales in 
excess of R3m p.a., and nine had sales in excess of R6m p.~. 
in 1973-74), and that ten of them did not sell petrol and oil. 
TABLE 3D. Net Profits, and Sales Breakdowns for an RSS Sample 
We1gnted net Pront 
on Sales {before Tax) Sales % · 
Workshop 7,54% 50,00% 
New vehicle sales 2,03% 9,12% 
Spares 1,70% 20,00% 
Petrol and oil 0,94% 11 '76% 
Used vehicles 0,24% 9 '12% 
100,00% 
. I ... 
(56 ) Financial Mail, 2nd quarter, 1975, P.775. 
(5?) For~example, Cottage Motors and Cliffords Garage in the Cape peninsula. 
(5B) See NPI Survey, 1973-1974, pp.SB-63. 
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3.7.3 A theory will now be developed concerning the size 
and number of departments in an RSS, which will provide a 
useful insight into the value of fuel and oil sales to the 
typical multi-department RSS. 
3.7.4 In commerce generally, it can be seen that there are 
two different types of shops which might sell the same 
product. For example, a "specialist" shop may sell new, 
and reconditioned car batteries, and little else; whereas 
a hypermarket may sell new (but not second-hand) batteries 
among its range of thousands of items. The factors deter-
mining these two extr~mes are: 
a) The size of the market into which the. particular shop 
is selling. There must be a "large" market before the 
demand for a single item can justify a "specialist" 
shop .. Such a shop must be able to provide convenience 
and expertise to a large enough portion of the market 
to .be able to draw those customers away from other 
types of shops. 
b) The 11 Specialist" and "general 11 shops aim at different 
types of market. The general shop will sell to the 
customer who does not need expert advice on what he is 
buying. Such a customer is also likely to find it 
inconvenient to visit a separate shop to purchase the 
specialist item. On the other hand, the specialist 
shop will aim at those customers who need expert 
advice along with their purchases, or who want to 
purchase an item, or service, that only the specialist 
shop would stock. 
c) It is possible that a shop ~ay sell a limited range of 
items because its resources are limited. The most 
obvious example is when land and buildings preclude 
the expansion of activities. Another example is the 
shortage of management expertise required to move into 
a new area. 
-. I ... 
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3.7.5 The optimum diversification for an RSS can be 
show~ symbolically. A firm will expand output to the 
point where total revenue less total costs is maximised~ 
i . e . : 
(TR~ TC) = G is maximised. 
If there are N departments, the profit G for each department 
K may be subscripted Gk. One would deduce that a shop would 
allocate its activities such that: 
Gl = G2 = G3 = .... = Gk 
3.7.6 ln this situation, total profits would be maximised 
providing all activities are entirely independent and do not 
affect the others, and providing that each department costs 
the same. Because it is highly likely that different depart-
ments will affect each other, the maximum profit specification 
must contain a variable allowing for the effects of each 
department upon each of the others. Let Bk be the sum of all 
positive and negative effects upon each department other than 
K, as fue result of the operations of department K. 
3.7.7 Bk will be the sum of two positive and two negativ~ 
effects;. 
a) Customers that visited the firm with the intention of 
purchasing from department K may purchase from other 
departments. 
b) The existence of department K may mean that certain 
resources will become available to the other depart-
ments, eg. management or expertise, advertising 
facilities, customer facilities and larger scale 
administration.· 
c) Department K may, however, draw customers away from 
other departments. 
d) It may also compete resources away from other depart-
ments. 
.. I ... 
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3.7.8 Each department is also weighted by its total 
costs, TCk. The optimal Department sizes will then. be: 
Gl + (B2+B3+B4 ... +Bk) + G2 + (Bl+B3+B4 .•• +Bk) + •••• 
~r ~2 
k-1 K 
Gk + (K~l Bk + K~K+l Bk) 
TCk 
3.7.9 A typical RSS, when opening a new department, will 
carefully consider the· effects of the existing departments 
upon the potential new department; and the effects of the 
new department upon those already existing, i.e. it will 
desire to maximise the B values in each case. An OC, 
however, would be interested in a new department primarily 
because of its B value effects upon its fuel and oil sales. 
3.8 THE DEMAND FUNCTION FOR AN RSS 
3.8.1 In Chapter 4, equation (E87) provides the structure 
for an RSS model - it can be used to predict the number of 
customers who will flow from zones, i to RSS, j. If the 
predicted customer flows are multiplied by their average RSS 
expenditures, Ei, a demand figure for each RSS in the study 
area is obtained. 
3.8.2 Ei is affected by the following: 
a) The number of cars in zone i. 
b) The per capita disposable income in zone i. 
c) The number of persons per car in zone i. 
d) The average age of cars in zone i. 
e) The average engine capacity of cars in zone i. 
. I ... 
(59) 
·-·~---_.--... -·· -~-··- -~-... .. --------~-=-~___,...........~ 
45 
f) The travelling requirements of the aver~ge cu~tomer 
in zone i, as determined by the following: 
i) The geography of the zone. 
ii) The infrastructure of the zone. 
iii) The occupation of workers in the zone. {A 
customer will tend to spend more at RSS when the 
economic activities in which he is involved are 
spread nver a wide area; there are natural impedi-
ments to travel, such as mountains and lakes; the 
roads are few, Jn poor condition and indirect; his 
home to work travelling dista~ce is high~ and he 
has an occ~pation which requires much travelling) 
(eg. some ~ales jobs). 
Ei may be lower, and more elastic, if substitutes for 
the car are available in the zone. For example, 
commuter train and bus services may be well developed 
in the zone. 
g) Expenditure by customers will be related to the state 
of the economy, aside from di.sposable income. Most 
customers will decrease their RSS expenditures in a 
depression, because their marginal propensity to save 
at a given level of income will increase.( 59 ) 
ln RSA the appeals by the government to use less fuel 
may have a greater effect in depressed times, beca.use 
of the impact of the depression on the consumer, and 
his desire to correct the situation. (Of course, self 
interest will normally predominate, but in these 
circumstances, self interest and austerity may well 
be synonymous). 
3.8.3 Price was not explicitly determined as a variable 
in the model in Ch. 4. This is ·because in RSA the product 
is sold at the same price by different RSS, and a price 
function in the model would be meaningless. (See 3.5). 
. I 
Personal savings increased by 35% in 1977, against a decrease of 8~% 
in 1976 - see discussion in Barclays Business Brief, May 1978. 
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When.th.e government does allow a price change, ·all RSS 
vary their pr1ces simultaneously by the same amount. 
Should it be desired to know what the effect of an inde-
pendent variation in price by one RSS would be, one of the 
components of equation E83 in Chapter 4 may be devoted t~ 
price. The parameter for this factor would have to be 
estimated using data obtained in a country were prices are 
free to v a r Y ( e g . UK , US A ) . Est i m a t e s of p r 'i c e e 1 as t i -
city for SA are, however, made )ater in this chapter. 
3.8.4 The.demand function for an OC is simply the summation 
of the demand functi~ns of the individual RSS tied to it~ 
and the industry demartd function is the summation. for all 
the RSS. The OC and industry demand curves therefore depend 
upon the number of RSS involved, and the shape of each of their 
individual curves. Factors which affect the demand of a 
single RSS will also, (to a p~o rata degree) affect the 
demand of its OC (unless such factors simply cause the change 
in de'mand at one RSS to be offset by·the change in demand at 
another tied to the same company. However, most SA OC have 
the p o 1 i c y of not 1 o c a t i n g the i r own R S S i n com pet i t i on w·i t h 
each other). 
3.8.5 It is unlikely that any individual RSS or OC will be 
intent upon increasing the industry demand curve. This 
would only create a poor relationship with the government, 
which is attempting to.minimise fuel consumption (See 7.7). 
The energies of the RSS and_OCs are, _therefore, directed 
towards maximising their market shares by competing for 




3.9 DEMAND ELASTICITY 
(60) 
3.9.1 The selling price of petrol in RSA is fixed. {3.5). 
However, there are a few instances of unilateral price cuts 
by individual RSS in South Africa, and there is also a case 
in which many of the RSS tied to one OC were involved in 
price_cutting. These cases are examined below. 
3.9.2 The individual RSS market demand curve. The first 
case is when an individual RSS changes its petrol price, 
and the prices of other RSS remain constant. 
3.9.3 On 18/7/77, Vic Proctor•s Motors, Cape Town, uni-
laterally cut the selling price of its petrols by lc/Litre 
(to 24,4c/L for 93 octane for example) and advertised it 
on billboards on its site. During the next three days, 
sales volumes increased by 33%. On the third day, the 
government price controller ordered that prices be increased 
to their previous levels. (It is interesting to note that 
Shell was 11 happy to supply 11 petrol during this period). On 
resumption of the old, higher prices, sales still remained 
approximately 20% above their previous levels. (60 ) 
3.9.4 From the above, it can be estimated that the short 
term, ceteris paribus elasticity of demand for that single 
RSS was approximately: 
% change in quantity 
% change in price = 
33 = 7,3 
4,52 
3.9.5 The price cutting attracted customers to that RSS who 
had never visited that site before. Using the terminology 
of 4.2, it can be seen that Vic Proctor's was established on 
the frames of a number of new customers, and a large portion of 
them from then on decided that this RSS was the most convenient 
one to visit under 
tion of additional 
their old levels. 
certain circumstances. Hence the continua-
sales even after prices had returned to 
. I 





3.9.6 Note that a unilateral price cut by an -RSS is most 
unusual, and hence this case attracted a large amount of 
free additional publicity. For example, the RSS manager 
~as interviewed on a peak hour radio programme.( 61 ) 
3.9.7 Mr Proctor maintained he did not cut prices in 
competition with the Esso RSS that were doing this at the 
time, but rather because he was copying the example of 
other price cutting cases in Pietermaritzburg and in the 
Transvaal. 
3.9.8 There is little available evidence with w~ich to 
consider price cutting in the long term by a single RSS. 
The RSS sited next to certain hypermarkets (eg. Pick •n 
Pay, Brackenfell) are selling petrol at small discounts 
(ie. ~ c/L, during 1978). However, the DC believe that 
such discounts are not 11 meaningful 11 enough to attract many 
additional customers, especially as the discounts are often 
provided only on production of a coupon to be obtained at 
the hypermarket next door. (62 ) 
3.9.9 A less direct example of long term price cutting by 
a single RSS may again be seen in Vic Proctor•s Motors. 
In December, 1977, this RSS obtained the sole riiht in the 
area of Cape Town to indirectly cut its prices by giving 
away a particular trading stamp.( 63 ) On 16/8/78, ft was 
still the only RSS in _the Cape area selling these 11 hotel stamps 11 • 
During August 78, the sales volumes of this RSS were 26% 
above the target calculated using the previous year•s per-
formance. An elasticity calculated from these figures 
. I 
SABC Radio Today, 0730 hrs, 19/7/77. 
Telephone conversation with the regional sales manager of a large OC, 
15/8/78. 
On purchasing RlO worth of petrol, the customers receive one stamp. 
Twenty-five of these stamps will buy the customer a bed-night for two 
at one of sixty hotels around the country. Cost of the stamps ·to the 
RSS are 6,67 cents each. Thus, for those customers who partake of the 
scheme, and who buy exactly RlO worth of petrol, the price reduction 
provided by the RSS is 0,67%. Obviously, it may be argued that the value 
of the reduction to the customer is greater than this,,because he will be 





woul~ be misleading, because of the unquantified hotel-
value to the customers. Suffice it to say that the demand 
curve faced by this RSS alone is elastic in both the long 
and the short term, providing that rival RSS do not 
retaliate. 
3.9.10 It will be argued that should several RSS at 
different points around the city cut prices, the resulting 
increases in sales for each will not be as great as in the 
case discussed above. This is because a large portion of 
the increase in Vic Proctor•s sales was made up of a small 
number of 11 Special offer seekers 11 , ie. a limited number of 
customers in the general area who are prepared to travel 
long distances to obtain the discounted prices. (This was 
confirmed by Mr Proctor). Once several RSS start cutting 
prices in this way, they will only obtain a small portion of 
the 11 Special offer seekers 11 , and further increases will have 
to come from more 11 normal 11 customers. 
3.9.11 In the absence of price controls, and of the orderly 
marketing objective of the OCs, the demand curve faced by the 
RSS is likely to have the "kink" suggested by P. Sweezy. (64 ) 
This is confirmed by R. Cassidy Jr.( 65 ) in which he describes 
the US market in the 1940s and 1950s - a market with no 
formal price controls. 
3.9.12 Throughout 1977, "many" of Esso•s RSS (there is con-
flicting data as to what proportion of t~e total) cut their 
petrol prices by i c/L below the industry regulated level. 
Esso believed that its· RSS faced elastic demand curves, 
and that these price cuts would enable it to expand its 
sales - which are only 3-5%( 66 ) of the tot~l retail market. 
Sweezy, (1939) • 
Cassidy, (19 54) . 
See 3.6.7. 
. I ... 
(67) 
50 
It believed that the other OC, in spite of the loss of sales 
that they would suffer, would not match these price. ~uts, 
because the cost of the matching in the remaining 97% of the 
market would be too great. 
3.9.13 Esso was corret in its prediction that none of the 
remainirig OC would match its price cuts (except for limited 
periods with individual RSS). However, all the OC were 
extremely concerned about Esse's action, not only because of 
the losses of sales suffered, but also because it represented 
a departure from 11 0rderly marketing ... The maintenance of 
.. orderly marketing .. between the OCs is one of their specific 
objectives; (see 3.6.8) although it may be argued that the 
OC with small market shares (Esso and Trek) will be strongly 
tempted to enlarge them by deviating from this principle. 
The danger is that departure by one OC from the status quo 
could rapidly deteriorate into a widespread and highly 
damaging war for all concerned. 
3.9.14 It seems, however, that Esso over-estimated the 
elasticity of its combined market demand curve. It is 
believed( 67 ) that the sales volume increase was less than 
expected, especially in the long term, as .. marginal .. 
customers came to realise the true value of a ~ c/L price reduc-
tion when measured against their loss of convenience. Had 
Esso offered a greater price cut (1 c/L was suggested), and 
had they advertised these cuts effectively (the only ads 
used were billboards at the RSS), they may have made large 
market gains. 
3.9.15 It is not understood why the price controller did 
not more obviously discipline Esso during the year. 
Perhaps the government-OC informal price agreement allows 
Esso this limited price cutting. 
. I ... 
Telephone conversation with regional sales manager of a major OC, 15/8/78. 
... 
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3.9.16 The industry demand curve, unlike the RSS and OC 
demand ~urves, is likely to be inelastic. The primary 
reason is that when prices in the industry are changed, 
the consumers have no opportunities to avoid the price 
changes by switching between RSS. 
3.9.17 Townshend( 6B) maintains that the main feature of 
the market demand for petrol as a whole is that it is price 
inelastic, and he makes a "guestimate" for Britain of 0,2. 
The main reason for the low elasticity, he says, is the 
absence of direct substitutes for petrol. His second 
reason is that petrol only accounts for a portion of the cost of 
running a car. (A 10% increase in the price of petrol would 
result in a 5% increase in total car running costs in South 
-
Africa, for the average consumer at the end of 1978). 
3.10 ECONOMIES OF SCALE OF AN RSS 
(68) 
(69) 
3.10.1 Economies of scale may be defined as the causes of 
the downward sloping part of the long run average total 
cost curve of a firm. Viner (1952) distinguishes external 
and internal, and real and pecuniary economies of scale. 
The most likely causes of economies of scale for an RSS are: 
a) Technical: labour may become more efficient 
because changing between jobs is avoided. A medium 
sized RSS may have ten pump attendants, a cashier, 
a lube bay attendant, a spares.assistant and a 
manager, instead of one or two men performing all 
these functions. Similarly, larger land and 
buildings will allow more specialisation. 
More cost efficient equipment may be used, eg. a 
90001 tank costs R807 (9,0 c/L) and a 230001 tank 
costs R1410 (6,1 c/L).( 69 ) 
Townshend, (1972}, P.372. 
Distribution, Shell 16/8/78 
their RSS. 
. I ... 
Smallest and largest tanks used by 
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b) Managerial: The larger an RSS, the higher the quality 
of the management it can afford. Alsd, a small RSS 
' 
may not make full use of a manager 1 s time in a 
management capacity. 
· c) Financial: A large RSS may be able to obtain money 
more cheaply because of its larger needs, and because 
of the greater interest of the parent OC in it. 
(3.6.4). 
d) Transport: A delivery of 2000L over 20 km to an RSS 
will cost Rll,lO (0,55 c/L) and a delivery of 22 OOOL 
over 2D km wiJl cost R37,40 (0,17 c/L).(?D) 
e) Advertising costs per litre sold will likely be lower 
for a large RSS. 
3.1D.2 Note that economies of scale will also apply to the DC, 
and of particular importance will be b, c, and d above. 
A doubling of the sales of an RSS will not require a doubling 
of RSS administration costs by an DC, nor will the retail 
marketing staff need to be doubled. The costs of financing 
a large RSS are also likely to be more effective on a per 
rand basis. 
3.10.3 The actual monthly rents and annual rates and. taxes 
paid by a sample of 41 company-controlled RSS in Cape Town 
city, its southern suburbs, and its northern area, were used 
as the basis for an economies of scale calculation, the 
results of which are shown in Table 3E. Curves were regressed 
to enable predictions at the intervals specified in the Table. 
A major OC s~pplied the data required for the estimation of the 
remaining rows.(ll) . 
(70) Transport, Shell 15/8/78. 
(7l) See Table 3E's notes. 
. I .... 
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TABLE 3E: RSS ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Rand per month attributable to Petrol Sales 
MONTHLY SALES MJ 
10 50 100 150 200 250 500 
Site Costs 70 80 100 150 250 370 630 
Buildings 100 200 200 240 280 350 400 
Pumps, Tanks, 70 90 180 240 290 330 480 
Canopy, Sign 
Pump Attendants 160 160 320 480 640 800 960 
Other Personnel - 3 50 450 500 600 700 800 
inc. Manager 
Overheads 170 240 300 330 360 400 650 
Rates and Taxes 60 70 160 180 210 230 350 
TOTAL PETROL SALES 630 1190 171 0 2120 2630 3180 4270 
COSTS ============================================================== 
(cents per Litre) 6,30 2,33 1 ,71 1 ,41 1,32 1,27 0,85 
TABLE 3E: NOTES 
1. It is assumed that the 10 and 50 kl p/m RSS have no workshop. 
2. The costs may be interpreted as those for an established RSS at the end 
of 1978. The actual rents for a sample of 41 RSS in Cape urban areas 
were used as a basis for the table. 
3. Variations of over 100% from Table 3E were found in the sample. 
The Table must be interpreted with particular caution not only because 
of this variation, but also because profits earned by the different 
departments of different RSS vary considerably. An RSS which survives 
primarily on petrol sales obviously must make a profit in that department, 
whereas a multidepartment RSS need not (see 3.7). A regression of the 
Table's results indicates a break even sales volume of 98 kl p/m~ but 
numerous RSS actually exist with sales lower than this. 
4. 50% of land, building, management and overhead costs, rates and taxes· 
were apportioned to all RSS except the 10 and 50 kl p/m categories; 
these received 100%. 
5. The 10 kl p/m category assumes a single operator only. 
6. A typical 250 kl p/m RSS canopy costs Rl5 000; to instal 2 duo pumps the 
costs are approximately: 23 kl tank Rl 500, 2 duo pumps R4 700, pipes, 
electrics and installation R2 100. 
7. A canopy is assumed only for the 150 kl p/m RSS and above. 
8. A typical pump attendant in Cape Town earns R160 p/m, and he sells around 
50 kl p/m. 
9. Overheads include advertising, bank costs (primarily a petrol overdraft), 




3.10.4 The Table shows only those RSS with Volumes 
exceeding 98m3 p/m to be making petrol profits.( 72 ) 
It must be remembered that because of the variations from 
the Table, certain small RSS will be profitable; in 
addition, although some RSS may be making a loss on petrol, 
they may be compensating in other departments (3.7). 
3.10.5 An important point, examined in Chs. 7 and 8, is 
that governmental regulation has increased the operating 
costs of many RSS. Building standards, minimum physical 
sizes, and minimum services to be provided have all in-
creased costs. 
3.10.6 It will be shown below that in practice competition 
between RSS will preclude the enjoyment of economies of 
scale beyond a certain output. Because convenience to 
customers is so important a factor in determining the 
sales of an RSS (Ch. 4), the 11 natura1 11 or unregulated 
number of RSS in any area is 11 high 11 (Ch. 8). The marginal 
cost of additional sales volumes for any RSS rapidly in-. 
creases once it is supplying a high proportion of its dwn 
sales area,( 73 } because it can only gain further volumes 
in competition with other RSS in other sales areas. 
(See 6.7 for empirical evaluation}. If all competition 
could somehow be suppressed, an RSS could expand sub-
stantially and great economies of scale would result. 
In practice, one method by which an RSS can expand is to 
increase its "attractiveness" factor (See Ch. 4) by adding 
additional facilities and generally becoming a more complex 
and costly operation: 
In February 1979 the RSS GM was increased by 35%, to 2,51 c/L. · 
Break even volumes should then average less than 50 rn3p/rn. 
See 6.0.1 for definition of "sales area". 
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·3.l0.7 Diagram 3D illustrates this argument. · At sales 
volume to the left of A, the RSS is able to expand its 
sales to new customers within its sales area, and will 
enjoy economies of scale in doing so. However, should 
it continue expansion beyond A, the effects of competition 
will be increasingly felt, and at B it can be seen that 
the average costs are rising rapidly because of the costs 
of competition; In an unregulated market, any expansion 
beyond B is nearly impossible. The "no competition curve" 
shows the economies of scale that could occur without 
competition; the shaded area between the two curves 
represents the cost of com~etition (or the savings to 
be gained from eliminating competition). 
COST 
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3.10.·8 Diagram 3E expands this argument. The actual 
LMC and LAC curves for an hypothetical RSS are shown in 
the diagram, and also the same curves) should no competition 
exist (NCLMC and NCLAC). The essential feature of the NC 
curves is that the RSS will not have to incur costs in 
drawing customers away from competitive RSS as it expands 
output.· Up to output A, the actual and NC curves are 
identical. 
DIAGRA~1 3E:· The Effect of Eliminating Competition 
COST 
0~--------------------~------------~----~~~UANTITY 
A X Xnc 
3 . 1 0 . 9 T he o u t p u t o f t h e R S S, w i t h u n r e s t r i c t e d 
competition will be X and profits X(P-M). However, if 
competition were eliminated, the equilibrium point for 
the RSS would expand to Xnc, and profits would increase 
to Xnc (P-N). Chapters 7 and 8 will examine the OC 
and RSS policies, and legislation enacted by the govern-
ment, to limit competition and reap the benefits of 
economies of scale illustrated above. 
. I ... 
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3.10.10 An important party has been excluded from the 
disc~ssion so far - the customer. An increase in RSS 
volume beyond X in Diagram 3E implies that the locitional 
cnnvenience so valued by the customer is being denied to 
him. As sales volumes increase, the market area of the 
RSS is obviously expanding, and the newly acquired customers 
will have further to travel to that RSS (assuming that they 
were previously satisfied by some closer RSS). Alterna-
tively, the new and convenient RSS that certain customers 
desire, and that the free market would create, will not 
be built. An estimate of these costs suffered is made 
in Chapter ·8. 
3.11 CYCLICAL SALES 
(74) 
3.11.1 Most RSS do not face a steady level of demand during 
their selling hours. On a daily basis, there will normally 
be sales peaks roughly coinciding with the times customers 
in the area travel to and from their workplaces. Certain 
days of the week, and months of the year, will regularly 
have higher sales than others. Table 3F illustrates the 
hourly and daily fluctuations in sales for a sample of 
eight RSS. (? 4 ) 
TABLE 3F: 
Time 
Sil es lhdex 
Day 
Sales :hdex 
CYCLICAL SALES - INDICES 
7-8 8-9 9-10 10:..11 11-12 12-13 
100 135 119 124 139 139 
MON ·TUES WED 
100 97 102 
13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 







. l ... 
Comprising RSS from the high and low density residential categories, 
and industrial category. 
Frida 
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3.11.2 Every RSS will desire to be able to satisfy al) 
customers who wish to make a purchase. However,. it is 
possible that certain RSS may not be able to accommodate 
potential customers' purchasing requirements at peak 
cyclical sales periods, because of inadequate RSS 
facilities (capacity). A trade off therefore exists 
between the cost of additional RSS capacity, and unsatisfied 
demand (in terms of customers who do not visit that particu-
lar RSS, or customers who'have to bear the costs of queueing.) 
An RSS should therefore increase its capacity until an addi-
tional rand of capaci~y cost is just matched by the net 
present value of additional sales generated by the marginal 
addition to capacity. (The discount rate to be used is 
the RSS's cost of capital for capacity expansion). 
3.11.3 This is shown diagramatically in Diagram 3F. 
The capacity of the RSS is a straight line showing the. 
maximum sales volume the RSS can handle at any one time. 
SALES 
VOLUHE 





HAXIMUM CAP A CITY 
LINE 
. I ... 
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3.11 .4 It is losing sales, and therefore profits whenever 
the sales line deviates (above or below) from the 
maximum capacity line. In the one case, the RSS is 
not satisfying demand, in the other case there are unused 
facilities at the RSS. Thes~ deviations can be ~ombatted 
either by attem~ting to increase demand during the slack 
periods (for example, by lowering price or having special 
offers during these periods), or by attempting to increase 
the RSS's capacity during the peak ~eriods, (for example, 
by engaging extra staff). 
. I . . . 
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4. LOCATION. AND DEMAND 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
( 7 5) 
(76) 
4.1.1 There is a broad rule circulating among the retail 
marketing men in the South African DC which says that 70% 
of the attraction of any RSS to it~ customers is based 
upon its location. The importance of location as a, 
( 
factor affecting RSS ·customer patronage has been confirmed 
by several writers.( 75 ) 
4.1.2 A customer will be prepared to incur costs in search-
ing and travelling when he is buying a large and infrequently 
purchased article, and he believes he will obtain a better 
buy from one seller than another. However, petrol is a 
relatively small and frequent purchase, and one for which 
it is not widely believed that ther~ are large differences 
in product quality,( 76 ) particularly in SA where the 
different brands are sold at uniform prices in similar grids. 
Levitt has considered that motorists buy petrol as a rent 
for keeping their cars upon the road. For these reasons, 
the typical SA customer will not be prepared to incur high 
searching and travelling costs to buy petrol. It takes a 
special effort to select among brands because of their 
differing locations, and therefore he often does not want 
to believe that there are differences among brands. 
4.1.3 The most valuable resource at the· lower end of the 
o i 1 i n d u s try i s there f o r e the r i g h t to s. e 1 1 pet r o 1 at c e r t a i n 
locations. The key factor in profitability development from 
the OC point of view must be an attempt to find and hold 
these prime RSS. 
. I . · .. 
Tamshend, (1972); Winer, (1967), Pp.55-59; Levitt, (1962), Pp.51-63; 
Cox and Alderson, (1950), P.327. 
Levitt, Ibid. 
-- -- _... _____ --~ 
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4 .. 1.4 The objective of this chapter ts to build a framework for 
th~ analysis of the effect of location on RSS profitability. . . . 
Various locational theories will be examined, and a specific RSS 
locational model developed. It will then be used for the 
empirical evaluation of several hypotheses in Chapter 6. 
4.2 THE RSS-CUSTOMER STRUCTURE 
4.2.1 Hayes(??) maintains that the size and distribution of 
most shops in a given area will depend upon two broad factors. 
These are the consumer's desire for convenience of the shops, 
and the ·ability of the·shops to satisfy his purchasing desires. 
The first of these impli~s shops which ~re close to the consumer's 
location, and the second implies the economies of -scale and 
variety which are usually associated with large shops. The size 
and distribution of shops will depend upon the magnitude of these 
two opposing forces, which in turn will depend on the frequency 
and cost of purchases made. Small and frequently purchased goods 
will give rise to numerous smaller shops, and vice versa. Hayes' 
thinking has been developed into Diagram 4A. The customer will 
obtain more satisfaction from a rand of spending as the shop's 
size increases, but the customer's total transport costs to the 






Shopping -- Benefits from size 







small 0 DISTANCE 
(7?) Hayes, (1968), Pp.S-10. 
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4.2.2 Any customer will desire to minimise the sum of the 
total selling prices at a shop, and the total cost of 
getting to it. Or taking a marginal approach, a customer 
will not spend an additional cent in travelling to a larger 
shop if his extra satisfaction from that particular shop 
will be less than one cent. The points M and N in Diagram 
4A indicate firstly, the equilibrium size of shop, and 
secondly the equilibrium shop distance, for the particular 
consumer for whom that graph applies. This approach 
assumes that the consumer is rational, and that he is 
making the trip only to do the shopping at one shop. 
4.2.3 The above approach may be used to show the distance 
from which a shop will draw its customers. The lower are 
the prices the shop charges the customers for their 
satisfaction, and the lower are the costs that the customer 
faces in getting to the shop, the greater will be the market 
area of that shop. 
4.2.4 The discussion will now be more specific to RSS: 
the RSS market is one in which the importance of convenience 
to the customer dominates the customer•s economies of 
scale factor. A casual examination of many of the urban areas 
in RSA will indicate a proliferation of RSS nearly as great 
in number as the cafes and convenience shops in the same 
area. (The typical small cafe is a shorter distance from 
the customer than the large supermarkets, and charges higher 
prices than them - an example of a "convenience" type shop}. 
Each RSS will have a small market area in which quantities 
sold are almost entirely independent of sales in contiguous 
areas. Local markets consist of clusters of dealers in 
direct competition with one another.(lB} 
. I ... 
( 78) Townshend, ( 1972 ), P. 3 7 4. 
(79.) 
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4.2.5 Let us assume that in any given area there are a 
certain number of RSS of given types, at a point in time. 
Such RSS will have fixed locational and non-locational 
attractions. When someone first becomes a potential 
customer in an area, he will incur costs ~n searching for 
the most convenient and attractive RSS available to him in 
the areas in .which he will_normally travel. Those RSS he 
finds during his search will become his frame; ( 79 ) i.e. 
the RSS he will select to ·patronise under various circum-
stances in the future. 
4.2.6 Once a customer has established his frame, he w i 11 
reduce his search costs to virtually zero. He will only 
modify his frame if: 
( i ) by chance he sees or hears of a new RSS which he 
comes to believe should be on his frame; 
(ii) an RSS, through advertising, is able to convince 
him that it should be on his frame; 
(iii) he believes that savings from frame modification 
will more than justify search costs. 
4.2.7 Thus a new RSS, upon setting up in an area, (or 
an existing RSS attempting to expand its market area), 
has to break into the frames of ~ustomers in the area. 
It has to identify potentia) customers, contact them, and 
inform them of its convenience and other attractions. 
This informing process must convince the potential cus-
tomers that they should incur costs (in terms of time,-. 
effort, and change itself) in thanging _their frames to 
include it. 
. . I ... 
Frame is a concept developed for this thesis, analogous to the frame 
concept in statistical sampling. 
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4.2.8 The concept of a frame can be used to explain the 
apparent ignorance of many customers, and also why customers 
habitually frequent a less than optimally located RSS. 
As explained above, a customer will spend a limited amount 
of resources in setting up his frame. It is possible that 
certain RSS which should be on his frame will be excluded, 
and this will later manifest itself as the ignorance of the 
customer~ In addition, because most customers will have a 
frame of limited size, their patronisation of those RSS on 
their frames will appear to be habitual. This will be seen 
to be even more so when (as discussed in 4.3 and below), 
RSS visits are combined with other regular trips such as 
weekly shopping.(BO) 
I 
4.2.9 The hunger of a customer is an important factor affecting 
RSS patronisation. When a customer has a full fuel tank, he 
has no desire to fill up (he feels no hunger). ·When his 
tank is empty, he will on the other hand be starvi~g, and 
will be prepared to incur substantial costs to appease him-
self. There are additional factors, apart from fuel tan~ 
ullage, upon which hunger depends: 
(i) The habitual 11 feeding time 11 of a particular customer. 
Most customers normally adopt the practical approach 
of waiting for "meal times 11 before "feeding 11 • 
11 Meal time 11 might be the opportunity to fill on a 
regular shopping of work trip. In RSA, a customer 
who knows that he will be particularly hungry it some 
stage in the future (but out of regulated selling 
hours) will get a filling permit, if he is able to. 
. I .... 
(80) The manager, Porter Sigma, Cavendish Square, commented that when Saturday petrol 
hours were reintroduced on 1/3/78, he had hoped to have a large gain in petrol 
sales. This was because customers that he had lost when the restrictions were 
originally introduced would return. Such customers would once again find it con-
venient to combine their Saturday morning shopping and their RSS purchases. How-
ever, he was disappointed -- the reason being that many such customers had now 
established filling routines at what were now less convenient RSS. 
Another example may be seen in Vic Proctor's Motors (See 3.9) which cut its 
prices and substantially increased its number of custome·rs in a few days. When 
prices returned to normal, sales remained 20% higher than previously. 
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(ii) The customers expected product usage until the 
next filling opportunity. 
(iii) The expected opportunities to fill before the 
customer's tank runs dry. 
(iv) A customer will be hungrier for higher quality 
fuels, better service, etc. (See 4.5) 
(v) Customers with uneconomical cars will generally 
be hungrier than ihose who can go f~rther and longer 
on a fill-up. 
(vi) Rich customers wil.l tend to be hungrier than poor. 
4.2.10 The selection by a customer of any single RSS from 
his frame will depend upon his hunger, his wealth, and his 
location at the time. If convenience of location was the 
only factor affecting RSS patronisation, all customers would 
be as portrayed in the left hand graph of Diagram 48. 








Factors which will cause the graph to move away from the 
vertical axis are: 
. I ... 
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(a) The non-locational attractions of less convenient 
RSS. (See 4.5). 
(b) Ignorance of the most convenient RSS. 




The custome~•s hunger at the 
customers are prepared to go 
Wealth. Rich customers may 






concerned with the 
4.2.11 Customers will have a greater incentive to incur search 
~osts when their graphs are dispersed to the right. The 
potential savings from their search costs will also be higher, 
the higher are their expenditures at RSS. In theory, a 
rational customer should attempt to minimise the net present 
value of his search costs plus his future RSS expenditure. 
4.3 CUSTOMER ACTIVITIES 
4.3. 1 The typical customer will make a certain number of trips 
in his car, for business, pleasure or whatever, during a given 
time period. It can be assumed that the customer will route 
these trips optimally, in order to minimise all the costs of 
such travelling (subject to achieving his travelling objectives). 
At all times, the customer will be feeling some degree of hunger, 
ran g i n g from s t a r v i n g u p to f u 1 1 , w h i c h i s a s h e 1 e a v e s an R S S . 
(A customer may even feel hungry when he leaves an RSS when, for 
example, he might wish to carry some additional petrol in cans 
in his boot, but is prevented from doi~g so). 
4.3.2 A customer will also have the opportunity to travel to an 
RSS from wherever he is. There will be a cost associated with 
such travel; it will range from virtually nil, when the customer 
happens tq be passing an RSS on a trip he is al.ready making, to 
a high cost, such as when a customer has to make an expensive trip 
solely to go to an RSS. 
. '/ . · .. 
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4.3.3 It can be seen that these two factors (hunger and 
location) will determine when a customer will vi~it an RSS, i.e. 
a customer will visit an RSS at any stage that his hunger 
exceeds the cost of getting to that RSS. If he is not par-
ticularly hungry, for example, but only has to drive an 
additional lOOm. on a given trip, in order to fill up, he 
may well do so. Where there are high additional travelling 
costs involved in reaching an _RSS however, the customer will 
normally be very hungry every time he arrives at the RSS to 
fill up. 
4.3.4 To be able to use these two concepts in practice, it is 
necessary that they can both be measured. The obvious measure 
for both is money. It would then be possible to say that if 
a customer's hunger cost is greater than the cost of the 
additional travelling to visit an RSS, he will visit it; · 
otherwise not. 
4.3.5 The concept of the additional travelling is defined as the 
additional visiting distance~ (AVD)~ which is the cost of the 
additional travelling over and above that which the customer 
would have incurred without any RSS purchases. Should a 
customer make a trip solely to visit an RSS, the AVO is defined 
as the cost of that trip. Should he make a trip with the 
objective of visiting an RSS and a shopping centre which are 
right next to each other, the cost of that trip must be 
divided between shopping costs~ and AVO c&st. Several methods 





total trip cost is divided in proportion to expenditure 
by the customer on the shopping, and at the RSS; 
total trip cost is divided in proportion to time spent 
by the customer at the shopping centre, and at the RSS; 
the AVO cost is taken as the cost of getting to the most 
convenient RSS, had the shopping/RSS trip not taken 
place. 
. I ... 
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4.4 THE HUNGER CYCLE 
4.4.1 For the purpose of the analysis below, hunger may be 
defined ~s the cost a customer is prepared to intur at a point 
in time to enjoy the benefits of appeasement and other attractions 
(exogenous and endogenous -- See 4.5) offered by the RSS on his 
frame. Diagram 4C illustrates hunger. The horizontal axis shows 
both hunger, and the satisfaction to be obtained after incurring 
costs; both on the same scale~ The vertical axis, also on the 
same scale, shows costs. A 45° line has been inserted to indicate 
the points at which a customer will believe that the costs in-
curred in visiting an RSS and purchasing product are exactly 
balanced by the benefits from doing this. These benefits will be 
the enjoyment from consuming the product, and also all the other 
pleasures involved in visiting the RSS concerned. At any ~oint to 
the left of the 45° line, the customer will count the costs of 
visiting an RSS greater than the benefits. At any point to the 
right of the 45° line, the customer will have a consumer surplus 
equal to the horizontal distance from the 45° line. 
4.4.2 The horizontal line C represents the cost of the amount 
of product which will give him maximum satisfaction; (because of 
price control in RSA, this cost may be drawn as a straight line). 
The optimum quantity of product is determined by the six factors 
affecting.hunger mentioned above. 
4.4.3 Each of the RSS on a customer 1 s frame must have an AVO, 
and each of these AVO may be measured as a cost. For a particular 
point in time, each of these RSS can be represented an· Diagram 4C 
as a dot. The distance of a dot above C represents its AVO cost. 
Obviously, all RSS must be located on or above this line. The 
distance of a dot from the vertical axis represents the satisfac-
tion a customer would ga1n from the RSS. A vertical line L has 
been drawn to represent the satisfaction gained by a customer from 
purchasing the product from an RSS from which he obtains no addi-
tional satisfaction. RSS to the right of this line, therefore, 
have additional attractions to offer, over and above the product 
that they sell. RSS to the left of this line offer the product 
in a. way such that a customer derive~ a dissatisfaction when 
buying it. 
. I . . . 
69 
4.4.4 The line L has been drawn at the point where the 45° 
line crosses C. This· is because it is only here that the cost 
of product is equated to the benefits associated .with that 













4.4.5 The hunger cycle will now be discussed. Initially, 
assume that the hunger af a particular customer is low, and on 
his diagram all the RSS in his frame will be located close to the 
vertical axis. As hunger increases, the RSS will shift to the 
right, some faster than others. Eventually, oni RSS will touch 
the 45° line. The customer will then visit that RSS a~d appease 
and satisfy himself. Once again, 'with the customer now full, all 
the RSS will now shift leftwards back to the vertical axis. 
4.4.6 It is important to note that this is a stati~ analysis 
with regard to customer's location, In a dynamic situation, the 
RSS in the diagram wuuld vary their positions, depending upon 
the customer's location and circumstances, For example, the 
above analysis will give different results from the point of 
view of the customer's home, and from the point of view of his 
work. In addition, this analysis assumes that the· same amount 
9f.product will be purchased at each RSS. It can be seen that 
if the analysis is repeated under constant coriditions, an optimal 
RSS will emerge which will habitually be patronised. 
' /· ~ • .. 
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4.4.7 A second situation will now be discussed. This is 
when a customer is particularly hungry, and more than one 
RSS happens to be on the right of the 45° line, as in Diagram 
4D. In this case, the customer must select only one of them. 
4.4.8 Let s be the horizontal distances between the RSS 
and the 45° line, and c be the vertical distances between 
the RSS and the Cline. The customer will then select that 
RSS for which the ratio s/c ·is the highest. This must be so, 
because if all RSS were shifted leftwards, this RSS would be 
. . 0 
the last to touch the 45 line. Note that if two RSS has the 
same s/c ratio, the customer· would be indifferent between them. 
~/c represents the satisfaction to cost ratio. 
4.4.9 Upon filling, once again the RSS would slide back to 
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4.5 THE "ATTRACTIONS" OF AN RSS 
·4.5.1 In 4.2.10, five factors were listed which might c~use 
a customer to go to an RSS, other than the RSS with the most 
·convenient location. One of these was the non-locational 
"attractions" of an RSS. In addition, the definition of hunger 
given above included a qualitative aspect -- the customer will 
be hungrier for an RSS that provides 11 good food". in the form of 
product or service _that is perceived as better than that offered 
by other RSS, i.e. the customer's hunger will be increased by 
the non-locational attractions of. an RSS. 
·4.5.2 The non-locational attractions of an RSS may be classified 
as exogenous or endogenous. An exogenous attraction is one which 
will draw customers to a particular area (the RSS's area), rather 
than to the RSS itself. Endogenous factors are attractions of 
the RSS itself. 
(a) The distance of an RSS from a customer's place of 
residence or work (irrespective of AVO). The smaller 
this distance is, the more likely a customer is to have 
the psychological desire of a customer to have his car 
(b l 
11 nearby" when he 
The existence of 
next to the RSS. 
is having it serviced, etc. 
a shopping ce~tre or some other amenity 
It may be argued that this is not an 
exogenous factor if the customer would have gone shopping 
at the centre had the RSS not been next door to it. 
In such a case, however, the RSS simply has a low AVO on 
a trip the customer makes. If the customer would not have 
visited the shopping centre had the RSS not been there', then 
each has acted as an exogenous attraction for the dther. 
(cl The general surroundings in which the RSS is placed. 
Customers will prefer to visit clean o~ scenic areas, and 
will generally prefer to avoid polluted, slum, or other-
wise unattractive areas, 
, I ... 
·---- --~___...... 
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(d) The distance to the next RSS that the customer could 
go to. The greater is this distance, the more 
attractive the first RSS. 
4.5.3 Endogenous factors comprise: 
(a) The service available at an RSS. This is related 
to the c~urtesy and efficiency of the staff, and 
possibl~ to the equipment that the RSS has. 
(b) The time a customer perceives he will have to wait 
before being served. This is related to the Rss•s 
efficiency, as well ~s the number of pump attendants, 
pumps, and the general layout of the garage. The 
longer the time a customer estimates he will have to 
queue, the less attractive will be that garage. 
(c) The prices charged by an RSS, ~ompared to its com-
petitors. Petrol prices in South Africa are controlled, 
(see Part III). However, the servicing, repairs and 
aftermarket prices do vary considerably between 
different RSS. Customers are likely to move out of 
their normal RSS frames when they have a large repair 
to be performed -- i.e. they will incur high search 
costs to find the best value for money for a larg~ 
repair. 
Outside South Africa, many RSS compete via fuel price 
competition. Townshend (1972) maintains that price 
competition is very localised -~customers will only 
be drawn from nearby rivals. For the sake of a few 
cents savings, most customers are not prepared to 
incur search costs to change their frames. 
(d) The reputation of an RSS. 
(e) The brandname of an RSS -- customers may perceive 
certain brands as· relatively superior or inferior. 
. I ... 
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(f} The range of items and services available at an RSS. 
The greater the range of items sold (fuels, diesel, 
o~ls, B.P's multiblend pump, spares, aftermarket, 
insurance} and services available (repairs, tuning, safet! 
checks, and credit etc.), the more attractive will be 
that RSS. 
Credit is likely to be a particularly important attrac-
tion. When the new selling hours regulations were 
introduced in March ·1978,the provision of credit to 
petrol customers was also forbidden. Porter Sigma, 
Cavendish Square, estimates that it immediately lost 
15% of its regular customers, who now no longer had 
the incentive to. go out of their way to obtain the 
facility. 
{g) The physical design and appeal of the RSS can attract 
• customers. The emblems, colours, building design, 
cleanliness and age of an RSS, can serve to make it 
more or less appealing. It is important that the 
RSS be clearly visible to customers. The ease of 
access into the RSS, the road frontage, and the ease 
of parking and manoeuvering once inside will also 
affect customer patronisation. 
(h) The size of the RSS. It is not clear whether a large 
RSS is more or less appealing to customers. To some 
customers, size may affect positively or negatively 
the attraction of an RSS listed above. 
4.5.4 The government regulates a wide range of areas which 
influence the attractiveness factors listed above (See-Chs. 
7,8}. Controls include opening hours, services that may be 
provided, prices, numbers of RSS, standards and safety. 
The imposition or withdrawal of these controls will tend 
to change the relative attractions of different RSS. 
4.5.5 Advertising itself will not make one RSS more attractive 
than another. What it will do is change the customer's per-
ception or knowledge of one or more of the above factors. It 
tries to tie a particular brand name, or a particular RSS to 
certain attractive factors. 
• J 
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4.6 INTRODUCTION TO RETAIL MODELS 
4.6.1 A mathematical model is defined as a representation 
of some aspects of the real world using numbers, symbols, 
and the language of mathematics. The models that will be 
examined aim to reproduce the main locational features of 
the retail system under study, without including all the 
complexities of individual _consumer•s behaviour. 
4.6.2 The objectives in building an RSS model are: 
(i) to describe the effect upon the demand of a hypo-
thetical RSS of different locations of that RSS; 
(ii) to calculate the area from which an RSS will draw 
its customers; 
(iii) to estimate the effect upon one RSS of the entry 
or exit from its market area of another RSS; 
(iv) to estimate the effects of changes in the following 
upon an RSS: 
(a) population 
(b) average incomes 
{c) proportion of income spent at RSS 
(d) the exogenous and endogenous attractions of an RSS 
(e) the locational convenience of an RSS (eg. as the 
result of building a new road). 
4.6.3 These types of questions have previously been answered 
subjectively, or by using methods such as trade area analysis 
(TAA). Sefore 1930, marketing studies concentrated on . . 
problems dealing with individual shops or classes of goods, 
and their market areas. Advances in marketing techniques 
soon allowed whole areas to be analysed, instead of just 
individual outlets. In this approach, known as TAA, trade 
areas are delineated, and consumer expenditures allocated to 
individual shopping centres. An hierarchy of centres is 
. I 
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postulated, and th~ size of the trade area is assumed to 
vary with the size of the centre. The centres are 
evaluated individually in a time-consuming and judgemental 
procedure. TAA is costly, slow and lacking in precision 
and detail. 
'4.6.4 In comparison, retail models have the following 
advantages: Firstly, they allow for the evaluation of 
an almost unlimited number· of opportunities at low cost. 
Secondly, their objective approach delimits the effects of 
weak estimates or poor judgement. Thirdly, a model is able 
to cope with large numbers ·of factors. 
4.6.5 The essential variables to be taken into account in. 
an RSS model are: 
(a) A measure of the sales at RSS in given zones j 
originating from consumers located in given zones i. 
(b) A measure of the RSS purchasing desire of consumers 
in zones i. 
(c) A measure of the consumer attractions of RSS in 
zones j. 
(d) A measure of the friction of movement between i 
and j. 
4.7 CENTRAL ~LACE THEORY 
4.7.1 Christaller {1933) and Losch (1941) observed that an 
integrated pattern of settlement sizes will. occur over an 
area large enough to have several market centres. There 
will be an hierarchy of m~rket settlement sizes, regularly 
spaced, and in regular sequence. Central plac~ theory is 
based upon the following postulates: 
. I ... 
(81) 
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(a) For a given type of business, there exists a 
threshold of demand below wh.ich a good cannot be 
offered for sale; i.e. there is a minimum market 
size required to support a good. 
(b) Each centre has a range, or a maximum distance that 
consumers a~e willing to travel to it. 
{c) The size of trade areas depends upon the type of good. 
(d) Centres are classified into hierarchies according to 
the size of their trade areas (or equivalently, by the 
types of good offered at the centre}. 
(e) High ranked centres duplicate the functions of low 
ranked centres, and also provide additional market-
ing functions. 
(f) Free entry and exit of businesses produces a contrac-
tion of trade areas to their minimum size. 
(g) If it is assumed that the pqpulation is uniformly 
spaced over a plain, the market areas will be a set 
of regular hexagons with shops located at the centre 
of each hexagon. 
4.7.2 .There is evidence to suggest that these ordered struc~ 
tures exist(Bl) in which a large centre will duplicate all 
the functions performed by smaller centres, and smaller 
centres will be arranged aro~nd the mettopolis, with all 
operating at the limits of their thresholds and ranges. 
The smallest market areas will be around convenience and 
general stores where small and frequently purchased items 
such as food are sold, and the larger m~rket areas will be 
around the big supermarkets and specialist stores located in 
the large centres. Diagram 4E illustrates the classical 
central place laydut where seven contiguous. hexagonal trade 
areas for one good provide the basis for the hexagonal trade 
·area of another higher ranking good. 
. I 
Carruthers (1967), Thorpe (1968). 
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DIAGRAM 4E: Central Place Theory 
4.7.3 The approach of researchers such as Carruthers and 
Thorpe has been as follows: 
(a) To define an hierarchy of -the centres in the area 
under study. This is ideally done using sales 
figures by centre, but where these are not available 
centres have been ranked using a series of indices 
giving points for ~riteria such as type of shop and 
transport services. L82 ) 
{b) Trade areas are then defined for each centre, and 
for each ~lass of good, (remembering that the larger 
centres will repeat the activities of the smaller 
centres). This is done subjectively, or based upon 
consumer surveys. 
{c) Sales are described in each trade area, _using a series 
of regression equations. Projected changes in popu-
lation and expenditure are then able to give predicted 
changes in sales. In the long t~rm, possible changes 
in the population structure, or in the infr~structure 
~ay require a forecast of changes in the trade area or 
. I ... 
(82) . 
Carruthers, (1962), Sma1les and Hartley, (1961). 
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in the hierarchical classifications themselves. 
4.7.4 The early retail models did not reveal why observed 
irregularities occurred in observed shopping patterns, and 
neither were the actual sales at many shopping centres in line 
with what the accepted theory predicted.< 83 ) "Empirical studies 
in urban areas using customer shopping surveys indicated that 
consumers did not appear to discriminate among choices perfectly 1084 
for example, not appearing to ·select one alternative consistently. 
In addition, this type of approach had non-overlapping market 
areas, anotrer characteristic not in accord with reality. 
·4.7.5 Another shortfall of CP theory is its inability to predict 
the existence of many of the large 
located out of the central areas. 
hypermarket in the Cape is located 
Town and 15 Km from Bellville, the 
GRAVI MODELS 
11 hypermarkets 11 that have 
For example, the Brackenfel 
approximately 50Km from Cape 
nearest large suburb. 
4.8.1 Early investigations of the market area concept were 
based on the notion that a definable relationship exists between 
the size of a city, and the distance from which shoppers are 
attracted. This gravity concept of interaction postulates that 
there is an attracting force between two populations that is 
proportional to their mass, and inverse to the friction against 
interaction that is exerted by·the distance between the two 
populations. Interaction between two centres is therefore 
seen as a function of population concentration, and distance 
between the populations. 
4.8.2 In 1929 Reilly( 85 ) developed a law of retail gravitation 
to delimit retail market areas. Reilly described the attraction 
that two adjacent cities exerted on intervening small communities 
.for the purchase of fashion goods. His law is expressed as follows 
. I ... 
(83 ) R.D. Luce, (1959). 







( E .1 ) 
where: 
Ta and Tb are the trade drawn to two cities a and b. 
Da and Db are the distances from the intermediate place 
to a and b. 
Pa and Pb are the populations of the cities a and b. 
4.8.3 This model was later repostulated in terms of a break 
point between the trade areas of the two cities. This was 
the point at which the customers were indifferent to the two 




( E 2 ) 
where: 
Dab is the distance between the cities a and b. 
Db is the distance of the break point from the city b. 
4.8.4 Reilly's empirical work did not accurately substantiate 
his models. In addition, there are two major criticisms that 
have been levelled against them: firstly, that they were. 
invalid hypotheses arrived at intuitively through an analogy 
with pure physics,( 86 ) and secondly, that they delimited non-
'overlapping market areas.( 87 ) 
4.8.5 In recent years, an extension of the gravity hypothesis 
has been used to describe retail sales from a distribution of 
shopping centres. The main advancement was made by Huff{ 88 ) 
who developed the model to describe the interaction between a 
. I 
McCabe,. (1974), P.ll; Nelson, (1958), Pp.150-151; Hayes, . (1968), P.25. 
Wilson, (1974), P.206. 
Huff, (1962). 
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continuous population distribution and a larger number of 
shopping centres, with a consequent change in emphasis from 
the market area of the seller to the shopping area of the 
buyer. Huff suggested that as areas of competition con-
tinually overlap, customers appear to be allocated among 
shops in a probabilistic manner. His model is expressed as 
follows: the probability P that a customer will choose a 
centre j from a set of centres is 
u. 





where Uj is the utility associated with the j th centre. 
4.8.6 If the utility Uj of a centre is a function of its 
"attractive power" (Aj)' and of the distance. from zone i to 
the centre (dij)' then utility may be expressed as follows: 
u. = 
J 
where a and 13 
Hence: 



















4.8.7 This formula maintains that the probability that a 
customer from zone i will patronise a retail centre in zone j, 
is the ratio of the attractiveness of the centre to the distance 
from th~ zone centroid to the centre (raised to appropriate 
powers), divided by the sum of all similar ratios for all 
zones and centres. 
. I ... 
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4.8.8 Total available retail expenditure from zone i can 








=B .• C. where: 
1 1 
average annual per capita retail expenditure in 
c1 is the number of customers in zone i. {See 
factors determining E.). . . 1 
4.8.9 The retail sales (S) attracted from zone i to centre j 
can therefore be expressed as 
s .. 
1J 
= E •• P •• 
1 1J 
·substituting, 
E i . 





m N s .. = 









m E • 
. r 1 1 1= 
· where there are N zones for j and m zones for i. 
4.8.10 The general form of this model can be expressed as 
follows: sales attracted from zones i to centresj are: 
(a} Directly proportional to the retail expenditures· 
available at zones i, E .. 
1 
(b) Directly proportional to the attractive power of the 
shopping centres j, Aj. 
(~}: Inversely proportional to a function of deterrence 
, between zones i and j, f(d .. }. 
lJ 











4.8.11 If it is assumed that these hypotheses are multi-
.plicitive, then 
S.. = K .. E .. A .. f(d .. ) 
1J 1 1 J 1J 











4.8.12 In order to define K., we do the following: 
1 
(ElO) 
( E 11) 
( E 1 2} 
N N N s .. = s.* = K .• E. .A .• f(d .. ) z K .• E .. ~ A .• f(d .. ) :L 1 J 1 :L 1 1 J 1 J 1 L J 1J 
j = 1 











j = 1 
j = 1 j = 1 
E . ' 
1 
as in ( E 11 ) 
K. E. N A .. f(d .. ) = 
1 1 :L J 1 J 
j = 1 
1 
A. f(d .. ) 
J 1 J 








A. f(d .. ) 
J 1J 
4.8.13 Lakshmanan and Hansen( 8g) working independently, 
arrived at the above model. They defined the cost function 
in a negative exponential form to the base e. Wilson( 90) 
( E 1 3) 
(El4) 
( E 1 5 ) 
maintains that the negative exponential 
to manipulate analytically, and he uses 
arguments. He· adds that it would seem 
function is convenient 
it in many of his 
better to try to 
Lakshmanan and Hansen, (1965). 
Wilson, (1974), P.7o. 
.... ) . 
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find empirically the shape of the cost function which gives 
the best fit between model predictions and observations, 
rather ·than simply to assume that one member of the family 
of power functions will fit best. 
4.9 INTERVENING OPPORTUNITIES MODEL 
4.9.1 This approach was originally developed by Stouffer(9l) 
and it has been adapted by Schnieder( 92 ) and Harris(93 ). 
The model is based on the hypothesis that there is a constant 
probability that a customer will be satisfied at each oppor-
tunity that arises. Unlike the gravity model, interzonal 
·distance does not appear explicitly; instead the possible 
destination zones are ranked in increasing order of impedance 
from the origin. 
4.9.2 Wilson( 94 ) derives an IO model as follows: Let j(u,i) 
be the u ranked destination zone away from i. (Rank is 
determined by increasing travel cost). Then let U • • 1 .) be . - 1J~,:U,l 
the probability that a single traveller from i will continue 
beyond j(u,i). 'If Lis the probability that he will be 
satisfied when offered an opportunity, then the probability 
that a traveller will not be satisfied by the first oppor-
tunity (ie. will continue beyond the first opportunity) is: 
u .. 11 . ) 
1 J \.- '1 
where Dis the number of opportunities in zone j(u,i). By 
combining successive opportunities, we get: 
u .. ( .) • u .. ( 1 ., (1 .. LD.( .) 1J U,1 1J U- ,1 J U,1 1 
and by rearranging we obtain: 
u. ·t ') - u. ·t 1 '\ lJ~,:U,l . lJ~,:U ... ,lJ. = - LD.(_- ') J u '1 
u. ·c , ·) 1 J _u.... , 1 . 
(_E16) 
(El7) 
{_E 1 8) 
If Aj(u,i) is defined as the cumulative number Df opportunities 






Harris, ( 964) • 
(94) Wilson, (1974). P.397. 
' ·"'-
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u. '( '}- u. '( 1 ') . lJ u,1 lJ u- ,, 
Uij (u-1 ,; ) 
4.9.3 If continuous variation of opportunities is assumed, 
dU = -L d A 
-u 
and this integrates to 
log U = -LA+C 
where C is a 
In terms of the 
constant of integration. 
model•s requirements, {E21) can be rewritten as: 
U;j(u,i) = 
-LA.( ') . J u, 1 
Kie where K. is a constant. 1 
If there are 0. travellers leaving i, then T .. ·{. . ) , the 
· 1 1J U,l 
number of trips from i to j(u,i) is: 
and by using (E22) we obtain: 
-LA.( l ') -LA.( ') 
T.. . = Q.K {e . J u- ,1 -e J u,1 ) 
1J(U,1) 1 i 
N - -LAj(N,i) 
Note that r T. '( ') - K.O.(l-e ) u=l 1J u,1 1 1 4.9.4 
' 
if there are N zones. (E24 ). i s subject to the constraint 
· that 
I: T .. = a. . 1J 1 
J 
The 
-LA.(N .) e J ,1 in (E25) is likely to be sufficiently small 
that it can be neglected, and therefore, because of constraint 
(E26), Ki ~ 1.0. Equation (E24) can then be ~ritten as the 
intervening opportunities model: 
-LA.( l ') -LA.( ") 












4.9.5 Stouffer(9S) saw one of the biggest problems of 10 
theory i_n defining opportunities. How does one define an 
opportunity to "shop", unless specific items can be is~lated? 
However, RSS will not face this problem-- a filling oppor-
tunity is clearly definable. 
4.10 MAXIMUM ENTROPY DERIVATIONS 
(95) 
(96) 
4.10.1 As already noted, a principal criticism of the early 
gravity models is that they were based on an analogy with 
Newtonian physics. The maximum entropy approach of Wilson 
"overcomes any possible criticisms of the retail model as having 
weak empirical or conceptual bases".(96 } It is essentially a 
method of making the best use of available information by 
expressing everything known about the system in terms of con-
straints. All unconstrained states are then assigned equal 
probability. 
4.10.2 If the variables Tij are used, it is poss~ble to define 
a matrix of the T .. known as a distribution {T .. }. A state of 
1 J 1 J 
the system is then defined as a particular assignment of indi-
viduals within {Tij}' The assumption is now made that all 
microstates are equally probable (within the restriction of the 
overa.ll macro-constraints}. The terms micro and macro are 
used here to specify the -individual elements of the matrix, as 
opposed to the constraints conce~ning the whole matrix. 
The probability of a particular trip distribution occurring is 
proportional to the number of states that can give rise to the 
distribution. The greatest number of states that give ris~ to 
a matrix {T .. } is W {T .. }. 
. lJ 1J 
StQuffer, (1940). 




w { T .. } T = 
lJ n T ~ . 
ij 1J 
where T is the tota 1 number of trips. (97} 
4.10.4 It can be seen that this is independent of the order 
of the individual trips. To find the most probable {T .. }, 
lJ 
W {T .. } is maximised, subject to the given (E30-32} constraints. 
lJ 
The total number of possible states is w, where 
w = E W {T •• } 
lJ 
and the summation is over Tij' satisfying equations (E30), 
(E31}, (E32), below. 
I: T .. = 0. 
j 1J 1 
E' T .. = D. 
i 1 J J 
E. E' T .. c .. 
lJ lJ = c where c is a cost function. i j 
4.10.5 The set of Tij's which max1m1ses (E28) subject to 
(E30}, (E31}, (E32} is calculated by Wilson(98 } as follows: 
Maximise the Lagrangi.an i where 
i_ =lnW +I: A(~} (0.-E T •. )+E 
;· 1 ' 1 j lJ j 
A(~) (D.:..E T .. )+ 
1 J i 1 J 
a (C-r 1: T .. c .. ) 
i j lJ lJ 
where A(~), A(~), and Bare Lagrangian multipliers. 
. 1 . 1 
(Note that if InW rather than W is used, Stirling's 
.approximation 
In N! = NinN - N 
may be used to estimate the factorial terms). 
(97) Wilson, (1970), Pp.4-5. 
(98) 
Supra, P .18. 
. I ... 
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(E30) 





4.10.6 The Tij 's which· maximise 1, and which therefore 
constitute the most probable distribution of trips,. are 
the solutions of 
a -1. = o 
T •. 
lJ 
and of the constraint equations (EJQ), (E31) and (E32). 
By rearranging Stirling's approximation we get: 




= - In T .. - x en - >. (~) - ac .. a T .• lJ 1. 1 1J lJ 
and this vanishes when 
T .. = exp(- ,,q) - A(~) - ac .. ) lJ 1J 
4.10.7 Substituting (E38) into equations (E30} and (E31}. 
to obtain.,_(~) and ,_(f) , 
e x p ( - 1 ( ~ ) ) = 0 i [J exp (-. !.(r) ~ -1 ac .. ) 
lJ 
exp(- ;.(T) ) =D. [I: 
J ;- exp {-
;. (l) 
1 " ac .. ~ -1 
1 J 













substitute into (E38l, to get: 
T .. = A. B . 0. 0 . exp(- ac .. ) 
1J 1 J 1 J 1 J 
where, using {E39), (E40), (E41), ( E42}: 
A. = [! B . 0. (- ac n • )] -1 1 J J exp 1J 
B ' [I A. 0. exp (- ac .. ~ -1 = J 1 1 lJ 
I 
















Thus we wish to find th~ greatest number of states that give 
rise to the matrix { Z .. 1 .,} • The maximand will there-1J \.U,1L 
fore be: 
-z 
IT Z. . ( . ) 1 ij 1 J u ' 1 •. 
where Z is the total number of states for a given di~tribution 
{ 'Z ij ( u , i ) } . 
4.11 .2 There will not be a constraint on trip attractions 
(similar to equation (E31)), but as there cannot be more trips 
cbntinuing beyond j(u,i) than originally set out from i, the 
following applies: 
2 ij (u,i) ~ 0. 1 
If (E53) is summed over all J. 
I: Z. . ( ·) ju 1J u,1 
= K~ 0. 
1 1 
u' 
" . t d 1 K" where K. 1s a cons ant an ~ . ~ 
1 1 
number of zones. 
N, where N is the total 
4.11 .3 A constraint analogous to (E32) is also required. 
If intervening opportunities is used as a proxy for cost 
(See 4. 12), the minimum cost for the trips beyond j(u,i) 
is Aj (u,i) Zij (u,i)' where Aj (u,i) is the cumulative 
number of opportunities up to j(·u,i). If this is summed 




I: A. (u,i) ziJ' (u,i) j (u,i)J 
= c 





4.11.4 Maximising (E51) subject to (E54) and (E55), Wilson(lOO) 
has obtained the most probable distribution as: 
- I n Z . . (- . -) - LA . ( . ) - ).. . = 0 lJ ·u,1 J u,1 . 1 (E56) 
. I . . . ·. 
Wilson, (1970), Pp.l54-155. 
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therefore: 
Zij (u,i} = exp (-LA. ( '} - A • ) J u '1 1 
4.11.5 To obtain A i, (E57) can be substituted into (E54) 
to get: 











t exp (-LA. ) 
Ju J (u,i) 
K~ 
1 
exp (-LA. ( ') ) J u, 1 . 
K. 0. exp (-LA. ( .)) 
1 1 J U,1 
and substituting into (E50), 
T .. ( u 'i ) = K. o. [ exp (-LA. (u - 1 , i ) ) - e x P 1J 1 1 J 
is obtained, which is identical to (E24). 
4.12 THE SIMILARITY OF THE IO AND HUFF TYPE MODELS 
(-LA. 
J (u,i))J 
4.12. 1 It can be shown that th~ primary difference between. 
the IO and the Huff models is in their definition of cost. 
(Using maximum entropy techniques, and two different defini-
tions of costs, each of these models was derived above). 
' 
4.12.2 The main assumption of the IO model· is that the number 
of trips from i to j (u, i) is proport i.ona 1 to the number of 
opportunities at j and inversely proportional to the inter-
vening number of opportunities. It can be seen that the I0 1 s 
~number of opportunities at ju parallels the Huff model's 
Pattraction of jP. In addition, the IO model uses the number 
of intervening opportunities between i and j as ·a measure of 









4.12.3 If Z .. ( .} . lJ U,l trips are made beyond j(u,i), then 
these must incur costs greater 
.. made to nearer zones. If the 
than those which have been , 
number of opportunities 
passed is used as a measure of cost, the minimum cost for 
all trips beyond j(u,i} is A.( 1.}'X Z .. , ')'where A.( '} J U, lJ\..U,l J U,l 
is the cumulative number of opportunities from i up to 
d . 1 d' '( ') .. (101) an 1nc u 1ng J u,1 , 1.e.: 
L Aj (u,i} = ~ Djn .{102) 
n=l 
From the definition of z .. . 1J (u,i)' 
N 
z .. { u, i ) = L T .. 1J 1 J n 
n=u +1 
where N i s the total number of zones. 
4. 12.4 If {E62} and {E63) are summed over all i and all 
j(u,i), a cost function 
L L 
i j(u,i) Aj (u,i) Zij (u,i) z c 
is derived. 
By substituting Z .. (u i) from (E63), it can be seen that the 
1 J . ' ' 
coefficient of Tij (u,i) in (E64) would be: 
( u - 1 ) D j 1 + ( u - 2 ) D j 2 + .. .+ D j ( u _ l ) 
4.12.5 This account of the cost of getting to a particular 
j(u,i) shows that the number of opportunities passed contri-
bute to the cost associated with a particular element in a 
trip matrix, and that each of these zones of opportunities 
is weighted by its ranking-- the closer the j(u,i) to i, 
the greater the weighting. 
. I 
See.Wi1son, (1970), Pp.154-155. 








4.12.6 Now, maximising: 
z 
rr zij (u,i)! 
ij(u,i) 
subject to constraint equations (E54) and (E64), Wilson( 103 ) 
shows that by introducing Lagrangian multipliers 1. ·and L for 
- 1 
the constraints, the most probable distribution occurs when: 
-In Z. . ( . ) - LA . ( : ) - 1. = 0 
1J U,1 J U,1 1 
so 
Z .. ( ') = exp (-LA.( ') -A.) 
1J U,1 J U,1 1 
-By substituting from (E68) into (E54), A can be obtained: 
K~ 0. 
1 1 exp (- :l.·) = 
1 
L: exp (-LAj (u,i)) 
j(u,i) 
4.i2.7 By writing (E59) and (E60) again, and using (ESO), 
it is again possible to obtain equations (E24) or (E61), 
the statement of the IO model. Thus the IO model has been 
derived by entropy, assuming that cumulative opportunities 
passed is a measure of cost. 
4.12.8 Wilson(l0 4) has derived a 11 gravity/opportunity model" 
by assuming that intervening opportunities are used as a 
measure of cost but are not weighted in the form of (E65). -
He maintains that the assumption 
c .. 
1 J 
= A. ( . ) J u '1 • 
may provide a superior account of cost. 
is made in (E32), the derivation of (E46) 
made to give: 
Wilson, (1970), Pp.l54-l55. 
Ibid, P.l56. 
If this substitution 








T •. (u,i) • a.O. D • (u,i) exp {- B A. (u,i)) lJ 1 1 J J 
= [ j(u,i) D. (u,i) exp (- B A. J -1 a. (u,i)) 1 J J 
In this model the "attractiveness" function Dj (u,i) is 
defined as the number of opportunities in zone j, which 
is the u ranked zone away from i. 
4.13 DISTANCE TO THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY FACTOR COMBINED WITH IO MODEL 
(105) 
4.13.1 Hayes(lOS) discusses the insertion of a "distance to 
next opportunity" factor into the intervening opportunities· 






u i s 
by 
• - M U 
the distance to the next opportunity. 
the probability a customer will ndt be satisfied 
an opportunity and will wish to continue. 
M is a parameter describing the effect of distance to 
next opportunity. 
(E20} is equivalent to: ~ U = - L U 
a A 
A is the cumulative number of opportunities between 
i and j. 
L is the probability a customer will ·be satisfied when 
offered an opportunity. 
Combining (E73} and {E74) gives: 
U = exp 7 (LA + MB) 
. I ... 







4.13.2 This will derive a modified IO model by using the 
steps for equations (E22) to (E27). 
T . . .- ( . ) = 0 . [ e x p - (LA . ( l . ) + M B . (• l . )) -
. 1 J u ' 1 1 ,. J u - ' 1 . J u - ' 1 
exp -(LAj (u,i) + MBj (u,i))] 
where T .. is the number of trips from i to j (u,i). 
1 J 
(E76) 
4.14 DERIVATION OF AN RSS MODEL 
,..: t ..... -~·. -
4.14.1 The broad requirements for an RSS model were outlined 
in 4~6. The major work in building a model will be in 
defining the deterrence and attraction components, bearing in 
mind that RSS and their customers have different characteristics 
to those in a general retail model. 
4.12.2 Examining the deterrence portion first of all, it 
can be deduced that the following factors will reduce patronage 
of RSS . by customer i: 
J 
(a) The cost of travelling from i to j in terms of time 
and distance. The greater is this cost, the less the 
likelihood of patronisation of j. 
(b) The number of opportunities passed between i and j. 
This factor is likely to be of more importance with RSS 
in RSA than with other shops generally, because there 
is a greater degree of homogeneity between the products 
of RSS than between the products of other 11 general 11 
shops. These 11 general 11 shops are likely to offer a 
wider choice of types, prices and qualities of goods 
than the RSS do. Therefore the difference in attrac-
tion between different shopping centres is likely to 
be greater than between different RSS. The prices 
between RSS are virtually uniform (3 .5), as is the 
. J 
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product (3.4.5), and often customers go to an RSS 
to buy only one item-- petrol. It is more signi-
ficant, therefore, when a customer passes intervening 
RSS opportunities than when he passes intervening 
"general shopping" opportunities.· 
4,14.3 Examining the "attractiveness 11 portion of the model on 
the other hand, will show the following to increase the patron-
age of RSS . by customer i: 
J 
(a)The distance to the next opportunity. This factor, 
which was discussed in 4.13, implies that a customer 
will frequent RSS "( .) if the distance to RSS "( 1 .) J u, 1 J .u+ , 1 
is high. 
(b)The remaining exogenous and endogenous attraction 
factors listed in 4.5. 
4.14.4 It has been shown in 4.4 how hunger determines at what 
point in time a customer will visit an RSS. It also explains 
why one RSS is chosen rather than another: a customer will 
choose that RSS for which the ratio of satisfaction to costs 
is the ~ighest, i.e. that RSS which has the maximum positive 
sj/cij. 
It was shown how satisfaction is derived by a customer from 
two areas: from the. product itself, and from the variety of 
11 attractions" of each RSS on the customer's frame. 
4.14.5 The gravity models discussed in the above sections 
take account of both the costs and the attractions of the 
different RSS to different customers. They do not, however, 
take account of the dynamic element Hunger. Ideally, a dynamic 
model would make an estimate of the hunger at each individual in 
the system. The model developed in Chapter 6 however, will 
make an assumption which avoids the need to include a hunger 
variable: it will be assumed that each individual in the system 
i~ at his peak hunger value on one or more occasions during the 
period covered by the model. This will cause the maximum 
activity of each individual at the time the model is run. 
. I ... 
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4.14.6 The concepts of search, and of customer frame (intro-
duced in 4.2) must be accounted for by an RSS model. When 
the model is initially set up, an allocation of customers will 
occur, and it is reasonable to assume that this allocation is 
in line with the initial frames of each customer~ If a new 
RSS is now introduced into the model, it will in practice init-
ially be less attractive than the model suggests it should be. 
The reason is that the new RSS will not yet exist on the frames 
of many customers •. Similarly; certain changes of the input 
data should require that customer frames be taken into account. 
For example, if a new road is built past an RSS, that RSS will 
not initially be as popular as the model predicts, because its 
improved location will not yet register on many customers' 
frames. In summary, when one RSS should theoretically draw 
customers from other RSS because of a changed parameter, it 
will not, in the short term, do this tb the extent expected. 
(In the long term there will be no inhibition of customer alloca-
tion). It is therefore suggested that for short term analysis, 
a factor z be applied to all RSS that draw new customers from 
o t h e r R S S , s u c h th a t 0 < z < 1 . z w i 1 1 t e n d tow a r d 1 o v e r t i me . 
It may be obtained by using the multiple regression approach 
described in 4.17 below. 
4.14.7 The Huff and the IO models discussed so far in this 
chapter both consist of a cost (deterrence) and an attractive-
ness portion. The Huff approach ignores the importance of 
intervening opportunities, and ~lso the distance to the next 
opportunity, whereas the IO approach ignores the actual cost 
of travelling from i to j, and the distance to next opportunity 
cost measure. It is obviously desirable to include all three 
measures in a single model. 
4.14.8 A particular disadvantage of the IO model is that it 
will give equal rankings to consecutive RSS, no matter how far 
apart they are. In other words, the rankings of three RSS in 
the same street will be the same as the rankings of three RSS 
each lOkm apart. The rank distance factor derived below 
attempts to solve this problem. 
. I ... 
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4.15 . RANK-DISTANCE FACTOR 
4.15.1 This variable will overcome the problem mentioned 
abov~, in which the IO model wiil give equal rankings to 
consecutive opportunities, no matter what the travel costs 
between those opportunities are. Both the rank and the 
. travel costs are significant variables in the determination 
of an RSS visit by a custome~~ as has been seen so far in 
the chapter. However, there is no clear method fiy wfiich 
they should be ·combined -- simply multiplying rank and travel 
cost is not adequate because:. 
(a} The distances of all other RSS must be taken into 
account. In Diagram 4F below, it can clearly be 
seen that a visit by customer 1 to RSS 1 is more 
significant than a visit by customer 2 to RSS 2, in 
spite of the ranks and travel costs of RSS 1 and 2 
being identical. 
DIAGRAM 4F. 
.I CUSTOMER 1 I 
The Importance of "Other RSS" 
when deftning deterrence. 
X 
OTHEI\. 
:::;,. ... RSS 7 I RSS 1] 
I c us T 0 MER 2l ~ -------'!>!llo- OTHER RSS J RSS 2 
(b) One can intuitively see that it is "more significant" 
when a customer visits his 30th ranked RSS, with a 
travel cost of 1 unit, than when a customer visits 
his nearest RSS which is 30 units away. 
. I 
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4.15.2 The travel costs to all RSS ranked before RSS 
-ire taken account of as follows: a mean of all the 
j(u,i) 
RSS travel costs up to and including j(u,i) is obtained, and 
·this is divided into the travel cost to RSS j(u,i): 
u 
(E78) 
.4.15.3 The result is the ratio of the travel costs to RSS j(u,i) 
to the travel costs of ~11 RSS ranked before it (and 
including it). This ratio is then multiplied by the travel 
costs to RSS j{u,i) to obtain a rank-distance factor: 
R • • { • ) 
lJ _U,1 
• 
D. . ( . ) 








D •• { . 




i j {u, i ) 
u•l 
In the RSS model (Ch.6), a calibration variable A is used 
to adjust this factor. 
4.16 COMPOSITE ATTRACTION 
4.16.1 The "attractiveness" section of the model will now 
be developed. Cordey Hayes, in (E73) and (E74) expressed 
the derivative of the probability that a customer will con-
tinue beyond j with respect to distance to the next oppor-
tunity and with respect to cumulative opportunities passed, 
as negative functions. Note that it is important that each 
.zone j contains only one RSS, in order that the diitance to 
rrext opportunity factor may be expressed using_ zones. His 






fi u MU = -
0 B •. 
lJ 
0 u QU = -
~ y • 
J 
4.16.2 These equations may be understood as indicating 
that U .• the probability that a customer from i will 
1 J 
continue beyond j wi 11 decrease as B .• , the distance to 
1 J 
the next opportunity increases, and as Y., a "general attrac-
J 
.tiveness 11 index of j increases. 
Combining (E80) and (E81) gives: 
U. • exp - ( MB .. + QY. ) 
J - 1 J J 
Therefore, the probability that a customer will be satisfied, 
(and therefore attracted) by an opportunity is: 
v . 
J 
= exp ( MB .. + QY. ) 
1J J 
4.16.3 The cost function (E79) and 11 attractiveness" function 
(E 8 3 ) a r e n ow s u b s t i t u t e d i n to W i 1 s on ' s s u g g e s t e d " g r a v i t y 1 
opportunity" model (E71) and (E72): 
T .. a.O.V. exp ( a 1J = - c .. 
1 1 J , J 
)J -1 a. = [ J; v . exp ( - a c .. 1 J J 1 J 
(E84) and (E85) may now be expressed in the form of retail 
models such a~ those derived by Cullen( 106 ) and Cordey-







exp (MB .• + QY. - Z c .. 
lJ J lJ 
I: exp {MB .• + QY. "" Z c .. 
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4.16.4 The working model for Chapter 6 will be: 
= .exp (a Wj'+/3 Bij- ft.Cij) 
T. . 0. 
, J , J exp C a W j + ft B. i j - /.. ci j } 
where: 
w. is a composite attractiveness parameter .. 
J 
a~. is the distance to the next opportunity after j(.u,i). 
1J 
(Note that there is only one RSS ·per j zone in the 
·model, and therefore the necessity of expressing rank as 
j(.u,i) falls away). 
4.16.5 The formula will therefore account for the distances 
of all RSS ranked before u, and it will also account for the 
distance to u + 1. It might be argued that it should also 
account for 
be shown in 
very low. 
as u + 1 . 
the distances to u + 2, u + 3 ... etc. but, as will 
Chapter 6, the importance of RSS beyond u + 1 is 
A cutoff valve was required, and it has been taken 
4.16.6 There is a second practical reason for taking a cutoff 
at this point. The formulae discussed above are based upon 
exponentials of attraction and deterrence factors. Many 
computers cannot calculate values greater than e230 which 
will be a value greater than ~0 99 . For this reason, the 
rank-distance factor has been chosen as a ratio, rather than 
an absolute value, as has been'the compostte attractivenes~ 
variable developed below. 
4.17 INDEXING 
4.17.1 Most general shopping models are based upon two vari-
ables; one to encompass the "attractiveness" of the shopping 
centres, and another to encompass the various costs of movement 
. I ... 
( £87) 
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from origins to s~opping centres. The attractiveness 
variable has been postulated in a variety of ways, usually 
with one variable acting as a proxy for several related 
variables that could be used to describe attractiveness. 
McCabe(lOB) maintains that attractiveness is usually related 
to size, and the proxy variable for size could be: 
(a) The annual sales volume of a store (usually the 
best measure of size,· but not always available). 
(b) The number of items carried by, the store. 
(c) Floor space. 
(d) The number of types of store in a centre. 
(e) The number of employees. 
4.17.2 Lakshamanan and Hansenl 109 ) have used floorspace data 
and Black(llO) has used retail sales. These researchers 
have assumed that as the size of a centre increases, amenity 
will increase because of the appearance of 11 major name 11 stores, 
greater variety, and possibly greater competition. McCabe(lll) 
maintains that the number of items carried by a store can safe-
ly be used as a proxy for all other non-locational variables. 
He maintains that 11 ••• the degree of uncertainty in shopping 
decisions appears to diminish as the size of the shopping cen-
tre increases, reflecting the assumed increase in the number 
of items available".(ll 2 ) 
4.17.3 It is clear that the attractiveness variable W. in the 
. J . 
RSS model cannot be simtlar to the attractiveness variable of 
the. general shopping models. There is .!!.2. powerful intuitive 
reason to assume that a "large 1' RSS will be more attractive to 
customers, as there is with a general shopping centre. 
Rather, there are likely to be a number of attractions which can 
be combined as a general· 11 attractiveness 11 index. 
(lOB) McCabe, (1974), Pp.29-32. 
(109) 
(llO) Lakshamanan. and Hansen, (1965). 
Black, (1966). 
( 11l) McCabe,. {1974). 
(112) 
Ibid., P. 29. 
. I ... 
(113) 
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4.17.3 Diagram 4C showed how a number of RSS can be located 
on such a diagram for one particular customer at a given loca-
tion and at a point in time. The locations of the RSS in this 
diagram depend upon the costs to the customer of gettin~ to the 
RSS, and their attractions in their ability to satisfy his 
hunger. 
4.17.4 On the cost side, Diagram 4C used cost of product C, 
plus AVO cost (represented as 'the distance above C). It has 
been shown above how there are costs other than AVO involved 
in selecting a particular RSS. A rank-distance factor was 
developed above as an improved deterrence measure. 
4.17.5 On the attraction side, it may be said that the hori-
zontal distance of an RSS from the vertical axis represents 
first, all factors other than the deterrence factor which 
will attract a customer to it; i.e. the "attractions" of an 
RSS discussed in 4.5, and second, the number of opportunities 
in zone j.(ll 3) A method is required of isolating these 
"all other attractions 11 factors. 
Chapter 6 is summarised below. 
The approach used in 
4.17.6 Firstly, the model is set up with all the necessary 
live data, except for the composite attraction values of each 
RSS. A value of one is inserted in the composite attraction 
variable required for each RSS, and the model is then calibrated 







To simplify any model, only one opportunity is included per zone. 
In ut c 
'values 
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4.17.7 The result of this simulation run will be an esti-
mation of the sales of each RSS based on the deterrence 
portion of the model only. This has been graphed in Diagram 
4G, where the smooth line represents the output of t~e model 
(ie. the synthesised sales), and the crosses represent the 
actual outputs of the RSS. The variations between the smooth 
line and the actual sales values may be referred to as Ej, and 
E.-= W. +e. 
J J J 
where : 
w. is the difference accounted for by the 11 attraction 11 
J . 
portion of the model, and 
e is a 
j 
and for 
rna de 1 . 
variable accounting 
deficiencies in the 
This variable will 
for random fluctuations, 
deterrence portion of the 
be equivalent to the 
11 residua1 11 values of a multiple regression analysis. 
4.17.8 RSS that are placed above the synthesised sales line 
in Diagram 4G (ie. which have positive values for£.) may be 
J 
considered more 11 attractive 11 than those which are placed below 
the synthesised sales line. 
4.17.9 The E. value for each RSS may now be subjected to 
J 
multiple regression using the various attraction factors for 
each RSS; the E. will. be the dependent variables, and the 
J 
variety of attraction factors the independent variables. 
The equation obtained from the multiple regression may be used 
for several purposes. The importance of each attraction 
(E88) 
variable in the regression upon synthesised sales may be 
assessed; to do this the model is run using attraction factors 
predicted by the regression equation, but ·with the required 
changes made to the particular independent variable under 
consideration. 
. I ... 
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4.17.10 It is possible that there still may be a divergence 
-between actual and synthesised sales of certain of the RSS 
under study. This implies that there are factors which 
affect RSS sales which have been excluded from the model 
(or rather, as independent variables in the multiple regression). 
4.18 CALIBRATION 
4.18.1 The initial run of the model will inevitably produce 
output with a large discrepancy between the actual and the 
synthesised sales of each RSS. These discrepancies will be 
caused by the varying weights of the attraction and deterrence 
variables for different study areas, and also because these 
two variables are calculated using different measures and 
methods. 
4.18.2 The objective of calibration is to minimise the differ-
ences between observed results and those predicted by the 
model for the same time period. The alpha, beta and lambda 
parameters should be chosen to optimise one or more goodness 
of fit statistics; two are discussed·below: 
4.18.3 If X .. (OBS) are a set of observations, and X .. are 
lJ lJ 
the equivalent predictions from the model, the simplest 
objective would be to minimise.the sum of squares, S. 
S =!: (X .. - X~.(OBS) )2 
ij lJ lJ 
4.18.4 
X. ( OBS). 
1 
fitted 
An indication of goodness .of fit can be given if X. and 
1 
are plotted against each other, and a straight line 
between them, such that: 
X •. = 
1 
X. (OB S) 
1 
An exact fit· would produce a 45° line, such that a
0 
= 0 
and a , · = 1 , 0 . An i n spec t i on of the c u·r v e s may . i n d i cat e t h at 
only particular values are misaligned. A linear regression 
above would also require the maximisation of the coefficient 




4.18.5 A second goodness of fit measure is chi -square, 
where: 
2 " X = L 
i 




4.18.6 Writers such as Wilson( 114 ) and Cordey-Hayes( 115 ) 
have warned against the bogus optimal fit that is obtained 
when a = 1 and B = 0 using the standard two parameter 
shopping model. 
4.18.7 Wilson(ll 6 ) recommends the use of a simple matrix of 
a and B values to assist calibrate the model. Goodness of 
fit statistics are calculated for each element of the matrix, 
and the values of a and B which give th~ best fit are chosen. 
The computation can be repeated for a finer grid around these 
values, if necessary. In Chapter 6, the model developed has 
three calibration parameters, and therefore this method of 
choosing the best value from a (three dimensional} matrix would 
be extremely wasteful of computer time. A more rapid proce-
dure known as .. golden-section search 11 has therefore been pro-
grammed into the model. This method is discussed in detail 
in Ch. 6. 
4.19 EXTERNAL INTERACTION 
4.19.1 (Ell) ensures that the system under study is closed, 
ie. that the total of all RSS sales is equal to the total of 
all RSS expenditures by customers.. It is likely however, 
that some customers in any area under study will visit RSS 
outside that area. Conversely, some of the RSS being examined 
(114 ) Wi1s·on, (1974), P. 323. 
(115) 
Cordey-Hayes, (1968), P.32. 
<
116) Wilson, (1974), P.324. 
. I ... 
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will sell to customers who originate outside the study area. 
This problem is likely to be more severe with an RSS model 
than with a normal, shopping model, because RSS customers are, 
by definition, mobile. 
4.19.2 Two methods by which the effects of external inter-
action can be minimised are:. first, to maximise the size of 
the area under study, both in terms of the number of RSS and 
the number of customers, and second, to include one or more 
11 external" zones in the model, in which data for external RSS 
and external customers is inserted. External interaction in 
the RSS model is discussed in 6.2.4. 
• J ... 
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5.1.1 Chapter 3 indicated that regulation has important 
effects upon th~ RSS, shaping both their characteristics 
and their profits. The objectives of this chapter are to 
provide an introduction to regulation and the emerging theory 
surrounding it, and then to develop a framework within which 
regulations governing the RSS may be investigated. The 
actual legislation will be examined in more detail in Part III. 
5.1.2 There are three main methods by which government can 
directly influence the private sector: taxing, spending and 
regulating. Regulation may be defined as intervention i~ 
the free market by a body in a position of responsibility 
(usually a regulatory agency). A regulatory agency is a 
" ... quasi judicial government commission established by legis-
lative act to oversee a specified economic field 11 .(ll?) 
Regulation is a means of achieving gov~rnment objectives 
directly, rather than through the use of incentives or deter-
rents. Regulatory powers may be conferred upon the depart-
ments or ministries of a government, as well as upon an inde-
pendent agency. 
5.1.3 The objective of regulation is to u ... protect and pro-
mote the public interestu(llB) by preventing certain sectors 
of the economy from earning excessive (monopoly) profits, and 
from engaging in inequatable price discrimination among cus-
tomers, commodities and places. Weidenbaum( 119 ) considers 
regulation to be a response 11 ••• to failures in the normal 
market system 11 • 
Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 
Rodee, (1967), P.553. 




5.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Q20l 
(121). 
5.2.1 The traditional or original regulatory agencies were 
established. to ".~.regulate a specific industry, with the 
related concern of promoting the wellbeing of that industry".t120 ) 
Examples of such agencies in the USA are: the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal 
Communications Commission, and the Federal Power Commission. 
These agencies originated in the realisation that " ..• legis-
latures are unable, without assistance, to apply continuous and 
expert knowledge to the complexities of a modern industrial 
economy~'.C 121 ) Such regulation is most often applied to public 
utilities, with the objective of including the full (external) 
costs and benefits of their operations. It will desire to 
avoid any resource or product markets being subject to undue 
influence by private enterprise. In certain of these markets 
(eg. energy and primary commodities), the state will have the 
strategic objectives of maintaining security and stability 
(ie. protectionist measures). 
5.2.2 The newer regulatory approach (typified by the regula-
tory efforts of th~ US Congress in recent years) follows a 
different pattern. The newer agencies are broader in the 
scope of their jurisdiction-- their focus is not limited to 
a single industry, but rather to those aspects of all industries 
that fall und~r their jurisdiction. Examples of such. agencies 
in the USA are the EnvironmentaJ Protection Agency, the EquBl 
Opportunities Employment CommissiDn, the Cons~mer Product 
Safety Co~ncil, the Federal Energy Administration, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The objectives 
of such agencies will be designed to preserve public order, the 
security of goods and persons, orderly and equitable employment, 
public health and the environment. 
. I ... 
W~idenbaum, Cl977)_, P,l2 
Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 
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"Voluntary actions to deal with such problems may place a firm 
uhder a competitive disadvantage. The specific company attempt-
ing to correct the situation would tend to bear the full costs, 
while the benefits of improvement would be widely dispersed in 
society 11 .(122 ) 
5.2.3 The impetus for {he newer regulation may be provided by 
consumer groups, environmentalorganisations, civil rights 
advocates, labour unions, and other citizens' institutions. 
Such regulation may be reinforced by the belief that many of 
society's problems today have in some degree been caused by 
business, eg. pollution, discrimination in employment, unsafe 
products, unhealthy working environment and misleading financial 
reporting. 
5.2.4 Weidenbaum( 123 ) has demarked three types of regulation. 
First, he identifies those regulations that are constant and 
ongoing controls, such as continuous price and market share 
controls. Perennial government activities in the economy such 
as taxation may be classified under this heading. The second 
area of controls are those typified by stop-go, and guidepost 
objectives. For example, price regulations may vary under 
different inflationary conditions. The third area of regula-
tions are those that are evolving, and consist of tentative con-
trols. In the USA, many environmental and employment regula-
tions fall under this heading. 
5.2.5 Note that the government not only has legal power to set 
up regulations, but is also a large buyer of goods and services 
in the private sector. By means of its monopsonist power, it 
is able to impose a variety of constraints upon business. 
Typically, it may tend to bear more of the risks normally borne 
by a seller (eg. R.&D.) and may tend to bear increasing responsi-
bility for the supplier~ internal operations (eg. wages paid, 
minorities employed, imports}. 
j ••• 
(~22) . ' 
WeJ.denb.awn, (1977)_, P, 16. 
(123libid., P, 20 •. 
11 0 
5.2.6 Weidenbaum( 124 ) also identifies three different patterns 
of reactions by businesses to government regulations. (These 
reactions are not necessarily related to the classes of regula~ 
tion described above}. They are first, passive reactions by 
businesses, when they comply with government controls. Secondly, 
businesses may anticipate regulations, and will orient them-
selves to be in the most advantageous position possible at the 
time the regulations are promulgated. Thirdly, businesses may 
play an active role in the development and enactment of regula-
tion. This will be done by participati~n in the political 
processes evolving regul-ation. 
5.2.7 Some of the difficulties involved in, and problems that 
have emerged from regulating will now be discussed. The 
essential problem is that the objectives of any regulation are 
·not easy to evolve and define, and the results, which are often 
unpredictable, are difficult, if not impossible to measure, 
especially when externalities are included. Rodee( 125 ) main-
tains that the " ... legislation w~ich gives policy direction to 
an agency is usually vague, and a commission enjoys a great deal 
of freedom in establishing its goals, and particularly in imple-
menting specific objectives 11 • Issues outside the agency's 
jurisdiction may tend to be ignored. "The basic mission of 
industry is to provide goods and services to the public". (126 ) 
Issues such as productivity, economic growth, employment, costs 
to the consumer, and inflationary aspects may nat be given their 
deserved weighting in the deter~ination of regulations. 
5.2.8 
(a) 
Typical problems are: 
The general and loose objective of "protection and pro-
motion of the public interest" is often (if not always) 
subject to pressures from groups with differing (special) 
interests. There is often a tendency, particularly 
among the traditional regulatory agencies, for the public 
or consumer interest to be relegated as the agency focuses 
on the needs and concerns of the industry that it is 
. I 
{.1
24 }. Ibid, P.l67, 
(1
251 Rodee, (l9671, P,555, 
Cl261 Weidenbaum~ (1977) , P .15. 
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r e g u 1 at i n g . A .man i f e s tat i on o f the pro b 1 em i s that 
personnel may switch between the agency and the 
industry. 
The opposite problem occurs with the newer regulatory 
agencies. Rather than too much concern for any in-
dustry, their broader scope can result in apathy as to 
the effect of a particular policy on a single industry. 
Normally, a single industry does not tend to dominate 
s~ch an agency; rather, the most potent influences come 
from groups with specific interests such as environmental 
pollution~ racial discrimination and product hazards. 
(b) The piecemeal evolution of many regulatory agencies and 
laws has resulted in inconsistencies in their policies 
and objectives. Examples of conflic~ing goals are 
motor car fuel economies versus exhaust emission controls; 
and air pollution versus oil conservation.by conversion 
to coal on power plants. 
(c) The achievements, or performance of an agency and its 
staff are difficult to appraise. The vague objectives 
that may be given to an agency, and the unquantified 
external effects of its actions may tend to compound 
this problem. 
(d) Weidenbauml127 ) identifies an 11 announcement effect 11 in 
which fears or rumours of new controls in the future 
may dampen companies' investment or production plans. 
(e) Difficulties may exist in the interpretation of regula-
tions. Not only may there be conflicts in regulatory 
objectives (mentioned above), but the regulations them-
selves may be equivocal, or written in the esoteric 
jargon of specialist~. Weidenbaum( 128 ) provides some 
humorous examples, and also mentions how the small busi-
nesses particularly may have difficulty affording the time 
and expertise to comply with certain regulati.ons. There 
is generally an increasing percentage of personnel em-
ployed by business who must have a detailed knowledge of 
regulation in their field. 
Ibid' r P. 71 
. (128)_ Ibid ,, P.62-65. 




(f) Regulatory directives will tend to move very slowly, 
especially in those cases where litigation is involved, 
or where large resultant losses may be incurred by one 
particular group. There is a ..... disincentive to 
change once a regulatory pattern has been 
established 11 .C129 l 
(g} Regulation may have .unintended allocatory effects: 
" •.. fotced attention to the influence which the 
regulatory powers of the state could have on the 
dis~r!but!on ofcY381th as well as on allocative 
eff1ctenc1es". ) . 
" ... unintended and indirect consequences (of 
regulation} may have more economic significance than 
the desired direct ones 11 .(131) . 
J.Q. Wilson uses the example of ICC rates.t 1j 2 ) 
(h} Cramton(lJJ) argues that there will be a tendency 
for regulatory agencies to implement the passive 
functions of protectionism more effectively t~an 
the affirmative functions of planning, development 
and coordination. He maintains that an independent 
agency will tend to be isolated from the sources of 
political power, and because it has to evolve working 
arrangements with those it regulates, in addition to 
the v a r i o u s groups w i th w hi c h i t fun c t i on s (go v e r n_m en t , 
from whom it obtains i~s finance,· industry pressure 
groups and consumers, for example) it will respond only 
to urgent pressures, and will steer clear of"chan~e~ 
(i} Cramton also mentions that competition from exempt 
areas may limit the effectiveness of regulation. 
He feels that certain regulations may have " ... little 
or no economic significance 11 , and suggests that along 
w i t h 11 m a r k e t fa il u r e " t he r e may a 1 s o be " g ov e r n me n t 
failure 11 • 
G. Wilson, (1964)i P.l70. 
. I ... 
r 
(1
30l Peltzman, (1976}, P.211. 
{l31 ) Caves, (1964). 
(132) 
J.Q. Wilson, (1971), P.45. 
(133) Cramton, (1964), P.189. 
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( j) Certain outsid~rs may gain new controls over the indus-
; . (134) 
try as a result of regulation. 
(k) Smaller firms are likely to become more influential 
once an industry is regulated. ( 135 ) 
5.3 THE COSTS OF REGULATION 
5.3.1 In theory, the final cost of regulation is the net 
present value of the summated costs and benefits of all 
changes that result from that regulation, both upon the regu-
lated institution, and throughout the rest of the economy. 
It is also essential to consider the opportunity costs of 
regulation, ie. would the money spent on implementing one type 
of regulatory policy have had an improved cost-benefit ratio 
if channelled into other policies? 
5.3.2 The costs of regulation are felt in three areas: 
(a) The government (and thus the taxpayer). The costs 
of running the regulatory agencies are perhaps the 
clearest and most objective of the three. (Most agencies 
have a budget, and a clearly defined staff). 
(b) Costs to the regulated businesses in complying with 
; regulations. 
(i) Their administrative·costs in interpreting regula-
tions and in supplying information to the government. 
WeidenbaumL 136 ) cites cases of substantial increases 
in staff required by businesses to cope with this 
function. Increased training will be required, and 
decreased time will be available from the staff for 
production. 
(134}_ . 
St1.gler, (1971), P. 7 
(l3SL Ibid. 
(136) . . 
· We1.denhaum, (1977)., Ch.l4 • 
.. " ... - .. ... ... .... ......... 
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(ii) The businesses will often have to make certain 
c~anges to their operations in compliance with 
regulations. Areas such as work procedures and 
processes, capital employed, personnel employed, 
marketing methods and markets served may be involved, 
for example. Substantial direct costs can result 
from these changes. Weidenbaum( 137 ) notes that an 
increasing share of investment is being devoted to 
complying with regu1ations rather than increasing 
output. 
Note that sometimes these regulatory changes will be 
of benefit to the business itself. For example, 
government control upon certain operations in an 
industry may mea~ reduced competition, or greater 
stability in prices or factors of production. 
(iii)A business may suffer from decreased sales indirect-
ly caused by regulation. If a regulatory agency 
examines some aspect of an industry's operations, 
there may be a consumer 'wariness' or 'scare'. 
This will apply particularly when a product affect-
ing consumer well-being comes under scrutiny (.eg. 
food, drugs). 
(c} Regulation will impose costs upon the consumer in terms 
of: 
(i) Increased prices. 
(ii)The non-availability of products as and when they 
demand (as indicated in the free market). 
5.3.3 Posner( 138 } has examined the social costs of regulation 
(and of monopoly). Obtaining a monopoly is a competitive 
activity, so should a regulator set a price which will ensure 
monopoly profits (rents), these rents will be bid away in the 
.form of nonprice competition between the regulated firms. 
. I ... 
(l37l Weideftha,uml (1977) 1 P,l93. 
(138) ' 
- Posner 1 (1975)., 
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Barriers would have to be set against new entrants to the 
industry, who would also wish to compete away the rents. 
In terms of Diagram 5A, the equilibrium price for a competi-
. tive industry is shown as P, and the regulated price as PR. 
DIAGRAM 5A. Price Regulation 
Rand 
PR 1------*---~--------- MCR=ACR 
~--=----+~~------~-----------------MC:AC p 
D' 
L---------~--~--------------------------~~antity 0 Q 
5.3.4 When the market price rises to PR' consumers who 
continue to purchase the product will suffer a loss L. 
L is the rent the producers initially gain from the higher 
price. Those consumers who no longer buy the product suffer 
a loss M, regarded by Posner as a "deadweight loss" or a 
social cost. This loss M, however, underestimates the so~ial 
cost of monopoly, because the existence of the rent L will 
attract resources into efforts to obtain it -- these resources 
seeking L are an additi~nal social cost. The result will be 
a transformation of the rent into higher costs for the indus-
try as each firm's costs shift from AC to ACR. 
, I ... 
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5.3.5 If nonprice competition was somehow inhibited at 
zero cost, the r.ent L would still transform into a social 
cost in the long term, because the rent would attract resources 
into a position of being able to obtain it in the first place. 
·(Note that only some of these resources would be successful). 
Usually of course, the prohibition of nonprice competition 
will also involve social costs. Posner explains that these 
costs may be 11 10W 11 if heavy monetary penalties (ie. transfer 
payments) are combined with ~~~ .• modest resources devoted to 
apprehending and convicting offenders ... 
5.3.6 Kreuger( 139 ) also discusses the social costs of rent 
·seeking. She explains that the costs firms originally incur 
(139} 
in seeking to obtain a monopoly rent will be of two kinds: 
direct (trips to the capital city, location in government 
approved areas etc.), and bribery (outright bribery, hiring 
of officials or their relatives, etc.). Both these costs 
are social costs. Bribery has been treated as a transfer 
payment, but it must be remembered that bribery will draw 
resources into the activity of being an official who might 
receive bribes. 
5.3.7 Posner explains that the social costs in Diagram 5A 
might be reduced if, as a result of the expenditures on rent 
seeking, some socially valuable by-product were obtained 
(eg.: safety, customer service). In this case, the demand 
for the product would increase from D to o•, and social wel-
fare equal to N is generated. 
5.3.8 In summary, the imposition of an above equilibrium 
price will result in the following costs: 
(a} To consumers, the increased cost of product L plus 
a deadweight loss M. Another cost of regulation which 
is important in the case of RSS is the cost of the 
extra distances that must be travelled by certain 
customers because there are fewer RSS than in an 
unregulated market. (See Ch. 8). . I ... 
Kreuger, (1974)_. 
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(b) To producers, a transfer gain L in the short run, 
which in the long run would be offs~t by competition 
to gain a· larger share of L (or by new entrants to. 
the industry, if there are no barriers). 
(c) To the public a social loss equal to L will result 
from resources seeking L, by existing and ~otential 
firms. Howevei, it is maintained that the social 
loss will not necessarily be equal to L. The situation 
is in effect a gamble, and there is no reason to expect 
the seeking resources to be equal to the prize. In 
addition, the situation described is a competitive one, 
and there is unlikely to be collusion. 
The deadweight loss M is a social loss, whereas (the 
possible) N is a social gain. Regulatory costs 
incurred by the. government (G) will be a social cost, 
as will Kreuger's bribery seeking costs B. (Band 
G are not shown in the diagram). Social costs are 
thus: 
L + M + G + B - N 
A BRiff EXAMINATION OF THE EMERGING THEORIES OF REGULATION 
"The central tasks of the theory(s) of economic regulation 
are to explain who will receive the benefits or burdens of 
regulation, what form regulation will take, and the ~ffects 
of regulation upon the allocation of resources".(l40J 
5.4 MARGINAL APPROACH 
(140) 
(141) 
5.4.1 Remarkably little work had been done on regulation up 
to the early 1960's, possibly because it had not been 
recognised as an area with potent economic and political 
consequences. Most work that had been done concentrated 
upon defining the "general 11 or "public 11 interest, and the 
. (141) 
allocation of government expenditure to serve such interest. 
. I 
Stigler, (1971), P.3. 
Pen, (1962), Pp.l90-193. 
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5.4.2 An elementary marginal approach had been attempted, 
but with little success. (142 ) The rule that the last dollar 
spent by the state must provide the same marginal benefits as 
it would have provided had it been spent by the private sector 
is impossibly difficult to tie to reality. Such a rule im-
plies that the last dollar spent in each government department 
provides an identical amount of 11 Social good 11 , and that this· 
dollar is equal to the social benefits of the last dollar spent 
by each private entity. The rule may also be expressed as 
follows: the last dollar a private citizen is taxed should, 
directly and indirectly, provide the same benefit as it would 
if he spent it himself. The major problem with this rule is 
that the knowledge required to implement it does not exist. 
5.5 REGULATION IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: EXTERNALITIES 
5.5.1 Pigou( 143 ) has been credited with the original work 
in this area.· He suggested that: 
11 In any industry where there is reason to believe 
that the free play of self interest will cause an 
amount of resources to be invested different from 
the amount that is required in the best interest of 
the national dividend, th~l~ is a prima facie case 
for public intervention 11 .t 4) 
5.5.2 He defined marginal private net product (MPNP) and 
marginal social net product ~MSNP) as the private and 
social changes to production from the employment of the 
marginal resource, and explained how MPNPs between industries 
will equalise, but MSNP may diverge. He suggested that ( 1 4 5 ) 
w h e n M P N P a n d t~ S N P d i v e r g e .. w h e n c o m p e t i t i o n r u 1 e s " , o r w h e n 
a monopoly exists, it is theoretically possible to correct the 
situation through ~he use of a tax or subsidy, or by the 
regulation of price or output. He was advanced in his 
thinking in suggesting that: 
. I 
(142) . 
E. Sax, d~scussed by PEN~ ibid, P.194. 
(143 ) Pigou, (1932) . 
(144> Ib-~·d. 
" J P.331. 
(145 ) Ibid, P.381. 
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" ... we cannot expect that any public authority will 
attain, or even wholeheartedly seek, that ideal. 
Such authorities are liable to ig~orance, ~o sec~ional ( 146 p r e s s u r e , an d to p e r s on a 1 co r r u p t 1 on by p r1 v a t e 1 n t e r e s t 11 • 
5.5.3 Coase( 147 l argues that Pigou's approach to the correction 
of social costs through direct taxation or regulation devices 
will not necessarily provide the optimal result. He explains 
how total social product is ~ikely to be maximised through a 
process of bargaining between the affecting and affected parties. 
This bargaining process will result in an optimal allocation of 
resources, whether a liability for damages exists or not. 
However, Cease's argument assumes perfect knowledge, costless 
adjustments and no income effects. His theorem is also dis-
credited by the problem of 11 free riders 11 in a bargaining pro-
cess (it may be profitable for a minority t.o hold out, in the 
face of agreement by the majority), and also by the problem of 
strategic behaviour among bargainers (there is no guarantee of 
an agreement, especially if the number of bargainers is small; 
because individuals may feel they can "do better 11 ). 
5.5.4 He says it is important to focus upon the total social 
products yielded by different arrangements, and that Pigou's 
11 
••• comparison of private and social products is neither here 
or there 11 • (l 4B) 
5.5.5 In summary, he suggests that: 
11 Th e a i m of s u c h reg u 1 at i on s s h o u 1 d not be to e 1 i m i nate 
(smoke pollution)· but rather to secure the optimum 
amount of .(smoke pollution), this being the amQ.~B5) 
which will optimise the value of production 11 • L 
. I ... 
'
1461 
Ibid., p. 332. 
(l471coase, (1960}. 
(l 481 Tbid. 








5.5.6 Note that Coase suggested that the 11 Value of productionu 
should be maximised. Regulations which take only money measured 
effects into·account may produce the results desired by Coase in 
his article, but they will ignore social costs and effect~; an 
omission which will considerably change the desirable degree of 
regulation in certain circumstances. 
5.5.7 In reality therefore, the greatest uncorrected social 
costs will be found where the affected persons are not each 
individually incurring substantial social ~osts; where the costs 
are of a social rather than monetary nature~ and where these 
individuals are not cohesively represented. This is because 
the affected individuals will have little incentive or ability 
to pursue the socially required 11 Corrections''. (This provides 
the background to the approach used by Stigler in 5.8). 
5.5.8 Much of the work of the traditional regulatory agencies 
(see 5.2} is assumed to involve "correction" of the regulated 
industry~s operations to allow for external costs and benefits. 
The "public interest 11 theory maintains that this is why, and 
how regulation operates. Bonbright maintains that "public 
utility services are designed to be sold at cost, or at cost 
plus a fair profit".C150 } His theory is based upon two assump-
tions: first, that free market operations tend to operate 
inefficiently (or inequitably) and may be abused by those groups 
with market power; and second, that the cost of government regu-
lation is low. These assumpti·ons allow the proponents of ·this 
theoryl 151 } to argue that it is logical for the government to 
interfere wherever the free market is operating imperfectly. 
Stigler(152 } explains how the proponents of this view would 
explain regulations which injure the public (eg. American oil 
import quotas} as costs of some social goal (here national 
defence). 
. I 
J3?nbright, (19611, P.23. 
Bonbright, (1961); Davis, (1958); Friendly, (1962). 
Stigler, (1971), P. 3. 
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5.5.9 ( 153) Posner refutes these two assumptions: 11 ••• regu-
lation is not positively correlated with the presence of 
external economies or diseconomies or with monopolistic market 
structure". He also maintains( 154 ) that the ~osts of regula-
tion are "high 11 • 
5.5.10 Demsetz(155 l suggests that "the proper issue for anti-
trust then, is not the degree to which a market descriptively 
diverges from perfect competition, but the degree to which it 
diverges in either direction from that intensity of competition 
which takes account of the real social costs of competing. 
I 
No one has yet successfully tackled this problem ... " (Since 
Demsetz made this statement, ·M.K. Perry(156 ) has developed a 
model to examine this problem under somewhat limiting assump-
tions). 
Demsetz makes two contributions in suggesting first, that con-
centration in a product market need not be taken as evidence of 
collusion, and second, that 11 ••• monopolisation through govern-
ment protection is likely to be as d~fficult to defend 
intellectually as it is to attack politically 11 • 
5.5.11 Posner(157 ) explains how the existence of an internal 
subsidy (see 5.9) is an embarrassment to the proponents of the 
pub 1 i c interest theory . . "The i n tern a 1 s u b s i dy b r i n g s about 
results unthinkable in a competitive market". 
5.5.12 A modified view of the public interest theory(lSB) is 
that regulation has failed, not' for any of ·the above reasons, 
but because of mismanagement. However, Posner(159 ) maintains 
that many ~ocially undesirable results of regulation are often 
desired by certain groups:. He also asserts that there is 
little evidence of regulatory mismanagement, nor reasons why 
there should be any such inefficiency. 
(153lposner, (1974}, P.336. 
(154)' 
S,upra, P. 339. 
(155) 
(156) 
Demsetz, (1976) • 
Perry, (1978).. 
(157) 
Posner, (1971) , P. 27. 
(158) 
Herring, (1936) . 
(1591 
Posner, (19741, P.337. 
' . / ... 
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5.5.13 The last serious problem with the public interest 
theory identified by Posner(160 ) is the lack of a ~linkage 
or mechanism by which a perception of the public interest is 
translated into legislative action~ .. He suggests two ways 
around this problem. First, one can ~emphasise the moral 
differences between private and political action~, and second 
one can ~observe the potentiality for collusion among politicians.~~ 
Powerful politicians may be able to use their power to obtain 
pecuniary income~ or to ~impose their ·conception of the public 
interest (which might differ from the conception held by the 
e 1 ectora te ).11 
5.6 FAIR RATE OF RETURN 
5.6.1 Averch and JohnsonL161 } discuss the situation in which 
regulation is designed to give a firm a 11 fair rate of return 11 , 
based·on the value of its capital employed. Under these cir-
cumstances, the cost of capital to the regulated firm can no 
longer be equal to the market cost of capital. 11 For each 
additional unit of capital input, the firm is permitted to 
earn a profit (equal to the difference between the market cost 
of capital and the rate of return allowed by the regulatory 
agency) that it would otherwise have to forgo 11 • In other 
words, the firm will maximise its profits by using a greater 
amount of capital in its resource mix. 11 The effect of regu-
lation is to force the firm to ~xpand output (from its unregu-
lated output)~·· but output does not ~xpan~ to ... (the socially 
desirable level} ~ .. because a portion of what would otherwise 
be profit is absorbed by ... (increased social) costs••.L162 ) 
5.6.2 If the regulator bases the 11 fair rate of return 11 on the 
capital employed in all markets together, rather than each 
separately, the firm may have the i~centive to enter new markets 
. I .... 
(160) Ibid, p 0 340. 
(161). 
Ayerch and Johnson, (1962) •. 
(162) Supra, P.1o57. 
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in which the cost of doing so exceeds potential revenues. 
It will do this in order to inflate its rate base, and so 
allow it to increase total profits. Because the firm can 
Dp~rate at a long run loss in such markets, it may drive out 
competitors and establish new monopolies. 
5.6.3- This view is developed by Westfield(163 } who examined 
the market for capital goods, and found that in certain cir-
cumstances it may be in the interests of a regulated industry 
to pay higher prices for plant and equipment than in the 
absence of regulation, and that these higher prices need not 
harm that industry. 
5.7 EMPTY MOTIONS 
(_163} 
(l64) 
5.7.1 Writers such as C. Lindblom( 164 ) and J.W. Wilson( 165 ) 
believe that there is little rationality in much government 
action. Lindblom believes that the effects of budget items 
on a country's welfare are too complex for objective assess-
ment, demanding "intellectual capacities and knowledge beyond 
our reach 11 • The politicians simply go through their motions, 
and "common ideology, common prejudice or even common ignorance" 
are decisive. 
5.7.2 J.Q. Wilson, whose work was more specifically applied 
to regulation, may be considered as initiating the random 
behaviour school of thought. He proposed that whereas an 
"invisible hand 11 guides the market, a 11 dead hand 11 is involved 
with regulation. He maintains that most regulatory agencies 
do not have clear and previously agreed to standards against 
which the regulators and the regulated may operate, and that 
there is therefore a ... "fear of capricious government action". 
.. I ... 
Westfield, (1965}. 




He maintains that the regulatory tasks ..... probably could not 
be performed well even in theory, and amid the practical real-
ities of confused ends and ambiguous standards they are, through 
the· fault of no one in particular, performed abominably ... 
He maintains that agencies will ..... go to some pains to avoid 
developing ... rules... This lack of rules in fact provides 
the agencies with arbitiary power for more specific cases. 
5.8 THE INTEREST GROUP, CAPTURE, OR DEMAND AND SUPPLY THEORIES 
5.8.1 There are several versions of the interest group or 
capture theories of regulation, which are defined by Posner(166 ) 
as when ..... regulation is supplied in response to the demands 
of interest groups struggling amongst themselves to maximise 
the incomes of their members 11 • Two lesser known theories will 
be briefly discussed, and then G.J. Stigler•s important 1 Theory 
of Economic Regulation• ~ 167 ) Note that the demand by certain 
sectors of society for governmental favours is not a new 
activity.( 168 ) . 
5.8.2 The first of these capture theories is attributable, 
according to Posnerl169 ) to 11 Marxists and Ralph Nader type 
muckrakers... It is suggested that J.K. Galbraith{l?O) would 
be ~imilarly classified by Posner. The theory maintains that 
because 11 big business .. and the 11 capitalists 11 control the insti-
tutions of our society, they al~o control regulation. How-
ever, the existence of much regulation designed to serve the 
interests of small groups (eg. in the USA: union labour, 
truckers and barbers) immediately discredits this theory. 
U66) 
. -Posner, (1974)., P.336. 
(~67). . 
St~gler, (1971). 
(l6SLPEN, (1962), P.l96. 
(169) 






5.8.3 A second version of the capture theory, attributable to 




importance of interest groups in publfc policy 
A school of thoughtC173 ) maintains that over time, 
agencies may tend to be dominated by the indus-
tries regulated. Unfortunately, the theory does not go as far 
as explaining how or why only certain agencies will be dominated 
by only certain groups. Empirical evidence may be found to 
both prove and disprove the theory.C 174 ) 
5.8.4 Stiglerl175 ) proposed a more formal theory in which 
regulation is sought, rather than imposed (and therefore that 
. regulation is designed for the benefit of the seeking group) . 
. Various groups will seek the following from the state: 
(a} a direct subsidy of money; 
(b) limits on new entrants to the industry; 
(c) suppression of substitutes and encouragement of com-
plements to the industry; 
(d) price controls. 
The allocation of these benefits will be governed by laws of 
supply and demand. 
5.8.5 The absolute size of the costs and benefits of some 
proposed regulation, according to Stigler, is not the prime 
factor determining whether it will be implemented or not 
(although it would be in a market process). Instead, the 
characteristics of the political process a~e important in 
initiating regulation. The voters will employ political repre-
sentatives who are given wide discretion to make decisions that 
would otherwise require the simultaneous and universal approval 
of all voters. Individual voters will not have access to 
these representatives in proportion to their interest on every 
issue the representatives handle. There will be information 
(.171) 
Bentley, (1908) .• 
(l72) 
- Truman, (1951L 
(173) .. 
See Posner, (1974}_, P.341 for discussion. 
(.1741 
Posner, (1974)_, P.342. 
(1751. 




costs in familiarising with specific policy proposals, and 
voters will involve themselves in accordance with potential 
costs and benefits to them. A group which seeks access to 
.power held by political representatives must therefore be 
prepared to: 
(a) Incur information costs. 
(b) Provide votes and resources desired by the politicians. 
5.8.6 Stigler has indirectly used the theory of cartels to 
build a theory of the demand and supply of regulation. (See 
6. 1.3). The demand for regulation will be greater in indus-
tries in which private cartelisation is infeasible, usually 
when a large number of participants would mean that the c~sts 
of organising and policing a cartel would be very high. 
" ••. it may be cheaper'for large number industries to obtain 
public regulation than to cartelise privately". ( 176 ) 
5.8.7 Such large number industries will also have a greater 
voting power, and therefore a greater expression of demand to 
the politicians. There will be a point however, where addi-
tions to the size of the group ~ill again decrease the demand 
for regulation, because the large numbers will cause less 
coherence in the group, and will mean that the benefits of 
regulation have. to be dissipated among a large number of mem-
bers (although of course, the costs per member will be lower}. 
5.8.8 Other factors tending to increase the demand for regu-
lation by a group will be a low elasticity of demand for the 
industry•s product, and high costs of entry into the industry. 
(See Migue, 5.10}. 
5.8.9 The higher the costs of obtaining information concerning 
regulatory effects, the higher the costs of organising a cohe-
sive group, the higher the costs of votes and resources required 
by the politicians, and the higher the opposition from adversely 
affected grou~s, the lower will be the demand for regulation. 
. I ... 
(176) 
. Posner, (19741, P.346. 
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5.8.10 Migue(lll) summarises the theory as follows: " ... given 
the time and money costs inherent in all political action, small 
groups of individuals with (large) concentrated benefits will 
invest more in political activities than large groups with 
diffused interests". 
5.8.11 Peltzman(llB) has developed a formal model based on 
Stigler's work. He maintains that " .•• direct political 
support -- ' votes' -- is the object sought directly by the 
regulator". An important principle he develops is that 
" .•. the costs of using the political process limit not only 
the size of the dominant group but also their gains••. The 
rational regulator will develop a structure of costs and bene-
fits that maximises his political returns. 
5.8.12 Hirshlafer( 179 ) argues that wealth maximisation, and 
not simply vote maximisation will be the goal of the regulators. 
This is because the regulators themselves are an interest group, 
and vote maximisation will be ~nly part of their ultimate aim. 
An additional reason is that the regulator, and the vote-seeking 
politician are not necessarily one and the same body. 
5.9. TAXATION BY REGULATION 
5.9.1 Posner(lBO) acknowledges the value of the two prime 
theories of regulation (the 11 Ca.pture 11 , and 11 public interest" 
theories) in his article, but maintains that neither view ex-
plains 11 ••• the deliberate and continued provision of many ser-
vices at lower rates and in larger quantities than would be 
offered in an unregulated competitive market 11 • He maintains 
that this phenomen~n can only be explained if it is admitted 
that 11 ••• one of the functions of regulation is to perform 





) Pe1tzman, (1976). 
(
179
) Hirsch1afer, (1976). 
(180) 
Posner, (1971) , P. 22. 
. I ... 
--~ .. ~ 
(181). 
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taxing or financial branch of government 11 • The regulator will 
force certain firms to supply a service that a free and unregu- ' 
lated market would not supply, or would supply in reduced 
quantities. It will do this either to transfer wealth from 
one group to another, or because a politically dominant element 
of the state wishes to provide that particular product or 
service. The basic methanism used is the internal subsidy, 
in which a firm provides a service below its real cost, the 
deficit being made up by certain customers of the firm who pay 
higher prices than they would otherwise. Were it not for the 
power of the state, acting through the regulatory agency to 
control entry, the system would not be viable, because otherwise 
new firms would enter into those areas where price was held 
artificially high, and the pure profits generated there would 
be competed away (and thus the original firms would not be able 
to subsidise the required markets}. 
5.9.2 Posner notes that many r~gulated industries provide 
services rather than commodities. This is because subsidised 
. goods (rather than services) being transferrable, will tend to 
be sold on the free market. 
5.9.3 He also notes that many regulated industries are important 
to the economic 11 infrastructure 11 • A programme of internal 
subsidies need not bring about a larger total output than 
otherwise. 
11 
••• it would appear that the primary effect of such a 
programme is not to increase the amount of transporta-
tion, communication or power produced but rather to 
extend the service to classes of customers and geographi-
cal areas that might not be served in a free market 11 • 
" .•. internal subsidies are frequently designed tore-
?istribute we?.lt~ 8 f~ther than to correct imperfections. 1n the market .t 1 
. J ... 
Po.sner, (1971), P.40, P.41. 
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5.9.4 There are certain advantages that the internal subsidy 
may have as a method of public finance. It may save the 
administr~tive expense involved in cash transfers, and it may 
enable the adoption of simpler rate structures. In addition, 
by shifting taxing power from the central government to a re-
gulatory body, there may be substantial savings of government/ 
legislative resources. This is especially so where the regu-
lated industry requires expert knowledge, and frequent review. 
Yet another advantage is that whereas taxes tend to disturb 
future expectations of the business and consumer sectors, the 
imposition of internal subsidies may be less unsettling. 
Lastly, there are questions of "justice" involved, in that 
customers in the same industry will bear the cost of a subsidy, 
rather than distributing the cost of a subsidy onto the tax-
Cl82l 
(183). 
paying public at large. 
5.9.5 Objections have been raised to the use of regulation 
as a public finance device. Internal subsidies tend to be 
arbitrary and inequitable, and also they distort the efficient 
allocation of resources. (It does this not only by forcing 
higher prices in some markets, and lower in others, but also 
through raising barriers to entry). However, 11 ••• there are 
no a priori grounds for assuming that ... internal subsidy 
programmes imposed by regulatory agencies produce worse mis-
allocations than income or other taxes 11 ,( 182 ) Determination 
of the incidence of internal subsidies is complex, and there-
fore 11 If one is to oppose internal subsidies on equity grounds, 
it must be as part of a broader objection to the redistribu-
tive policies of the state".(183 ) 
5.9.6 Certain problems arise in using internal subsidies as 
a public finance device. They may be difficult to enforce, 
oecause a firm providing an unremunerative service may reduce 
the quality of that ser~ice to decrease its costs, and to 
deceptively indicate that a decrease in demand has occurred. 
. I ... 
Posner, (19.71)., P. 42. 
Supra, P. 43. 
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5.9.7 The size and effects of internal subsidies are not 
highly visible~ and the cost of getting this information is 
high. This means that certain effective political groups 
may be able to use internal subsidies without the public 
knowing about it. 
5.9.8 Another problem ~ith internal subsidies is that there 
are no clear cut, previously set standards to use to decide 
on the allocation of costs and benefits. 
5.9.9 Lastly, internal subsidies require a sufficiently 
large demand to enable regulated firms to withstand the burden 
of the subsidy. Where there is a strong private demand 
regulation may be used; but not in areas like defence and 
education. 
5.10 ELASTICITIES OF FACTORS 
5.10.1 As a result of his dissatisfaction with Buchanan and 
Tullock's article, (lB 4) in which they maintain that firms 
requiring externality control will prefer direct (quota) 
controls to penalty taxes or charges, Migue( 185 ) has intro-
duced two new explicit determinants of regulation into the 
capture theories. These are the elasticities of the fact6rs· 
used by an industry(lBG) and the cohesive political power of 
the consumers of that industry. He maintains that regulation 
can be designed for the benefits of producers, consumers, or 
both. 
5.10.2 If the supply of any resource input to an industry is 
price inelastic, the resource owners·will be able to obtain a 
large portion of any government subsidy granted to its output. 
. I 
(184).. 
Buchanan and Tullock, (1975). 
Cl85l Migue, (1977). 
U86) 
Note that Stigler mentioned elasticities in his 1971 article. 
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However, if resources are in price elastic supply, any subsidy 
~ill be dissipated among new resources entering the industry. 
Resources in elastic supply will, therefore, prefer barriers 
to entry and controls on output of the industry, rather than 
subsidies. 
5. 10.3 Citizens are individually both consumers of a broad 
range of goods and services produced by the economy, and at 
the same time suppliers of specific factors of production to 
specific industries. Therefore the benefits of regulation 
upon an industry are more likely to affect the owners of the 
factors in that industry, than consumers generally. "As a 
·result, the benefits of government intervention should generally 
appear to voter-producers as more concentrated than the costs 
to voter-consumers 11 • (lB?) 
5. 10.4 Consumers generally will prefer subsidies to barriers 
in any industry, because if they are powerful enough, they will 
be able to direct some of the subsidy to themselves. It can 
thus be seen how consumers, under certain conditions, will 
demand regulation for an industry. (Barriers to entry in an 
industry are therefore only likely to be raised where consumers 
are not powerful enough as a group, and where the factors used 
by an industry are in elastic supply). 
5.10.5 Migue also concludes that for a regulated industry, the 
more price elastic are its input factors, the more protected, 
and therefore underdeveloped it will be; the more price inelastic· 
are its input factors, the more subsidised and overdeveloped it 
will be. 
. I ... 
(187) . 
· M~gue, (1977), P.215. 
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5.11 CAPITAL STOCK THEORY 
5.11.1 Landes and Posner(lBB) explain that the US courts 
generally operate by producing extremely narrow and implicit 
resolutions to disputes. Broad rules require a string of 
judicial decisions for their creation. A series of these 
related precedents may crystallise a rule having almost the 
same force as a statutory r4le. They treat the body of . 
legal precedents as "a capital stock that yields a flow of 
information services which depreciates over time as new con-
ditions arise that were not foreseen by the framers of the 
existing precedents 11 • (lB9) A theory of capital stock, 
investment and depreciation rates is developed. 
5.11.2 This method has not yet specifically been applied to 
regulation, and it still. needs considerable development.( 190 ) 
5.12 DIRECT INFORMATION THEORY 
(.188)_ 
5.12.1 P. Nelson( 191 ) develops a theory of a "political 
market" containing politicians, voters and political goods, 
and he discusses the role of direct information in advertis-
ing by politicians. He maintains that the "track record" 
of political candidates gives an indication of their credi-
bility in the eyes of voters, and candidates who make pro-
mises inconsistent with their records run the risk of losing 
votes. It therefore follows that·most messages to the public 
are likely to be true. The opponents of candidates who are 
inconsistent or who lie will have an incentive to enlighten 
the public. ( 192 ) Nelson explains how advertisements will 
be most heavily distributed among voters who are most likely 
to vote for the candidates if they knew his position. 




Supra., P .. 292. 
(1911 Nelson, (1976}. 
(192) 
Tullock originally developed this idea in his 1967 book, Pp.l41-143. 
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5.12.2 Voters take·a passive role in the acquisition of 
information. A critical variable determining voter 
behaviour is the character of the group from which he re-
ceives his political information. Groups will be easier to 
reach, and will be more homogeneous as population density 
increases. The greater the population density, for example, 
the more likely are minorities to be informed about their 
minority interests. 
5.12.3 Nelson also explains why a minority will try to hide 
its gains from a majority, by making it hard for the majority 
to get information concerning those gains. His article 
implies the following, as far as regul~tory behaviour is 
concerned: 
(a) that politicians who are able to effectively direct 
information to a concentrated group of voters are 
more likely to be elected by those voters; 
(b) the more cohesive, and the larger (up to a limit) 
the group of voters, the more likely their demands 
will be attended to; 
(c) should such a group impose costs (regulations) upon 
the majority, they will have an incentive to hide 
those costs from the majority. 
5.13 MAXIMISING WELL-BEING 
Cl93t 
5.13. 1 Chant and Achesonl 193 ) have proposed that the regu-
lators will maximise their own well-being. There are several 
problems (5.2) ihat often crop up with regulation (such as 
vagu~ness of objectives, difficulties in interpretation of 
regulations, diffi~ulties in obtaining adequate information 
with which to work, and the problems in measuring the effects 
of regulations) that will give the regulatory agency consider-
able freedom of operation. In spite of this "leeway'', the 
. I ... 
Chant and Acheson, (1972).. 
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regulator has, there is no reason to expect it to operate 
inefficiently.{ 194 ) Therefore, the reasonably efficient 
skills of the regulator, according to Chant and Acheson, 
will be applied towards maximi~ing their well-being. 
Decisions made by the agency will be designed to be as 
popular as possible with those groups with whom the agency 
works {both those who established, and who finance the 
agency, and those groups affected by its operations). 
Conflicting pressures on the agency will sometimes be evaded 
by its giving out confusing signals. 
5.14 A COURNOT MODEL AND THE OPTIMAL NUMBER OF FIRMS 
(195) 
5.14.1 M.K. Perry. examines the situation in which the 
imperfectly competitive behaviour of firms in an industry 
results in unexploited economies of scale by those firms. 
Economies of scale could be exploited with fewer firms, or 
competition criu1d be fostered at the expense of economies 
" of scale. The traditional policy alternatives in such 
cases are Zaissez faire (when workable competition exists 
11 by some set of criteria") or monopoly regulation (when a 
"workably competitive" market doesn't exist). He maintains, 
however, that monopoly regulation may be " ... ineffective in 
restraining the monopolists• pricing or may introduce inef-
ficiencies in production". (l~ 6 ) 
5.14.2 Another policy is required, and Perry suggests that 
a Cournot model may be used to reduce losses from unexploited 
scale economies by quantifying the nature of the tradeoff. 
He first calculates the equilibrium number of Cournot firms 
that would exist in a free entry market -- the hypothetical 
Zaissez faire situation. This is done for a variety of 
values of the two variables in his model; economies of 
scale, and demand elasticity. He then calculates the number 
. I ... 
(1
941 Posner, (l974L P. 338. 
(.1
951 Perry, (19781. 
(1961 Supra, P.l. 
t • ··~- .. 
(1971 
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of Cournot firms that would maximise consumer plus 
producer surplus, while using the same economy of scale 
and demand elasticity values. "Thus, the alternative to 
laissez faire~ short of monopoly regulation, would be a 
set of policies designed to achieve the optimal unregulated 
industry structure".( 197 ) 
5. 14.3 Perry•s model concentrates only upon economies of 
scale and competition as measures of regulatory success. 
He assumes that the optimal number of firms depends only 
upon economies of scale, and elasticity of demand. He 
explains how these two factors are the most important deter-
minants, but nevertheless ignores other less important deter-
minants, such as the behavioural characteristics of firms. 
5.14.4 The model also assumes that an optimal (possibly 
Pareto?) distribution of gains can be achieved. He suggests 
that consumers could be compensated for their losses from 
revenue obtained from proportional taxes on the profits of 
. gaining firms, or by selling permits to firms to operate in 
the industry. 
5.14.5 Apart from the 11 consumers" and 11 producers" dichotomy, 
Perry also ignores the question of gaining and losing groups 
fn the economy. His theory assumes that regulation is 
initiated as a 11 corrective" measure by the government, and 
is not a result of pressures· upon the government. (See 5.8; 
5.15). 
. I ... 
Perry, (19781, P.2. 
... ... " 
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5.15 DECISION GROUP GOAL THEORY 
(_19.8) 
(199) 
5.15.1 None of the regulatory theories discussed so far 
may be considered as "comprehensive••, in the sense of being 
able to explain the provision of all regulation. Each 
theory tends to examine only one reason for a regulation's 
determination, and consequently each of the theories is 
unable to consistently explain all regulation to which it 
is applied.L 198 ) 
5. 15.2 The "traditional" theories of regulation have postu-
lated that the function of every government was to maximise 
some form of social welfare or utility (irrespective of 
whether the government was democratic, totalitarian, aris-
tocratic or monarchist in form) and the economists concen-
trated their energies upon the form that this social welfare 
function might take. 
5. 15.3 These theories have been discussed by Downs, and 
the objectives proposed included:( 199 ) 
" ... maximise the total satisfaction in a society .. . 
(by dividing) ... income on an equalitarian basis .. . 
" ... taxation ... should be employed ... bringing about a 
different distribution of wealth ... .. 
1'., .maintenance of full .employment". 
" ... production of public goods should be carried on 
to the point ... where the marginal satisfaction is the 
same from both public and private goods". 
5. 15.4 In his path-breaking book, Downs suggested a different 
approach to the analysis of governmental motives. He intro-
duces the concept of the self interest of politicians, by 
. I . ... 
Pos~er, when referring to the most widely accepted of. the regulato~ theories 
(Stlgler, 1971) maintains that ~ •. the body of empirical evidence supporting the 
economic theory of regulation has, however, several shortcomings"(Posner, 1974). 
Downs, (1957), Pp.280-282. 
(200) 
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assuming that they will have more concern for their.own wel-
fare than for that of others. He· assumes that ·11 ••• they act. 
solely in order to attain the income, prestige and power 
which come from being in officeu.( 200 ) 
5.15.5 It would seem that policies designed to provide poli-
ticians with income, prestige and power will not perform the 
traditional functions of government discussed above. How-
ever, Downs goes on to expliin that in seeking their own self 
interest, the politicians will provide the policies desired 
by the electorate. His reasoning is as follows: the poli-
ticians will not benefit from the trappings of governmental 
offices unless they are actually elected. They will there-
fore formulate their policies with the objective of winning 
elections, rather than any other reason. In other words, 
he maintains that their policies will be designed to maximise 
votes. 
5.15.6 Downs' model is based upon six assumptions: 
(a) All decisions are made by a "central unit of governmentn 
which can look at all margins of possible action. 
(b) At each margin, there are only two alternatives of 
action. 
(c) All government choices and their outcomes are indepen-
dent of each other. 
(d) There are only two parties competing for control of 
the government, one of· which is now in office. 
(e) Each party is aware of each individual voter's utility 
function, and therefore marginal policy preferences. 
(f) The voters vote rationally, and they have castles~ 
information concerning the proposed government 
policies and their consequences. 
5.15.7 Under these conditions, the government will subject 
each proposed policy to a hypothetical poll and choose the 
most popular voter preference. Unless it does this, it will 





5.15.8 There are likely to be divergences between the poli-
cies which are optimal from the point of view of the "govern~ 
ment officials", and those which are optimal from the point 
of view of the community as a whole. This is not a weakness 
of Downs• model, because in real life such externaLities 
occur. McKean( 20l)describes how the government officials 
may neglect costs inflicted or gains bestowed upon particular 
groups because: 
(a) the inclusion of such- costs and benefits may not be 
directly linked to the. assessment of performance of 
the official; 
(b) the affected groups may have little influence upon 
the officials; 
(c) the officials may lack knowledge of the costs or 
gains, or they may have to rely upon biassed advice 
from various groups or institutions in the economy. 
5.15.9 McKean's book postulates a process similar to that 
of Downs• model. He maintains that each individual will 
wish to maximise his "utility in life 11 ;{ 202 ) ie. not only, 
or even primarily selfish goals, but also moral, ethical and 
altruistic goals. Any decision will be subjected to a "T 
account 11 of resultant costs and benefits. An "unseen hand in 
government"( 203 ) thus allocates governmental action in a 
manner with certain parallels to Adam Smith's "invisible 
hand". 
5.15.10 Various other writers have elaborated Downs' model. 
G. Tullock has developed the roles of political ignorance, 
and of information and voting costs in Downs' framework.( 204 ) 
and Buchanan and Tullock have elaborated variations of the 
model in their book,( 20S) including a consideration of log-
rolling {which means either the trading of votes between 
. ·; ... 
McKean, (1968), Pp.25~29. 
Ibid, P.l3 
Op Cit., P. 21. 
(204 ) G. Tullock, (1967) . 
(20S) J.M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, (1962). 
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small groups of voters, or the trading of policies by politicians 
with their potential voters. Its object is to provide a voter 
with issues he strongly desires in exchange for his support 
with issues he {less strongly) opposes). 
5.15.11 There are several criticisms of Downs• model, based 
upon his six assumptions, and upon other criteria: 
(a) Not all decisions are made by a "central unit of govern-
ment", but rather by a limited number of people in those 
particular (normally senior political) positions in the 
government that have policy making and implementing 
authority delegated to them.( 206 ) This means (depending 
upon the political system) that the ruling party will have 
a strong (if not monopoly) influence upon policy changes. 
Let us refer to these persons with policy changing authori-
ty as the "decision group". {DG). 
(b) There are likely to be an infinite number of policy 
choices open to any government. 
(c) Most of these policy choices will be interdependent, and 
will have interdependent outcomes (ie. trade offs will be 
involved). 
(d) There are often more than two parties in a country. 
{e) The parties are unlikely to have knowledge of individual 
voter utility functions. 
(f) Voters may be irrational and uninformed. 
Other criticisms of Downs• model are: 
( 206) 
(g) He assumes that all parties will wish to maximise their 
votes. This is likely to be true of parties that are 
not in power but not necessarily so for a ruling party. 
Such a party will no doubt wish to maintain its position, 
but it may have some "surplus votes 11 available (ie. 
additional voters beyond those needed to hold it in power), 
- . I . . . 
A.R •. Ball, (1971), P.34. 
--- ~- --- --~ ' 
(207) 
.. ~- --r. 
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which it can affo~d to lose should it wish to enforce 
policies unpopular with voters.( 207 ) The party will then 
trade off a loss of support against other objectives. 
"Surplus votes" are likely ta be greater when election time 
is a long way off, or when there is no effective opposition. 
For example, it is conceivable that certain DGs would 
deviate from vote maximising policies when bribed, or 
should they have a strong ideological goal. 
(h) Downs' model assumes the ·existence of a democratic system, 
in that the parties' powers depend upon some form of 
electorate. In addition to this constraint, his model 
ignores the existence of non-voting groups in the economy 
who could have some influence upon the DG. All "relevant 
groups" (RGs), both voting and non-voting, must be taken 
into consideration by the DG in the formation of DG 
policies. An RG therefore has some wealth, control of 
the economy, political power (voting power or elected 
representatives) or some tool {the means to threaten or oppose) 
by which it can hinder or further the goals achievements of 
the DG. They will include competitive political parties. 
RG access to the DG will be through a variety of channels --
eg.: the normal course of business, court actions, testi-
monies in legislative hearings, services to officials (such 
as research on particular issues), personal contacts, and 
through representatives heading opposition groups, etc. 
It must be remembered that the DG has less than perfect 
knowledge, and it is only -through information obtained from 
its own research, and provided by the RGs that it is able 
to form its objectives. Special interest groups may be 
organised to lobby for a particular cause, others may be 
organised to counter the purpose of the first group they 
are all RGs. 
. I ... 
" ..• there has been no need for the National Party to seek English-speaking 
support to ensure that the party remains in power". .w. Kleynhans, in 
P .llp of De Crespigny and Schrire, (1978). 
( 
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5.15.12 A new theory of governmental decision making will 
now be proposed which is likely to be particularly useful in 
.the analysis of economic regulation. 
5.15.13 The capture theories of regulation assume that various 
interest groups, " ... struggling among themselves to maximise 
the incomes of their members",( 208 ) will present their demands 
to the government, and that the government will supply regula-
tions in response to these pressure groups. Downs and Stigler 
maintain that the government ~ill allocate regulations in order 
to maximise the.votes provided to it by the electorate. 
Others( 209 ) have argued that the government will allocate 
regulations among interest groups such that it will maximise 
its wealth. 
5.15.14 This chapter suggests, however, that the government 
does not just have one objective such as wealth or vote maximisatior 
(208) 
when developing regulations. The essential argument of this 
chapter is that the government will be guided by a series. of 
goals that have been developed by the DG (who have been ac~ing 
in their own interests) when it initiates regulations. The 
/ 
suggested new approach for regulatory analysis is set out below: 
5. 15.15 It is necessary to delimit the activities or areas to 
b·e analysed. The analysis of "regulation", for example, will 
prove a massive problem to handle. But the analysis of regu-
lations circumscribing RSS may be a manageable task. 
5.15.16 Next, the DG in the area of study must be identified. 
These people may be involved in a variety of activities. 
For example, there will be those who do the actual negotiating 
with the relevant groups (see below) in the economy, and there 
will. be those who design the actual regulatofy proposals result-
ing from these negotiations~ The DG is also likely to include · 
the people who have the power to ratify or veto any regulatory 
proposals. Hirshleifer( 210 ) makes the p;int that policy making, 
and policy implementing must be distinguished. A mass of 
I ... 
R.A. Posner, (1974), P.336 
<209 ) J. Hirsh1afer, (1976). 




5.15.19 The goals of. each of the RGs must be identified. 
Note, however, that this must be done from the OG's point 
·of view. Their ideals are typically likely to be: (See 7.11} 
(i) To allow each of its individual members to maximise their 
monetary and social benefits (and consequently the poli-
tical power of the group) within the existing social/ 
economic structure. The group's political power will 
then in turn, bolster each member. 
(ii) To propagate any ideological beliefs which the majority 
of its members have. 
5.15.20 In 5.15.18 above, a list of OG objectives to achieve 
their ideals should have been identified. The importance of 
each of these objectives in the OG's eyes must now be assessed 
ie. each OG objective must be weighted. 
This is likely to be a difficult task because the OG will seldom 
identify and publish its goals in the manner advocated above. 
In addition, few OGs will give their goals more objectivity 
than an ordinal· ranking. 
The technique used to weight the OG objectives in Chapter 7 
was to judgementally apply a weight to each OG ideal; based 
primarily upon the (subjective) research involved in isolating 
each ideal. Once the ideals were weighted, the "fine tuning" 
was done by weighting each of the objectives under each ideal 
in the same manner. 
The proposal to weight OG goals according to OG expenditu~e 
upon them was considered, but this approach was rejected because 
although the OG may have been prepared to spend $x on any goal, 
there is no way of finding what the divergence between actual 
expenditure and $x was. 
5.15.21 Each objective of each RG must also be weighted. 
It is important to note that the weight attached to each RG 
goal is not the weight as perceived by the RG, but ·rather the 





The same approach as above has been used for this difficult 
task ..• It will be seen in 7.11 that similar objectives 
and weightings emerge for most RGs. A computer model has 
been designed to evaluate the sensitivity of the final outcome 
to the variation of the different weights suggested in this 
chapter. This means that should the weights assigned to any 
goals be disputed, the relevance of such contention upon the 
final regulatory decision of the DG can rapidly be assessed. 
5.15.22 Weights must be assigned to each RG, reflecting how 
the DG perceives each RG as affecting its (the DGis) goals. 
The more important the DG believes an RG to be upon the attain-
, 
ing, or not attaining of any of its goals, the greater the 
11 relevance .. of the RG. 
The most important (but not the only) factor determining an RG's 
weight will be its size. In Chapter 7, weights are assigned 
to each RG according to their populations. The population-
based weighting for a group may be too high if it is excluded 
from the democratic process {eg. the black group in SA). 
In such a case, the group's weight must be decreased relative 
to that of the other RGs until it reflects that RG's specific 
contribution towards or blocking of DG goals. 
A population-based weighting should be adjusted if a group has 
relatively good, or poor access to the DG. (See 7.11 ). 
The population-based weightings should also be adjusted if the 
RG•s population is likely to c~ange relative to other RGs in 
the future. A relatively rapidly expanding RG should be given 
an additional weighting by using the discounted cash flow tech-
nique used in finance, but with future populations substituted 
for future cash flows. ( 213 ) The resulting discounted future 
populations may then be used, instead of the original population-
based weights. The discount rate to be used will be subjectively 
determined by the DG and will reflect the importan~e the DG places 
upon the achievement of its goals in the future, as opposed to 
the present. 
. I ... 
(2lJ) See for example, G.D. Newbould, (1970), Pp.lS-16. 
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In addition, an RGs weighting must be increased by a similar 
"discounted" factor if it is likely that its power in the 
democratic process will increase at some future date. 
5.15.23 The data gathered so far is now set up as in Diagram 
5B. This diagram is a representation of the way the DG 
"thinks" when deciding whether to implement a proposed regu-
lation or not. Essentially~ the DG ~ill evaluate (see below) 
the effects of the proposed regulation upon each of its own 
objectives, to obtain a value A. The DG will then estimate 
the effects of the proposed regulation upon each RG for each 
of its objectives, to obtain a value of B. 
If: 
A + B > 0 
then the proposed regulation will be implemented. 
Diagram 58. Information used in the DG Goal Theory 
DG•s objectives 1 2 3 4 5 . D 
we1ghts 
eva1uat1on 
Group l RG 1 s ObJeCtlves· l 2 3 4 5 . R 
We1ght we1ghts 
wl eva1uat1on 
Group 2 RG z·s ObJeCtlves I z j . 4 0 . R 
We1ght we1ghts 
w2 eva1uat1on 
etc. for N RGs . 
... - -.... -- .. -- . - ......... -- _... 
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5.15.24 Several feasible evaluation methods were examined,< 214 ) 
and an approach to the evaluation of goals based upon Hill's 
goals achievement matrix< 215 ) was developed. Hill suggested 
that various plans or policies may be evaluated through the use 
of a matrix set up to cover the activities of decision makers 
in a particular area. The columns in this matrix will con-
sist of the goals (or more specifically, objectives).of the 
decision makers, the rows will be the areas (or rather RGs) 
affected. Both the goals and the areas (RGs) are given 
weightings. Hill assumes that the 11 Costs 11 and 11 benefits" of 
a particular plan can be computed for each goal, for each 
group. Hi11( 216 ) defines "costs" as "retrogression from 
desired objectives 11 , and 11 benefits" as 11 ••• progress toward 
desired objectives 11 • Thus measurements are not necessarily 
in money units. 
5.15.25 This evaluation technique may be applied to the 
approach to regulation suggested above. It will be discussed 
first under the assumption that all measurements are in the 
same unit (eg. money). 
For DG goals 
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Implement a proposed regulation if: 
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(214 )Lichfieia, (1970). 
(2 lS)Hill, (1966). 
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a is an ass~isment by the DG of their political 
power (see below) 
6d are the DG goaJ weights. 
·B is a benefit measure. 
~n are the RG weights. 
Er are the RG goal weights. 
5.15.26 a is a value which represents the degree to which 
A may, or may not take precedence over B. Under a tyrannical 
and all powerful ruler, a will approach infinity, ie. the 
relevant groups will not be considered by the DG. At the 
opposite extreme, the value df a may be less than unity if the 
DG is in the middle of a democratic election campaign, and 
the votes of the RGs are critical to the DG's continued 
existence. The value of a will initially be determined in 
much the same way as the goal and RG weights suggested above. 
Once again, the computer model in thapter 8 will be most 
valuable in examining a range of a values. 
5.15.27 If the measurements for goals are not all in the same 
units, the most desirable policy may be selected using one 
of three methods suggested by Hill: 
(a) The goals achievement account. The matrix as a 
whole is examined, and a subjective trade off is 
made between the extent of the achievement of each 
goal, and its weight. 
(b) The weighted index of goals achievement. The fnc i-
dence of each plan is summed and weighted, and the 
plan producing the highest sum of weighted indices 
is the preferred one. Each plan may be treated as 
an ordinal scale for the summation (although this will 
' . 
obviously waste precision if the data used was measured 
on an interval or ratio scale), using +1, -1 or 0 
depending on whether the goals achievement is enhanced,. 
decreased or unaffected. An alternati~~ approach when 
interval or ratio scales are used, is to weight and sum 
. I ... 
( 217) 
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each measure of achievement of the goals. The 
units of measurement must be subjectivel-y manipulated 
to ensure that they " ... are approximately of the same 
order 11 .( 217 ) 
(c) Goals achievement transformation functions. Outcomes 
·measured on one scale are transformed into units in 
which outcomes on another scale are measured. With 
quantitative data, difficulties arise if both series 
of data are not linear. It is a method which seems 
more amenable to quantitative data, but has had little 
practical application so far. 
5.15.28 Proposed policies are individually evaluated using 
one of the three evaluation techniques suggested by Hill. 
Note that this approach can evaluate different degrees of the 
same policy (eg.: how much should certain government employees' 
salaries be raised?), and should therefore theoretically be 
able to find an optimal level for each policy. 
5.15.29 The reader may argue that the formula suggested above 
has a serious flaw -- the obJectives of the DG, and of the RG, 
will not be independent, nor unrelated. Rather, several of 
them will involve trade-offs with others (for example, the DG de-
sires to contain inflation conflicts with their desire to 
increase defence expenditure under many policy proposals). 
5.15.30 This argument is not·valid, however, because the 
formula allows for such trade-offs. Note first of all that 
it is not an agency that is regulating the SA RSS, but rather 
it is the government itself which is directly intervening. 
Several writers( 218 ) have suggested that agencies lack clear 
objectives, or have conflicting objectives. It is shown in 
Chapter 7, however, that the DG (and also the RGs} has clear 
. I 
H;i.ll 1 ( 1966) , P. 26. 
(2 lS) See 5.7, 5.13. See also Rees, (1979), Pp.l60-168 for example. 
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and logical objectives, all of which steer towards, in broad 
terms, benefitting the OG (dr RGs)~ Where these clear objec~ 
tives do involve trade-offs with each other however, they will 
automatically be accommodated by the model. 
5.15.31 Consider again the example of inflation versus defence, 
mentioned above. Assume the proposal to 11 build up strategic 
oil stocks .. is being evaluated on the model. The proposal 
will probably positively affect the 11 defence" goal, and nega-
tively affect the 11 inflation 11 goal -- the contribution towards 
the decision value depending upon the method of goal evaluation, 
and upon the goal weights. However, it can be seen that the 
conflict is allowed for, because the positive and the negative 
effects are both accounted for in separate goals. 
5.15.32 It is even possible to go one step further. Assume 
that a proposed regulation has both positive and negative 
effects upon the same DG or RG goal. These are simply the 
11 Costs" and 11 benefits" mentioned in 5.15.24, and must, by 
definition, both be assessed and combined when setting up the 
model to evaluate the proposal. In summary, as long as the 
person setting up the model is aware of the conflicts, there is 
no problem. 
5.15.33 The advantages of the DG-goal approach to regulation 
{over the other regulatory theories) is that it takes account 
of the plethora of (sometimes conflicting) factors which tome 
into the determination of any regulation. Each of the other 
·theories discussed in this chapter has concentrated on only 
one particular aspect of the determination of regulation. 
For example, the marginal approach concentrated on a balance 
of private and fixed marginal products; the public interest 
theory on the external effects in the economy requiring correct-
ion; and t~e rate of returh theory on a 11 fair rate of return 11 
for competitively powerful industries. Each of th~se theories, 
. I ,. • . 
(219) 
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for example, could be included as a DG goal. It can be 
seen that the DG-goal theory is able to give an indication 
of the circumstances in which Posner's taxation by regula-
tion theory comes into play. It also supports the incentive 
for secrecy that benefitting groups will have, as described 
in several of the th~ories in this chapter. 
5.15.34 Of particular inter~st is the relationship of the 
DG-goal theory to Stigler's interest group theory. Stigler 
proposed that ~arious groups will seek advantages from the 
"state", and that benefits would be allocated according to 
the pressures exerted on the political representatives. 
The new approach will separately account for the various RGs, 
and an improved definition of "political pressures 11 will be 
handled by the weightings allocated to them. 
5.15.35 Stigler was able to specify some of the important 
general conditions that are likely to determine the demand 
for regulation by certain groups. However, his theory has 
been both supported and "disproved .. ir\ certain circumstances. ( 219 ) 
If, for example, regulation is promulgated with the prime pur-
pose of providing an internal subsidy, or to serve an ideo-
logical goal of the DG, his theory will prove inadequate. 
In addition, Stigler's theory does not include a full account 
of the pressures forming a cartel or determining a regulation, 
in that a cartel that goes against the (major weight of) object-
ives of the DG will draw its opposition.( 220 ) 
5.15.36 Note that most of the policy development activities 
of the DG may be analysed in this same framework. Fiscal and 
I 
monetary policies for example, will be developed for the bene-
fit of the group with the power to propose and implement them. 
(Of course, the primary goal of such a group will normally be 
to ensure the 11 healthiest" possible state of the economy). 
. I ... 
Posner, (1974), Pp.347-356. 
(220) The pr.ime factor determining the effectiveness of a lobbying group in thE? 
South African context is its " .•. legitimacy ••• with the government", and 
" ••• compatibility of interest group goals with government policy". (W.Kleyn-
hans, in De Crespigny and Schrire, (1978), P.ll3). 
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5.15.37 Note also that this new theory has multiple goals, 
as opposed to Stigler's and Downs• single vote maximisation 
goal. Other criticisms of Downs' theory mentioned at the 
beginning of this section are also allowed for. The· new 
theory can be used to handle any number of policy choices, 
even if they are interdependent. It can allow for any 
number of political parties and other groups. It is able, 
in theory, to take account of lack of perfect knowledge, both 
by voters and political parties. It can also be adapted to 
any type of political system (by adjusting a in .the formula). 
5.15.38 In summary, the DG has various groups and differing 
pressures before it. There may, for example, be a group 
which has formed a cartel which is lobbying for the main-
tenance of that cartel, and one or more negatively affected 
groups lobbying for its dissolution. The DG will then deci_de 
which of a variety of possible policies will be to its own 
maximum benefit. There is obviously an element of gaming in 
this process. Assume that the DG starts with a series of 
proposed policies, and assume that these policies become 
common knowledge. Each (positively or negatively) affected 
RG will then develop an ante-policy for each proposed DG 
policy. If the DG is able to gain knowledge of these ante-
policies, it will obviously affect its own matrix, and the 
ratings for each of its proposed policies. This process 
can continue in a circular chain. This gaming approach has 
not been used in Part III of ~he thesis, because the required 
data is not available. Instead, a single evaluation is run 
for each regulatory proposal. 
. I . . . 
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5.16 RSS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE EMERGING THEORIES 
(221) 
5.16.1 Posner( 221 } maintains that regulation theory has not 
been " ..• refined to the point where it can generate hypo-
theses sufficiently precise to be verified empirically 11 • 
5.16.2 In this section, the applicability to the RSS of 
each of the theories discussed in 5.4 to 5.14 will be 
briefly examined. This will suggest an approach to the 
analysis of RSS regulation, and with this background, the 
proposed new theory in 5.15 will be used in Part III. 
5.16.3 Marginal Approach. It is almost certain that the 
SA government has not adopted the marginal approach in the 
formulation of its RSS regulation. The reasons are: first, 
that the government must lack the knowledge required for the 
implementation of this rule; second, that there is no reason 
to assume that the government is using RSS regulation primarily 
as a taxation device (this will become apparent in Part III of 
the thesis); and third, it seems as a matter of policy that 
the government wishes to minimise regulation of the private 
sector by only interfering in cases where there are specific 
government objectives.( 222 ) It is likely however, that 
government decision-makers do think in marginal terms when 
deciding on absolute regulatory levels. 
5. 16.4 Regulation in the public interest. Many of the indi-
vidual RSS in South Africa are probably earning super-profits 
in view of their advantageous locations (See Chs. 4,6). 
However, these profits will not cause any RSS to fall under the 
eye of the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act. ( 223 ) 
On the contrary, Part Ill will indicate that regulation of RSS 
in RSA has been at the direct expense of all the RSS consumers, 
and to the indirect benefit of only some of them. 
." I .... 
Posner, (1974), P.356. 
(222 ) Lombard, (1974), P.99; and 'SA in the 60's', Pp.44-45. 
(223 ) No. 24 of 1955. 
(224) 
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5.16.5 The proponents of the regulation in the public 
interest theory would argue that the costs of RSS regulation 
in SA are the costs of a social goal -- here the necessary 
security and stability of an essential commodity. A better 
explanation is provided by the DG~Goal Theory -- RSS regu-
lation is to achieve specific governmental objectiyes {as 
opposed to an altruism of the government toward the public). 
5.16.6 The modified version of the. public interest theory, 
which maintains that regulation fails due to mismanagement, 
is also likely to be inapplicable to SA. It will be shown in 
Ch. 8, once the government dbjectives have been listed, that 
there is no evidence of inefficiency in their achievement. 
In addition, it should be noted that this 11 mismanagement 11 
theory should ·be more applicable in those cases where the 
regulatory agency is a separate body from the government. 
5.16.7 In his article( 224 ) Posner raises the question of 
~~ ... collusion among politicians" and suggests that powerful 
political groups may be able to use their power to obtain 
pecuniary income or impose their conception of the public 
interest. It is likely that the National Party has the 
power and cohesion to accord with Posner's theory. However, 
it is again suggested that the. DG-Goal Theory provides an 
improved explanation in that through it a more closely defined 
reasoning can be applied to any government action. 
5.16.8 Fair rate of Return. Averch a~d Johnson develop a 
theory of a monopolistic firm wishing to maximise profit, but 
subject to a rate of return constraint (based on the value of 
capital employed). (225 ) This theory is inapplicable to RSS 
for two reasons. First, the SA government does not ostensibly 
wish to limit the RSS or OC profits to a "fair rateu.( 226 ). 
. I ... 
Posner, (1974), P. 340~ 
<
225 ) Averch and Johnson, (1962). 
(
226
) See 7.5 •. 11 for a discussion on the changing attitude of ·the government towards 
the OC, however. 
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Rather, it wishes to·enhance and stabilise their profits to 
ensure that the OC continue to operate in SA. Secondly, 
RSS and OC regulation is not based upon capital employed, 
but rather upon a government-controlled OC gross margin. 
(See 3.5). 
5.16.9 Empty Motions. Lindblom believes that many of the wel-
fare effects of regulation are too complex for objective 
assessment (5.7). Indeed, it is possible that the SA 
government is not fully aware of the costs that RSS regula-
tion imposes upon the consumer. However, in spite of the 
fact that the SA government may not have full knowl~dge, it 
has clear enough objectives to ensure that the actions it takes 
are not 11 empty motions". It is likely that this theory was 
directed at regulatory agencies in USA that are separate and 
independent of the government itself. 
5.16.10 The Capture Theories. The first two capture theories 
discussed above have been shadowed by the improvements of 
Stigler 1 S theory. They do not provide an acceptable link 
between the groups interested in regulation, and the emergence 
of that regulation. In Part III of the thesis, it will become 
clear that the SA government is not dominated by 11 0il interests" 
in the provision of its regulation. 
5.16.11 According to Stigler 1 s theory, the interest groups 
lobbying for oil regulation would be first, the OC; secondly, 
the RSS represented through the OC, and thirdly the RSS repre-
sented through bodies such as the Motor Industries Federation. 
He would maintain that the following factors would work in 
favour of the government providing regulation to the RSS: 
the large number of RSS in SA, the fact that they are already 
organised through their OC and the MIF, the inelastic demand 
for RSS fuels, the information likely available to the RSS on 
how regulation would affect them, and the low opposition from 
·adversely affected groups (ie. their consumers, who have little 
knowledge of the effects of regulation, and who have no equally 
. I ... · 
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~ffective body to represent' them to oppose regulation). 
It might be argued that the OC, the prime interest group, 
would prefer cartelisation to regulation, but Stigler would 
reply that in the South African situation the government 
would not allow private manipulation (cartelisation) of a 
strategic industry -- it would prefer such manipulation to 
be in its own hands. 
5.16.12 Because the RSS and OC groups are 11 Small 11 , relative 
to the whole economy, and because the benefits of regulation 
to them could be substantial, Stigler would argue that the 
costs to these groups of obtaining beneficial regulation from 
the government (ie. the costs of organisation, information, 
assessment, and the votes and resources desired by their 
political representatives) would be economically justified. 
5.16.13 An objection to the use of Stigler's theory in ex-
plaining RSS regulation in SA is that the obtaining of this 
regulation (by pressure groups) is not done in a framework 
which will directly, through a democratic process, affect 
the careers of any politicians. The pressure group will 
not .. employ .. politici.ans by means of votes and resources. 
Rather, there will be direct negotiation with the government. 
5.16.14 Taxation by Regulation. Posner makes a valuable 
contribution to regulatory theory in that he raises the issue 
of regulation being used as a. taxation tool via the mechanism 
of internal subsidies. In SA the internal transfer aspects 
of RSS/OC regulations were 1 ikely to have been given some weight 
in their formation -- it will be seen in Ch. 7 that the govern-
ment gave greater weighting to others of .its objectives, though. 
5.16.15 It is likely that price regulation ensures a greater 
equality of prices throughout SA than would otherwise occur. 
To this extent, it is an internal subsidy mechanism. It will 
prohibit the OC from raising prices in one market type (probably 
the higher cost/lower volume rural markets) ~nd lowering prices 
in another (the competitive urban markets). The state's 
. I ... 
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objectives in ensuring these stable prices included, 
for example, the desire to transfer wealth to DG ·supporters 
and to ensure stability in the provision of an essential 
infrastructural service throughout the country. (See Ch. 7). 
5.16.16 Another instance of RSS/OC regulation being used as 
a transfer device ·in SA may be seen in the application of 
UROTA requirements. UROTA requires certain RSS to supply 
several services that would only be supplied in lower quan-
tities in a free market. However, UROTA requirements are 
relaxed in certain areas of RSA and under certain conditions 
effectively transferring wealth to them. 
5.16.17 An important but indirect taxation effect of RSS/OC 
regulation in SA, and one of the central arguments of this 
thesis, is that the net effect achieved is a transfer of wealth 
from the general public to the government, (and to a limited 
extent, to the OC, the RSS, and other sectors of the economy). 
5.16.18 Posner notes that the perpetrators of certain agree-
ments will have a strong incentive to keep them secret from 
those on whom they impose costs -- this is also later con-
firmed in the SA context. (Ch. 7). 
5.16.19 Elasticities of Factors. The application of Migue•s 
theory to the SA context would lead one to conclude that 
resources used by the RSS are. 11 elastic 11 in the long run, and 
that RSS consumers are not a powerful, cohesive or well-
informed group. Because resources are in elastic supply, 
Migue would maintain that any regulatory subsidy would be dis-
sipated among new entrants to the industry. The industry 
would, therefore, prefer barriers to entry, and controls on 
output, to a subsidy. The existence of a variety of govern-
ment and OC-imposed barriers to RSS entry suggests that Migue•s 
arguments in the SA context are valid. 
. I ... 
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5.16.20 In analysing the interest groups involved in 11 0il 11 
regulation, the OCs are clearly the most cohere~t group --
they are few (eight) in number, have a high interest in, 
and benefits to gain from regulation, they have substantial 
monetary and information resources, and have dir~ct access 
to the government. Consumers will generally prefer regula-
tory subsidies to barriers, because if they are able to enter 
the regulatory negotiations they will attempt to direct some 
of the subsidies to themselves. The regulatory framework for 
oil in SA therefore suggests that the consumer is very weak. 
Indeed it seems likely that there is no body to specifically 
represent their interests in the OC-government negotiations 
(except possibly the Automobile Association). 
\ 
5.16.21 Capital Stock Theory. This theory is aimed at 
explaining the mass of legislation surrounding the (American) 
courts. In view of its embryonic stage of development, and 
also because the SA government has relatively clear regula-
tory objectives, (as opposed to having to rely upon objectives 
developed through precedents) it is not considered applicable 
for SA's RSS regulation. 
5.16.22 Direct Information Theory. Nelson emphasised the 
importance of the image of the politicians in the public's 
eyes, and of their selling themselves as a 11 product 11 to 
voters, who are essentially passive.( 227 ) His theory would 
maintain that certain politicians would associate themselves 
with RSS regulation, and that this would become an elective 
issue. It seems that his theory is more applicable to the US 
political market because RSS regulation has remained submerged 
as a political issue in RSA. 
5.16.23 He again raises the valid point that a benefitting 
minority will have the incentive to hide its gains from a 
"1osing 11 majority. 
. I ... 
<
227 ) See also Telser's discussion (1976). 
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5.16.24 Maximisin~ ·well Being. As with the ''empty motions" 
theory, it is suggested that this theory is directed towards 
certain regulatory agencies that are separate from, and inde-
pendent of the government itself. The SA government has a 
clear set of objectives in providing the RSS/OC regulation, 
which would not allow the concessionary and compromising 
atmosphere that emerg~s under this theory. Note also, that 
because the regulators and the government are synonymous in 
SA, 'the application of this·theory suggests the maximisation 
of regulators' well-being -- the hypothesis of the DG-goal 
theory. 
5.16.25 The Cournot Model. Perry's model is inadequate for 
the analysis of RSS regulation, primarily because it is a 
model for the determination of the optimal number of firms in 
a restrictive situation -- namely, when the imperfectly com-
petitive behaviour of firms in an industry is resulting in 
unexploited economies of scale. The model cannot examine the 
important RSS characteristic of price regulation, neither can 
it account for the plethora of regulations go~erning RSS, 
such as opening hours restrictions. It"is suggested that 
Perry's model would be a useful method of examining the RSS 
industry, should the number of firms (RSS) in the industry 
be the only aspect of regulation of interest. 
5.16.26 The DG-G~al theory is used as the approach to .RSS 
regulation in Part III of the thesis. 
. I ... 
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6. PETROL SALES VOLUMESJ RSS 11ATTRACTIONS"J AND. LOCATION --
A COMPUTER MODEL,' 
6.0.1 "SALES AREA" is defined as the contour around an RSS 
that contains that x% of an .RSS's customers which have the 
lowest ranked deterrence to it. Various sales areas can 
thus be drawn around the RSS, depending upon the value of 
x specified. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
( 22 8) 
6.1 .1 Much of the work in this thesis so far has involved the 
description, and the theoretical analysis of RSS. There are 
certain important assumptions that have been made: for example, 
that tot a 1 m a r.k e t demand i s made up of i n dependent , 11 s m a 1 1 11 and 
sometimes overlapping areas, and that only within these areas 
does 11 0ligopolistic" competition exist. A quantitative and 
empirical evaluation of such assumptions is required. 
6.1.2 The SA oil markets may be analysed at two levels: 
that of the RSS, and that of the OC. It is interesting to 
find that the individual firms at both these levels have certain 
characteristics which bear a close resemblance to the ••ideal" 
cartel. 
6.1 .3 J.V. Koch( 228 ) has listed the ch.aracteristics lik~ly to 
lead to a successful and long enduririg cartel as follows: 
Koch, 
(a) The number of firms in the cartel must be small. 
(b) The number of points in the market at which buying 
and selling takes place must be small. 
(c) The transactions of the cartel must be widely pub-
licised in the cartel. 
(d) The transactions of the cartel must not be widelx pub-
licised outside the cartel. 
(1976) 1 P.287. 
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(e) Barriers to entry exist in the industry. 
(f) The cost and demand structures of the cartel members 
are similar. 
(g) The cartel faces consumers without monopsony power. 
(h) If the government polices a cartel, through the regu-
lation of some of its conditions, the incentive for 
members to break it is greatly reduced, making it con-
siderably more effective than otherwise. 
(i) If the market shares of the firms in an industry are 
unstable or falling, the incentive to collude is increased. 
6.1.4. The market most likely to have these conditions favouring 
the formation of a cartel is an oligopoly. ( 229 ) The essence 
of oligopoly is the interdependence of firms in the oligopolistic 
market.{ 230 ) Other typical {and varying) characte~istics of 
oligopolies are: the low number of sellers, the potential for 
(or existence of) price and product competition, uncertainty 
as to what the actions of rivals will be, the incentive to main-
tain barriers to entry, to divide markets, and agreement to fix 
prices. Their ultimate objective is to put the oligopolistic 
cartel in the position of a monopolist. One of the objectives 
of the remaining chapters of this thesis is to examine the 
extent to which the oil industry has achieved a "cartel 11 position. 
It will be shown in Part III that although certain regulations 
benefit the RSS and OC, they are primarily dominated by the 
government. 
6.1.5 The objective of this chapter is to test the following 
major hypotheses: 
(a) That location is the most imp~rtant factor affecting 
the sales of an RSS. 
(b) That the sales area of an RSS extends over only a 
"limited" area because competitive RSS are dominant 
sellers outside this "limited" area. 
<
229 ) Leftwich, (1970), P.239. 
(230) 
Koch, Op cit, P.280~ 
. I ... 
161 
{c) That should mdre than one RSS exist within one of these 
. 11 limited 11 areas, then those RSS will be in 11 0ligopolis-
-tic11 competition with each other. 
{d) As a corollary to (c), that each RSS {and their host 
OC) will have strong incentives to limit competition 
because its effects are felt heavily by a "few 11 RSS, 
rather than being widespread. 
In addition to the above tests~ the various attraction factors 
{4.5) of RSS will be examined. 
6.2 ASSUMPTIONS 
;. , . 
6.2.1 A model should be a representation of the most important 
aspects of the problem under consideration. Inevitably, certain 
features of the real life situation will not be adequately 
represented. This and the following section list the assumptions 
and limits of the RSS computer model that has been developed. 
6.2.2 The model is static, rather than dynamic in its handling 
of time. It is necessary to assume that .the maximum hunger value 
for each individual customer will occur at least once during the 
time period covered by the model. The model in this chapter was 
set up using data covering the whole of 1978, and therefore this 
assumption will have no effect on the results. However, should 
the model be used for analysis 9ver periods of say, less thftn a 
month, then certain customers who visit RSS less than once a 
month must all be assumed to visit RSS that month. For example, 
it is possible that somebody may fill his car only once every two 
months. The output of the model will be affected in that, 
although synthesised sales volumes will be correct, the synthe-





6.2.3 Another implicit assumption of the model is that all 
customers will have the time, during the period covered by 
the model, to visit the RSS of their choice. It is unlikely 
that the model will ever be run to cover so short a period that 
this assumption has any effect. 
6.2.4 The problem of external interaction was introduced in . . 
4.19. It is likely to have the greatest effect upon the model 
when the study area is 11 Small ... , or when the RSS concerned are 
located on major freeways or roads in which a large portion of 
the traffic is likely to be 11 long-distance 11 • The choice of 
study area for this thesis was guided by these considerations. 
·(6.6) Neither of the two methods of minimising the effects of 
external interaction suggested was used, however. Cost con-
siderations precluded the additional surveys required to increase 
the size of the study area, and to obtain reliable data to insert 
into external zones. A relatively small proportion of external 
customers exists in the RSS study area chosen, (8%), yet even 
here a sample size of 1215 customers would be required to set 
up one external zone with an AVO confidence interval of ; 1 km 
at a 95% level of significance. 
6.2.5 These figures were calculated from the RSS survey as 
follows: Of the 300 customers in the survey, 24 (8%) were 
external. These customers had an AVO sample standard deviation 
of 5,003 km. The desired confidence interval is ± 1 km, and the 
desired confidence leve.l is 95%. Emory( 231 ) shows that the 
standard error of the mean is 'therefore l/l ,96=0,5102 and that 
0,5102 = 5,003 Therefore n = 97,155. 
1/n - 1 
Because only 8% of customers are external, total sample size 
required is 1 215. 
6.2.6 It is assumed that cij (see rank distance factor, 4.15) 
is an adequate deterrence function. The concept of AVO was 
developed in 4.3.5, but cannot be used in the model. as the 
. I ... 
Emory, (1976) I Pp.149-151. 
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deterrence function because of the difficulty in obtaining an 
"average••-AvD for any single customer to each of the RSS under 
study. The problem would be compounded when, as in this model,-
customers are aggregated by zone. For this reason, i to j road 
distance has been used as the primary measure of deterrence in 
this model. It is closely correlated with customer AVOs, because 
as the road distance from i to j decreases, so will most AVOs. 
Table 6A shows average customer deterrence used in the model 
alongside the average AVOsfor each j obtained in a survey (see 
below). A coefficient of correlation of 0,8035 was obtained. 
TABLE 6A. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN AVO AND DISTANCE 
DETERRENCE MEASURES 
RSS I ;: 3 4 ~ 
AVERAGE AVO 3,694 4,121 5,849 3,492 3,466 
AVERAGE DETERRENCE 14,656 14,769 15,438 13,562 13,081. 
(FR0~1 MODEL) 
Average AVO = -7,8582 + 0,83787 (Average Deterrence) 
Coefficient of correlation = 0,8035 
6.2.7 When a model is set up for a particular area, it is 
assumed that none of the characteristics of the area· under study 
change over the period analysed. A particularly important 
variable in the RSS environment is trading hours. A change in 
trading hours will affect the relative convenience of many RSS 
(eg. later hours may mean an RSS a long distance from work, but 
on the customer•s desired route, can now be reached). To assess 
t~e effect of a change in trading hours, the change in the numbers 
of customers residing in each i zone during selling hours must be 
examined. 
. I -... 
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6.2.8 Other variables assumed constant are the season, the 
state of the economy, political factors, government regulation 
and the characteristics of the customers. 
6.3 LIMITS OF THE MODEL 
6.3.1 The RSS model is specifically for the determination of 
petrol sales, and NOT spares, vehicle or workshop sales. A 
recalibration of the RSS model may enable it to predict such 
sales, but the application of one of the gravity shopping 
models is likely to be more applicable, for the reasons dis-
cussed in 4.14. 
6.3~2 The user must be well aware of the different types of 
RSS (See 3.2) when setting up the model. Both the deterrence 
and attraction factors will have different weightings for these 
different RSS. . For example, customer toilet facilities will be 
a far bigger 11 attraction 11 for a national route RSS than a 
suburban RSS. For this reason, it is important that when a 
study area c·ontains more than one type of RSS, a dummy variable 
I 
for each type of RSS be used in the multiple regression·to ob-
tain the composite attraction variable. 
6.3.3 If the model is set up in one area, the parameters ob-
tained may not be used in another study area, because so many 
known and unknown variables change between different areas. 
(eg. cultures, habits, work types). Ideally, the model should 
be set up and run immediat~ly, and not as an ongoing model- unless 
input is continually updated. It is a static, rather than 
dynamic model. 
6.3.4 If the model is to be used to analyse short term changes 
in sales, a z factor described in 4.14.6 must be used for each 
ga.ining RSS. 
. I ... 
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6.4 TECHNICA( DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
6.4.l A listing of the programme, which is written in 
FORTRAN IV, is provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 provides 
a description of the input required and options available; 
Appendix 3 provides a flow diagra~. Certain aspects of the 
programme require further discussion. 
6.4.2 Golden-section search i~ a method described by Wilson{ 232 ) 
to optimise some goodness of fit statistic. The RSS model has 
the option of using a coefficient of correlation, or a difference 
of squares as this statistic. The procedure works as follows: 
initially, for each of the model's parameters, a minimum and a 
maximum calibration parameter value is input into the model. 
Let these values for one of the parameters be_B~ and 13~ 
respectively, where the iterations of the procedure are 
represented by k. a1 and a1 are obtained as follows: 
al = 0,382 { al - al ) + al 3 2 1 1 
al = 0,618 { al - al ) + al 4 2 1 1 
The values 0,382 and 0,618 are approximations for 
F n-1-k and F n-k 
n+l-k F n+l-k 
where the Fs are Fibbonaci numb'e rs defined by 
Fa = Fl = 1 
Fn = F n-1 + F n-2' n ~ 2. 
6.4.3 If R is being used as the goodness of fit indicator, 
Wilson shows that if 
. I 
(232) '•1 Wl. son, (1974), Pp.320-322. 
.. 
166 
R ( ~k 3 ) > R ~k 4 











6.4.4 This will provide the two new estimates for the next 
iteration, and the procedure is repeated. The RSS model 
requires the following input for the calibration procedure: 
(a) An initial upper and lower estimate for each parameter. 
(b) The number of golden-section iterations required for each 
parameter. 
(c) The number of overall iterations for all parameters. 
This is required because the optimal value for one para-
meter is unlikely to remain constant as the values for the 
other parameters in the model are adjusted. The model 
optimises a , then ~' and then y individually, but the 
resulting values are unlikely to be optimal when taken 
~imultaneously. Therefore, once the lnwer and upper 
limits for each parameter have been·narrowed by the golden-
section search the required number of iterations, those 
lower and upper limits are again widened, and the overall 
procedure is repeated. The average of the lower and 
upper limits of each parameter will tend toward joint 
optimality on a series of overall iterations. 
{d) The amount by which the lower and upper limits of each 
parameter are widened on each parameter can be selected 
by the user. A value of 1.5 is sui-table for an initial 
calibration run, and of 1.1 for 11 fine tuning 11 • 
6.4.5 The model allows for the insertion of a 11 distance to next 
opportunity 11 factor for each i to j combination (See 4.13, 4.14). 
Because these values may be of less impnrtance_than the deterrence 
-
function c, the user may wish to ignore this section of the model 
by inserting values of 0 for ATRA(I,J) and ~. 
. I ... 
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6.4.6 Use of the calibration 11 goodness of fit 11 indicators. 
The model has two statistical indicators for the comparison 
of actual versus synthesised sales at each RSS. The sum of 
squares D is a measure that closely parallels the least 




j ( I A. - S. J J 
6.4.7 If synth~sised sales are calculated while maintaining 
the objective of minimising D, both positive and negative 
deviations between actual and synthesised sales will be 
accounted for, and larger deviations will be given a greater 
weighting. If it can be assumed that p (S.fA.) has the same 
variance o2 for all A., and that the meansJ E1s.) lie on a 
J . J 
straight line, and that Sj are statistically independent, then 
the Gauss-Markov theorem can be used to justify the use of this 
(233) I · · formula. If the further assumption that p (S. A.) is normal 
is made, then maximum likelihood estimates( 234 ) als~ j~stify the 
use of this method. Minimising the sum of squares will ensure 
that the two lines are as close as possible to each other. 
6.4.8 The coefficient of correlation, on the other hand, is a 
measure of linear relation between A. and s.. The formula 
used is:( 235 ) J J 
I: A.S 
N -~NA J (~ 
6.4.9 The maximisation of r during the model•s calibration will 
not ensure the minimisation of the deviations between AJ. and S., J . 
but it will ensure that they parallel each other as closely as 
possible. This is because r at no stage specifically minimises 
(
233
) Wonnacott and Wonnacott, (1970), Pp.21-22. 
(234) 
Supra~ Pp. 34-38. 
(235 ) P. Hickman and J.G. ·Hilton, (1971), P.298. 
- .. "" ~ . 
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differences between Aj and Si. Rather it will max1m1se the 
11 degree to which. the.variables are related 11 .( 236 ) Wonnacott( 237 ) .. 
explains that the formula will (i) calculate the deviation of 
the Aj and the Sj from their respective means, (ii) sum each 
pair to indicate which cart~sian quadrant they are in, (iii) 
ensure a common unit of measurement of these sums (standard 
deviations), and (iv) adjust each vector for sample size. 
The difference between these two goodness of fit indicators 
is indicated in Diagram 6A. Their use is described in 6.5. 
Diagram 6A. Comparison of Calibration Indicators 
Sales a) Sales b) 
MINIMISE D HAXIHISE r 
actual 
synthesised sales 
j ~---------------------,~ j 
6.5 SETTING UP THE MODEL 
(236) 
(237) 
6.5.1 The following data is required by the model, and is input 
according to the format in appendix 2. 
6.5.2 Having selected the study area (see 6~6), it was decided 
' that the most convenient i zones would be the enumerated sub-
districts specified by the City Engi~eer's Department, Cape Town. 
These are sub-divisions of magisterial districts, used for planning 
p1,1rposes. The j in the model are individually located· RSS, 
rather than zones. . I ... 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott, (1970), P.103. 
Supra, Pp. 103-107. 
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6.5.3 The road distance from each i to each j was measured 
on a 1:12,500 map of the study area with an opsometer. 
Using this data, and the formula E7g, a matrix of rank 
distance factors was calculated to be used as the deter~ence 
function c ... 
1 J 
6.5.4 A point is required somewhere in each i, from which to 
measure distances. Rather th~n using the centre of each i, 
a point was judgementally determined in each i to approximate 
the .. centre of gravity .. of income. Because average incomes 
by i were used, this is equal to a 11 centre of gravity of 
customers ... A personal knowledge of the study area was required 
to do this. In those r~sidential areas that are evenly spaced 
with houses, the centre of t~e zone was used, but where houses 
are concentrated on one side of the zone, or where large blocks 
of flats exist, a subjective adjustment was made. 
6.5.5 There are certain difficulties involved in definin~ the 
boundary of the .study area, after the area itself has been chosen 
(See 6.6). Because the RSS model is a probabilistic model, no 
clear boundary exists. Note that the larger a study area is, 
the greater the number of RSS it will contain, and therefore 
the less serious will be this problem. 
6.5~6 If the boundary is drawn too close to the RSS under study, 
customers that should be included will be excluded, and average 
sales per customer will be overestimated by the model. 
This will cause the consumption constant (RSS expenditure out 
of available income) to be too high. Conversely, if the study 
area is drawn too large, it will include customers who wo~ld 
actually patronise RSS outside the study area, causing average 
sales per customer to be underestimated by the model and too low 
a consumption constant. Ideally, the bounday should be drawn so 
that sales to. customers residing inside the study area who patron-
ise outside RSS are equal to sales to customers from outside the 
study area who patronise inside RSS. When this is achieved, the 
consumptidn constant calculated by the model should equal that 
obtained in an area customer survey. 






6.5.7 Because the obvious source of population and income data 
for the survey was the Technical and Management Services 
enumerated sub-districts (ESD), the study area boundary had to 
J 
be based upon them.. The RSS surrounding those RSS under study 
were linked by straight lines, to form a polygo~. All ESD 
which had their major portion inside this polygon were included 
in the study area. When this was done, it became clear that 
certain i zones had been excluded (eg. UCT) and these were 
added in. The resulting consumption constant calculated by 
the model was 0;027. 
6.5.8 The population of each customer zone is required. This 
was obtained from the City Engineer's Department publication~ 238 ) 
Unfortunately, the most recent data available was for 1970. 
There has been an increase of approximately 90 dwelling units 
in the 'Study area since then, (ie. approximately 340 persons), 
and virtually no reductions. This represents an error of ~1% 
of the study area population. 
The data was available for both white and coloured persons, 
and a weighted total was used. 
6.5.9 Ayerage per capita income for each customer zone is 
required. This was obtained for the coloured, and for the 
white population from the City Engineer 1 s Department.( 239 ) 
The most recent data available was for 1970, and this was 
updated by a factor 11 974 for whites and 2,255 for coloureds.(
240 ) 
6.5.10 Actual sales for each RSS are required. The annual 
sales in rand for each RSS were inserted into the model. ( 241 ) 
6.5.11 A distance to next opportunity ratio was inserted for 
each i to j combination. The ratio was obtained as follows: 
. I ... 
"Cape Urban Area Population by Suburb", 1970. TMS, City Engineer's Department, 
Cape Town. 
"Average Family Income in Greater Cape Town", TMS, City Engineer's Department, 
Cape Town. 
"Trends", P4.4. Vol.2, No.1, Sept.78, Bureau for Economic Research, U.Stel1enbosch 
26,8c/L -- a weighted average at the end of 1978. 
(242) 
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for each c .. , the c .. to the next ranked j, ie. u+l, was 
. 1 J . 1 J 
obtained. The ratio used was: 
cij {u+l,i) 
cij (u,i) 
6.5.12 An attraction value for each RSS was obtained as 
follows: firstly, all data was input into the model with the 
exception of the. attraction values. Values of l were then 
inserted for the attraction values for each j, and for the upper 
and lower .1 imits of the attraction parameter, alpha. The model 
was then calibrated using the coefficient of correlation as a 
goodness of fit indicator. The result was an allocation of 
customers to RSS based upon the deterrence function and upon 
the distance to next opportunity only. The essential output 
for this run is shown in Appendix 4. 
6.5.13 Differences between actual and synthesised sales in this 
run are caused by: firstly, not accounting for the different 
attractions of each RSS, and secondly, errors and inadequacies 
in the deterrence function and distance to next opportunity 
ratio (see 4.17). Because there is no practicable means of 
isolating this second cause, the entire difference is assumed 
to be accounted for by a lack of attraction values. Hence 
the ratios actual sales/synthesised sales for each j are the 
11 perfect 11 attraction factors. 
6.5.14 If these values are now used as attraction f~ctors, and 
the model is again calibrated,( 242 ) synthesised sales for 
each j should exactly equal actual sales. The output from this 
run is shown in Appendix 5. Discrepancies between actual and 
synthesised sales of up to 0.2% are the result of imperfect 
calibration -- this particular run was allowed 11 golden-section 
iterations within each of six overall iterations 
a.little under a minute of CPU time. 
requiring 
I . . . 
Using the difference of squares as the goodness of fit indicator. On this 
run the minimum possible deviations between actual and synthesised sales are 
required (rather than the closest possible "parallel" relationship). 
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6.5.15 These "perfect" attraction values may now be used as 
dependent variables in a multiple regression, with the inde-
pendent variables being the various attraction factors listed 
in 4.5. The predicted attraction values for each j are then 
inserted into the model -- the essential output for this run 
is shown in Appendix 6. The model is now ready to be used 
for the analysis of changes in the attraction independent 
variables, or other input data., or for predictions for hypo-
thetical RSS sites. 
6.6 THE STUDY AREA 
6.6.1 The study area chosen was approximately 10 km 2 covering 
parts of the suburbs Mowbray, Rosebank, Rondebosch and Newlands 
in Cape Town, (See map in Appendix 7). It consists of five 
RSS and thirty-six enumerated sub-districts (ESDs) which were 
used as i zones. This particular area was chosen because: 
(a) It is the only area in the Cape peninsula that consists 
of a "cluster" of RSS surrounded by an area containing 
no RSS. This made the definition of the study area 
boundary easier, and also reduced the problem of external 
interaction slightly (See 6.2.4). 
(b) It contains five· "suburban" RSS (See 3.2). This means 
that the s t u dy are a nee d. not be as 1 a r g e as w o u 1 d be 
required for the analysis of national route RSS, for 
example. In addition, because the RSS are all of the 
same type, this simplifies the multiple regression re-
quired ta predict the attraction factors, because a 
dummy variable for each type of RSS iS not required. 
(c) The area is close to the university. 
6.6.2 In addition to the data requirements ·mentioned in 6.5, 
a .survey was made of the RSS in the study area to determine the 
average AVO for each RSS. This wa~ used as an additional check 
. I - . ~ . 
(243) 
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on the validity of the. model's results, which are discussed 
in 6.7 and 6.8. 











Campground Service Station. 
6.6.3 The survey dates chosen were the 9th, lOth and the 17th 
of October, 1978. These dates were chosen with the objective of 
obtaining a representative cross section of the population who 
visit these RSS. The 9th was a "normal" day during school holi-
days, the lOth was a public holiday on which a large cricket match 
was being played approximately 1,6 km away at Newlands on the 
border of the study area, and the 17th was a "normal" working day 
for all. The results were weighted as follows: the 9th -- 0,19, 
the lOth 0~13, the 17th -- 0,68. A total sample size of 300· 
was chosen, ie. approximately 60 customers for each RSS. This was 
ascertained after a pilot survey indicated the approximate sample 
size required .. The final results gave the validities shown in 
Table 6B. 
TABLE 6B( 243 ) SURVEY AVO SUMMARY 
RSS HUNTS 1 ROBBS 2 COTTAGE 3 PREMIER 4 CAr~PGROUND 5 
Sample Size 62 66 53 61 58 
AVO Confidence + 2km + 2km + 2km + 2km + 2km 
interval - - - - -
Confidence level 99,8% 99,5% 98,6% 99,9% 99,9% 
Average AVO 3,694 4,121 5,849 " 3,492 3,466 
Sample Standard 5,0460 5,7846 5,7998 4,6606 4,3051 
Deviation 
. /· ... 
Confidence levels for each RSS were calculated as follows, given sample sizes, 
AVD confidence intervals, and sample standard deviations: 
a.2' (Estimate of standard error of the mean) = Sample standard deviation 
j N- 1 
Confidence level (in standard deviations) = Confidence interval I a_ 
X 
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6.6.4 A simple questionnaire was designed to obtain each cus-
tomer•s AVO. It proceeded as follows: firstly, it was ex-
plained that a survey was being done by a student concerning the 
convenience of service stations to customers. Customers were 
then asked to answer three short questions: from where they had 
just come, {ie. the last place they turned off the car•s engine); 
to where they were next·going (similarly defined); and why they 
came to that particular service station. 
6.6.5 The first two questions enable the calculation of AVO when 
plotted on a map. The third question was a brief check on the 
answers given to the first two, (eg. there is something wrong if 
the customer had an obviously high AVO, and yet maintained he 
came to that RSS because it was the most convenient), and it also 
gives a rough, but independent estimate of the importance of 
various attraction factors to customers. The emphasis in the 
questionnaire was on brevity and simplicity. The response rate 
was 99,3%. The results are summarised in Table 6C, and must be 
interpreted with caution because: 
(a) A single question which solicits answers cannot be as 
reliable as a series of questions designed to gauge the 
importance of the reasons for visiting an RSS. 
(b) The importance of each reason need not necessarily be 
proportional to the % occurrence in Table 6C, ie. for any 
single customer, one particular reason may exceed all 
others. 
6.6.6 Table 6C nevertheless confirms the overwhelming importance 
of locational convenience, and it also highlights the importance 
of habit (which in many cases is also related to loyalty).· 
(Habit was discussed in 4.2). 
6.6.7 On the same days the survey was conducted, each RSS was 
assessed for its attractive factors. The results are presented 
in Appendix 8. 
. I . . . 
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TABLE 6C. CUSTOMER REASONS FOR VISITING RSS 
REASON NUMBER OF CUSTOMERS AND PERCENTAGE 
RSS 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Locational % % % % % % 
convenience 58 93,5 55 83,3 43 81 '1 52 85,2 36 62 '1 244 81,3 
Habit 7 11 '3 12 18,2 17 32,1 13 21 , 3 l7 29,3 66 22,0 
Credit 3 4,8 6 9' 1 7 13,2 5 8,2 3 5,2 24 8,0 
Hunger 6 9,7 3 4,5 5 9,4 1 1,6 3 5,2 18 6,0 
Service 3 4,8 2 3,0 3 5,7 7 11 '5/ 2 3,4 17 5,7 
BRAND (Total)· 4 6,5 2 3,0 2 3,8 15 24,6 6 10,3 29 9,7 
She 11 6 6 2,0 
Ca1tex 15 15 5,0 
Mobil 2 2 0,7 
B p 4 2 6 2,0 
LOYALTY 1 1 '6 4 7,5 1 1 ,6 6 2,0 
OTHER l l 1 '9 1 1 ,6 3 1 ,0 
6.7 EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES: 
6.7.1 HYPOTHESIS: Convenience of location is the most important 
factor affecting the allocation of customers to RSS in the study 
area . 
. 6.7.2 METHOD 1: The model is set up to represent 11 real life" 
using 11 perfectn attraction factors. (4.17, 6.5). The model is 
. . . 
then rerun using the. same parameter values as in the "real life" 
calibration run, except that all the Rss•s attraction factors 
parameters are set to zero to eliminate their effect. 
. I ... 
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The result will be an allocation of customers based upon 
lbcational convenience only (th~ough the deterrence and distanc~ 
to next opportunity data). Identical parameters are used in 
this second run, because they define that particular set of RSS 
under study. 
6.7.3 RESULT 1. The r~sults are summarised in Table 60, which 
indicate that for this particular study area, the ignoring of 
all the RSS's attraction factors simultaneously (ie. the con-
centration upon locational factors) resulted in variations of 
sales between 0,1% and 12,5%. 
TABLE 60. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCATION 
J RSS 1 RSS 2 RSS 3 RSS 4 RSS 5 TOTAL 
Actual Sales 469 536 501 696 437 376 572 448 479 184 2 460 240 
Sales based upon 473 179 502 444 382 793 574 557 527 267 2 460 240 
location only 
Locational/actual % 100,8 100 '1 87,5 100,4 110,0 100,0 
6.7.4 It is likely that the above approach has underestimated the 
effect of RSS attraction factors, however. Not~ that total 
sales for each of the model's rl.(ns are identical. This means 
that during the "location 11 run, even though each RSS had zero 
attraction, the total number of customers attracted into the 
study area was still the same. In real life, some of these 
customers would have allocated themselves outside the study area 
ie. a problem of external interaction would arise. (4. 19, 6.5). 
However, one of the objectives in choosing the study area was to 
minimise this problem. (External customers in the study area 
comprised 8% of customers). For future research, it is suggested 
that a larger study area be .used to minimise the effect of 
external interaction. 
. I 
.. ~' ,_ , 
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6.7.5 METHOD 2. The model is set up to represent "real life" 
using "perfeit" attraction factors. It is then rerun using 
identical parameter values, but with the attraction factor 
for RSS 1 set to zero, other RSS retaining their ••actual" attrac-
tions. The synthesised sales of RSS 1 are then compared with 
its actual sales to indicate what proportion is accounted for 
by locational factors. The procedure is repeated for each RSS. 
6.7.6 RESULT 2. The results are summarised in Table 6E, which 
indicate that the power of locational factors to allocate cus-
tomers over RSS can vary from 41% to 53% of individual RSS sales. 
TABLE 6E. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCATION 
RSS 1 RSS 2 RSS 3 RSS 4 RSS 5 TOTAL 
Actual Sales 469 536 501 696 437 376 572 448 479 184 2 460 240 
Sales based upon 249 478 240 183 180 856 266 001 224 698 -
location only 
Locational/actual % 53 48 41 46 47 -
6.7.7 The problem of external interaction is likely to be considerably 
reduced using method 2, becaus~ customers will most likely allo-
cate themselves to other RSS within the study area, rather than 
outside the study area, when they are no longer "attracted" to 
any single RSS. 
6.7.8 The difference between the two approaches is that method 1 
gives an allocation of customers using locational factors only 
when all RSS have zero attraction at the same time, whereas method 2 
allocates customers assuming only one RSS has zero attraction --
the others remain as in "real life''. The answer to the question, 
"To what extent does location of an RSS account for the allocation 




(a) How many other RSS are competing for those custo~ers; 
(b) Whether the attractions of these competing· RSS are 
eliminated, or included in the model. 
The approach of method 2 is likely to be of the most value to 
users such a~ OCs. 
NOTE 1: A further confirmation of the importance of location 
as a factor allocating custome!s over RSS can be seen in the 
survey results of Table 6C: 81,3% of customers volunteered 
(ie. without any prompting) locational convenience as a reason 
for visiting the particular RSS. 
~~: The above results ·are also supported by those of the 
third hypothesis. 
NOTE 3: A close relationship exists between increases in 
deterrence and decreases in sales of an RSS (ceteris paribus). 
When the deterrence function from each i zone to RSS 4 was 
iteratively increased in compounded steps of 2%, then RSS 4•s 
sales fell, but not as rapidly as deterrence increased. The 
iterative series of runs on the model are summarised in Table 6F~44 ) 
TABLt: 6F. DETERRENCE -- SALES ANALYSIS 
ITERATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
% Deterrence Increase 2,0 4,0 6 '1 8,2 10,4 12,6 14,9 17,2 19,5 21 '9 
% Sales Decrease 4,0 7,7 11 ,3 14,8 18,3 21,7 25,0 28,2 31,4 34,4 
ITERATION 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
% Deterrence Increase 24,3 26,8 29,4 31 '9 34,6 37,3 40,0 42,8 45,7 
% Sales Decrease 37,4 40,2 43,0 45,7 48,3 50,8 53,3 55,6 57,9 
. I ... 
If the logarithm of sales are regressed against the increase in deterrence, 
the relation: loge (O!OOl.sales)=(8,23687- 1,89178(l+i)) where .i is the%. 
increase in deterrence is obtained. R2 = 0,9999. 
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6.7.9 HYPOTHESIS: The size of an Rss•s sales area is limited 
by competition. 
6.7.10 METHOD: The numbers of customers allocated to RSS 4 
will fall by more than 50% if the ratio of average deterrence 
from a 11 customer zones to RSS 4 to average deterrence from all 
i to all other RSS increases by 50%. Most of the customers 
lost by RSS 4 wi 11 be located outside its 50% sales area contour. 
6.7.11 RESULT: An increase in the average deterrence to RSS 4 
by 50% (deterrence to other RSS remaining in 11 real life") resulted 
in a fall in RSS 4 1 s sales of 61%. Table 6G analyses the cus-
tomers lost by RSS 4. Row d shows the % of customers lost outside 
the three sales area contours examined; row e shows the % of the 
sales area from which these customers were lost. Row f summarises 
the analysis by clearly showing a greater~~ of "peripheral" cus-
tomers to be lost to other RSS than "nearby" customers. This 
means that the severest competition exists on the peripheries 
of their market areas. 
TABLE 6G. DETERRENCE -- CUSTOMER ANALYSIS 
a Sales area (x%) = 53% 78% 91% 
b Total no. of customers lost 3 871 3 871 3 871 
c No. of customers lost outside x% sales area 2 216 1 220 51.3 
d % of customers lost outside x% sales area 57% 32% 13% 
' 
e % of sales area in which d were lost 47% 22% 9% 
f d/e % 122% 143% 147% 
6.7.12 HYPOTHESIS: A change in the attraction value of an 
RSS will have its greatest effect upon other RSS located inside 
its original sales areas. 
. I ... 
(245). 
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6.7.13 METHOD: The origina1{ 245 ) 25,1%, 51,2%, and 80,6% 
s~les areas of RSS 5 were examined when the attraction factor 
for RSS 5 was increased by 50%. {The attractions of other 
RSS remaining constant). It is shown that most of the addi-
tional customers gained by RSS 5 were already in its original 
sales areas. 
6.7.14 RESULT: T a b 1 e 6 H s u m_m a r i s e s the r e s u 1 t s of t h i s r u n . 
It clearly supports the view that RSS 5 is in competition with 
other RSS in the study area, and that its actions affect these 
RSS. (See 6.1). 
TABLE 6H. ATTRACTION ~- CUSTOMER ANALYSIS 
a Sales areas (x%) of RSS 5: 25,1% 51,2% 80,6% 
b Total no. of customers gained 1 973 1 973 1 973 
c No. of customers gained within x% s .. area 407 858 1 461 
d c/b%. ie. % of total gain 20,6% 43,5% 74,0% 
e Nos. of RSS within RSS 5's x% sales areas ·4,5 3,4,5 3,4,5 
f Index of sales area %s {base 25,1%) 100 204 321 
g Index of customer gain (base 20,6%) 100 211 359 
. I ... 
A gain of customers by an RSS must, of course, increase its original sales 
area contours. 
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6.7.15 The sales area %s (row a) have been compated to the% 
customer gains (row d) by constructing an index for each. 
They are presented in rows f and g. It can be seen that the 
greatest customer gains by RSS 5 have been made in the outer 
sales areas. This is because most customers close (ie. with 
a low deterrence) to RSS 5 were already patronising it. In-
creased patronage was obtained from those customers to whom two 
or more RSS had approximately equal deterrence. Tn these cus-
tomers, the increase in .. attraction .. of RSS 5 proved the turn-
ing point in their patronage. 
6.7.16 Thus the major competition between RSS will be through 
. the variation of their composite attraction factors, with the 
objective of gaining the customers closer to the peripheries of 
their sales areas (ie. on the outside of the 70-80% sales areas). 
6.7.17 This result also provides further support for the first hypo-
thesis above -- for the majority of customers, the deterrence 
function has proved more important than the attraction function 
in their RSS patronage decisions. The next hypothesis also 
supports the existence of this same competitive situation within 
sales areas. It shows how the closer RSS are to each other, 
the greater the competition for the SAME customers. 
6.7.18 HYPOTHESIS: Should the sales area of an RSS contain 
other RSS (sharing RSS), those sharing RSS will have a strong 
incentive to eliminate the first RSS; the sharing RSS lying 
in the 11 Closer" of the eliminated RSS's sales area contours 
will have the greater gains. 
6.7.19 NETHOO: The model was set up as for 11 rea1 life 11 , except tha1 
RSS 5 was eliminated. It was then recalibrated -- identical 
param~ters could not be used because they define only the ''real 
life" set of RSS. The allocation of customers resulting from 




6.7.20 RESULT: The customers ~reviously patronising RSS 5 
were allncated among RSS 1~2,3 and 4. RSS 4 is within the 
25,1% sales area contour, and RSS3and 4 are within the 51,2% 
sal~s area contour (see Rowe, Table 6H). This hypothesis 
maintains that RSS 3 and 4, in that order, will have the greatest 
%gains, (if other things are held equal). 
TABLE 61. ANALYSIS OF REMOVAL OF RSS 5. 
RSS NU~1BER 1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
a 11 Real 1 ife 11 allocation of customers 7 074 7 140 5 643 5 996 5 064 30 917 
b Allocation of customers with 7 297 7 908 7 608 8 104 30 917 RSS 5 eliminated -
c %I gains 3% 11% 35% 35% - 0% 
d e AIIKACIIUN 2,695 2 '714 3,142 2,707 2,482 
Table 61 presents the results of this analysis. As expected, 
RSS 3 and 4 have the highest gains. However~ it was expected 
that RSS 4 would have a greater % gain than 3 -- in fact the 
gains have been identical, although RSS 4 did have a greater 
absolute gain. The rea~on that RSS 3's % gain has been ·as 
large as 4's is that RSS 3 has a higher attraction factor in the 
model. Row d presents e raised to the power of the attraction 
factor for each RSS. It is clear that the attractions of RSS 
are an important factor in the .allocation of customers, 
PARTICULARLY when the RSS are close to each other. This supports 
the above hypothesis, because it again shows that when the 
importance of deterrence in the customer RSS patronage decision 
is low, (because the two RSS have approximately equal deterrence, 
or very low deterrence) the importance of the attraction factors 
becomes paramount. 
. I ... 
.. -
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6.8 ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
(246) 
6.8.1 Certain of the attractive factors of an RSS making up 
the composite attractive variable in the model are controllable, 
ie. may be varied if the RSS concerned, or its host OC desires. 
It would be of considerable value to the RSS to know what the 
effect on its sales will be if it changes one of these 
"attractive elements". {See Appendix 8). 
6.8.2 The method of obtaining the equation to predict the 
composite attraction variable has been described in 4.17 and 
6.5. The "attractive elements" of an RSS will be the inde-
pendent variables in this equation. The larger is the study 
area {and therefore the greater the number of RSS), the more 
observations there will be in the multiple regression equati·on. 
If there are N RSS in the study area (N observations) there 
may only be N-1 independent variables at the most.( 246 ) 
6.8.3 It is unfortunate from this .Point of view that the 
study area chosen ~ontained only five RSS. The best equation 
obtained used only three independent variables: first, a 
rating based on the existence of an attractive amenity (shopping 
centre, school, etc.) close to the RSS; second a customer ser-
vice rating; and third, the age of the RSS. The equation 
(t values in brackets) was: 
ATR = -0,65947 + 0,1388 ATRAM+ 0,171888 SERVC+ 0,015423 AGE. 
{-0,418) {0,884) {1,110) (1,128) 
6.8.4 In spite of the weakness·of this predictor.equation, some 
interesting results were obtained in Tabl~ 6J. The average of 
each of the attractive elements for the RSS under study was used 
to build a base case. The effects upon this base case of varying 
. I ... 
Johnstone, (1963), chapters 4 and 5. 
-~ -
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one attractive element at a tim~ were then examined . Positive 
. linear relationships were established between variations in the 
attractive elements, and base case sales. If, for example, 
. the age of this average RSS were somehow increased by 10% from 
29,4 to 32,34 years, and the ages of other RSS were held con-
stant, Table 6J indicates that its sales would increase by 3,29%. 
6.8.5 The size of the sales effect depends upon: 
(a) The number of independent variables in the multiple 
regression equation, and their parameters •. 
(b) The number of RSS in the study area. 
(c) The location of the RSS concerned in relation to its 
competitors. 
TABLE 6J. THE EFFECT ON SALES OF CHANGES IN 
SELECTED ATTRACTIVE ELEMENTS 
An independent increase of x% ... will cause the RSS's 
in one element only of ... composite attraction 
variable to change by: 
element x% 
l. ATTRACTIVE AMENITY 1% 0,4392% 
(For the study area, 
values ranged from 
l to,5) 10 4,39206 
100 43,92064 
2. CUSTOMER SERVICE: 1% 0,76452 
(For the study area, 
values ranged from 
3 to 6) 10 7,64529 . 
100 76,45295 
3. RSS AGE: 1% 0,44837 
.(For the study area, 
ages ranged from 
17 to 40 years) 10 4,48379 
100 44,8379 
... and this will cause 













6.8.6 An ~ttractive RSS has been defined in 4.17 as one which 
will draw more customers than its locational convenience alone 
justifies. The average customer AVO for an RSS will therefore 
.be a good indicator of its attractiveness -- not a perfect one, 
however, because the "centre of gravityn of customers locations 
will affect this AVO figure. For example, should a highly 
attractive RSS be located in the centre of the heaviest mass 
of population in the study area, its average customer AVO will 
be lower than expected. 
6.8.7 Table 6K presents these. two series of attractions. 
The exponent of the attraction factors calculated by the model 
are used, because this is the form in which the model uses them. 
A correlation coefficient of 0,94 was obtained. 
TABLE 6K. SIMILARITY OF AVO AND MODEL 1 S ATTRACTION 
RSS 1 2 3 4 5 
Average AVO 3,694 4,121 5,849 3,492 3,466 
e(Attraction) 2,695 2,714 3 '142 2,707 2,482 
6.8.8 The model and the survey have (although not intentionally) 
given a crude indication of the validity of the frame, search 
and habit concepts (4.2). 
6.8.9 The small B parameter obtained in the 11 real. life 11 run 
indicates that the distance to the next RSS opportunity has little 
correlation with the decision to visit an RSS. This indicates the 
existehce of customer habit, of limited customer search, and of 
customer frames of limited size. 
. . I ... 
. .. . 
186 
(a) 22% of the customers in the survey volunteered, without 
_any prompting, habit as a reason for their ·RSS visit. 
It is expected that this figure would be far higher had 
a direct question been asked. 
(b) This section has indicated the importance of age in 
determining the attractiveness of an RSS, in spite of 
the fact that the newest RSS in the survey was 17 years 
old! This indicates that very little is spent by 
customers on search to update their frames. The import-
ance of habit was also confirmed during the survey when 
it was noted that a "large"portion of the customers 
visiting RSS 3 were 11 elderly". RSS 3 and RSS 1 are 
both 40 years old (see Appendix 8). However, RSS 1 has 
lost much of its original character and now has a different 
clientele. 
6.8.10 RSS 3 and RSS 4 had the longest dealer service at 15 
and 17 years respectively. The combinations .of RSS age, 
dealer service, long service of the driveway staff, and unaltered 
character of the RSS apparently appeals to the older customers. 
It may possibly be argued that a high proportion of the elderly 
live in the area -- this point was not investigated. 
6.9 DETERRENCE -- A DISCUSSION, AND SUGGESTED NEW LOW COST APPROACH 
FOR THE OC. 
6.9.1 Chapter 4 developed the conce~t of AVO, and although this 
is the ideal theoretical RSS deterrence measure it was not used 
in the RSS model for practical reasons. (6.2) Instead, a 
road distance measure from customer zones to RSS was used. 
In spite of this apparent disadvantage., the model was adequately 
set up for the study area. One may conclude, therefore, that 
in this particular study area, working or residential proximity 
to RSS may be an important (possibly the most important) deter-
minant of RSS sales. 
. I ... 
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6.9.2 This does not discredit the AVO concept however, and 
particular care must be taken when using road distances in 
any other study because: 
(a) The study area chosen was particularly suited to the 
use of road distances (See 6.6). 
(b) A close relationship exists between AVOs and road 
distances (See 6.2)~ 
6.9.3 It is likely to be an expensive, time-consuming task to 
set up the model for a study area containing say, ten RSS. 
The model in this chapter took. approximately three normal 
working man weeks to set up, (remembering that one of the 
factors in the choice of study areas was ease of set-up). 
6.9.4 Appendix 9 provides the details of an RSS model that is 
likely to be markedly quicker and cheaper to set up, especially 
over large areas. It will have some sacrifice in accuracy, 
but will be an improvement on the sales prediction method~ 
being used by many OC at present. 
6.10 HIGH CONCENTRATION AREAS 
6.10.1 A phenomenon which has been observed is the existence of 
"pockets" of RSS in certain areas. For example, there is the 
inevitable 11 gasoline alley" in small towns on national roufes; 
there are also "corridors" of RSS lying on the major routes into 
cities (eg. Voortrekker Road, Cape Town). 
6.10.2 It is suggested that these high RSS concentrations 
emerge in single or merged high profit market areas. New RSS 
are attracted to these areas even if a substantial number are 
already there, because the existing competitors are in fixed 
locations, whereas the entering RSS have a choice at" locations. 
Th.is choice allows them to gain a "large" share of the market 
. ' . 
(until_ yet another RSS enters the area). The inhibition of much 
competition (See Ch.8) also ensures that some of the RSS, which 
would otherwise disappear do not. 
. . I 
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6.10.3 For example, assume a town on a national route has 
three RSS, all located in its main street, a~d that none of 
ihem is making outstanding profits. A new RSS may locat~ on 
the periphery. of the town on the main road, and it may compete 
away a lucrative portion of the market. The outcome will be 
three RSS with "low" sales, and one RSS at the entrance to the 
town, with high sales (drawing the eyes of yet another potential 
competitor!) 
6. 10.4 The high concentration area concept is outside the 
limits of this thesis. (1.2) However, an approach to 
empirical evaluation could be the comparison of median and 
modal sales of RSS in a study area. The larger the divergence 
between the two within an area of limited size,. the more likely 
the above situation exists. 
I . . . 
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"The interests of governments are of many kinds; oil is often 
the lifeblood of their economies and vital to their military 
security; it plays a role in external political alignments and 
responsibilities; it influences, sometimes powerfully, their 
balance of payments; it is a significant item for their tax 
receipts in dom~stic currency; and it is responsible for the 
creation of vested interests which often exercise considerable 
economic and political influence. Each government is faced 
with a different set of circumstances, and the relative import-
ance of the individual ingredients varies, necessitating 
different weightings in the determination of the general 
policies to be adopted". ( 247 ) 
7.1 .1 The objective of this chapter is to set up the DG-goal 
regulatory theory of 5.15 to enable it to be used to test several 
hypotheses in the final c~apter.( 248 ) The DG and RGs are 
identified, as are their goals. 
to both the groups and goals. 
Weightings are then applied 
The contentious nature of this 
work has necessitated research in a range of areas, and a depend-
ence upon the views of·a variety of writers. If the reader is 
unh~ppy with any of the results provided in the evaluation 
matrices at the end of this chapter, he is asked to refer to 
Chapter 8, in which several maj6r hypotheses affecting some of 
the evaluatinns are derived, using methods other than the DG 
goals theory. In addition, a computer model is developed in 
Chapter 8 to allow for the rapid evaluation of alternative 
v a 1 u e s of content i o us v a r i a b 1 e s . . T hi s •• s e n s i t i v i t y a n a 1 y s i s " 
allows the effect of error in a variable•s derivation to be 
seen in the final regulatory decision's outcome. 
. l ... 
Penrose, (1968), P.23. 
In spite of Posner•s assertation that regulatory theory has not been 
" •.. refined to the point where it can generate hypotheses sufficiently 
precise :to be verified empirically". Posner, (1974), P. 356. 
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7.2 LIST OF REGULATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS GOVERNING RSS/OC OPERATIONS 
(249) 
7.2.1 up to 1977, a variety of acts had been used to control 
·various aspects of the oil industry-- these are summarised in 
8.3. The Petroleum Products Act; No.l20 of 1977, had the 
effect of placing most of the government's powers over the oil 
industry into a single Act. In addition to the specific 
regulations discussed below, this Act gives the government the 
power to manipulate the oil industry at will. 
7.2.2 UROTA {Undue Restraint of Trade Act, No. 50 of 1949) 
.To combat 11 ••• certain combines, associations and cartels which 
give rise to monopolies••.( 249 ) 
" ... the main article the minister has in mind in connection with 
this bill is the sale and distribution of petrol and· oil".< 250 ) 
7.2.3 UROTA ensures that petrol supplies cannot be denied by 
the OCto a garage operator wishing to sell petrol, providing that 
the potential RSS reaches certain standards. UROTA was repealed 
by the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act {No. 24 of 1955). 
However, it did not disappear as a regulatory force, but instead 
was then included in the unpublished Rationalisation Plan (an 
agreement between the OC and Department of Commerce -- see below). 
7.2.4. UROTA applies only to RSS with pumps installed on or 
after 6/4/50. Major UROTA requirements are that-~he applicable· 
RSS must have at least one qualified mechanic, sufficien't floor 
space for repairs to be carried out on six vehicles simultaneous-
ly, and a range of tools. In effect, the Act ensures that 
f 
applicable petrol sellers also become fully equipped repair 
garages. Once these UROTA standards have been met, any garage 
that wishes to become a petrol seller is entitled to supplies 
. I 
Minister of Commerce, Hansard 23/6/49. 
(2SO) Hansard 24/6/49. 
(251) 
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from one of the OC. Should one of the OCs decide that the 
~arage would be a profitabl~ petrol reseller, and therefore 
desire to contract with it, the resultant RSS would then come 
off that particular OC's rationalisation plan quota. (See 
below). However, should none of the OCs want to tie that 
garage, it then has the right to be allocated by the Department 
of Commerce to one of the OCs for ~ts fuel supplies. It then 
becomes known as a ROSTER RSS. 
7.2.5 Note that there are two further institutions maintaining 
UROTA type requirements for RSS. Firstly, the MIF refuses 
to admit new RSS members which do not measure up to standards 
very similar to those of UROTA. Secondly, the various munici-
palities in RSA all have building restrictions and standards 
requiring various minimum specifications to be met. 
7.2.6 The above ensure that it is highly likely that any new 
RSS built in RSA today is also a fully equipped repair garage, 
with one exception. Certain areas, notably the "country 11 
areas, and 11 Bantu" areas, will have some of the UROTA require-
ments waived by the Secretary for Commerce upon application . 
. 7.2.7 THE RATIONALISATION PLAN~ 251 ) This is an informal 
agreement between the government, the OC and the MIF, which 
has been in force since 1960. It consists of a series of five 
year plans, in which each of the petrol wholesalers (OCs) have 
the number of new RSS which they may open limited by quota. 
The plan also allows the participants to open a limited number 
of new RSS, on condit~on that they close an equal number of 
nearby RSS already in existence -- such 11 Swops 11 do not come off 
quota allocations~ 
Further points of note are: 
. I ... 
See G. Kukard, Sunday Times Nov. 72. Also Financial Mail, 1st quarter 71, 
Survey on the SA oil industry. 
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(a) The plan makes provision for the Minister of Economic 
.. Affairs, at his discretion, to add further RSS to the 
quotas of each participant. These additional q~otas 
tend to be used as a "reward" for companies that promote 
the participation of South African capital and ~nter-
prise in the oil ~ndustry. Local location and owner-
ship of oil industry components is a specific DG 
objective. (See 7.5.1ld}. 
(b} The smaller OC (Esso and Trek} are given additional 
quotas. 
(c) The development of sites which, in the opinion of the 
Secretary for Commerce are in the national interest 
(eg. in 11 developing" areas) will not come off quotas. 
(d) ROSTER sites do not come off quotas. 
(e) In rural areas, some general dealers sell petrol -- the 
rationalisation plan prevents the OC from supplying 
equipment to a dealer if he is within a "certain" 
(unknown) distance from an RSS. 
(f) The plan provides that there shall be no restrictive 
clauses in any OC/RSS contracts, other than those 
tying the RSS to a certain brand of fuel; ie. contracted 
supplies for tyres, batteries and various other accessor-
ies are prohibited. 
7.2.8 CONTROLS UPON THE SITING OF AN RSS. The ~1inister of 
Economic Affairs, and the "local authorities" of various areas 
are empowered to control the location and erection of buildings, 
and to demolish or alter existing buildings. ( 252 } An OC or 
other person wishing to build a new RSS must submit pl~ns to 
the local authority for consideration. These plans are 




land survey, roads, building survey, water and 
Normally the local building surveyor-makes the 
as to whether the RSS may be built. However, in 
certain cases such as rezoning or relaxation of zones, the 
authority of the Administrator is required. .. I ... 
(252 ) Sub-section (1) of Section 35 of Ordinance 33 of 1934; and National Building 
Regulations and Building Standards Act, No. 103 of 1977. 
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7.2.9 Building regulations vary depending upon the area, but 
typically, cover the following areas: 
(a) A division of land into zones, certain of which 
prohibit RSS. 
(b) Minimum building/land area ratios. 
(c) Prescriptions of distances from main roads, and 
details of entrance and exit roads. 
(d} Minimum parking areas. 
(e) Limitations of work that may be done in certain zones. 
7.2.10 It can be seen that the government therefore has a 
means of "channelling 11 new RSS development into areas that 
it desires. Although each case is theoretically considered 
on its merits, the right of veto remains as a powerful poli-
tical tool should the government require. Note also that 
the s e t t i n g · of b u i 1 d i n g stand a r d s con s t i tu t e s a f o r m of 
barrier to entry. 
7.2.11 PETROL PRICE AND MARGIN CONTROLS. The Minister of 
Economic Affairs is empowered to control, inter aZia, the 
prices and therefore margins of fuel products in South Africa. { 253 ) 
In 3.5 there is a discussion on, and breakdown of the price 
structure. 
7.2. 12 Between April, 1971, and February, 1979, there were 
thirteen petrol price changes. In 1960, the OC fixed GM was 
approximately 1,7 c/L, and it remained unchanged until March, 
1977, when it was decreased by 0,3 c/L.C254 ) The GM all~wed 





year. However, this does not reflect the true RSS 
as the OC normally allow the RSS some negotiated 
In 1977, the average RSS margin, including rebates, 




) Price Control Act No. 25 of 1964, Petroleum Products Act No. 120 of 1977. 
{254} 
Financial Mail, 1st quarter 76, P.923; 1st quarter 77, P.643; 4th quarter 75, 
P.432. See Table 3C. 





7.2. 13 Petrol price and margin changes are not promulgated 
by the Minister. The Department of Commerce and the OC 
agree upon a proposed price change, and notice is then given 
in writing to the OCs. A few days before the change, the 
OCs give notice to the RSS. The public is normally notified 
of the change through the various media, at the time of the 
change or possibly a little before. 
7.2. 14 CONTROLS UPON RSS TRADING HOURS, THE PRIVATE STORAGE 
AND TRANSPORTATION OF FUEL, AND UPON SPEED LIMITS. The 
National Supplies Procurement Act 1970, empowers the Minister 
of Economic Affairs to controi the procurement, distribution 
·and selling of a variety of goods and services. Certain 
loopholes in the Bill( 256 ) were eliminated by the Petroleum 
Products Act, 1977. This Act gives the government unlimited 
powers to control the 11 Strategic 11 oil industry, including com-
plete control over the entry of new RSS. 
7.2. 15 Changes in RSS trading hours, prohibitions of the 
private transport and storage of petrol, speed limits and 
maximum fuel tank sizes for vehicles are normally gazetted 
by the minister. These regulations are aimed primarily at 
the private motorists, who consume 70~80% of the petrol in 
South Africa. (257 ) 
7.2.16 REGULATIONS GOVERNING ADVERTISING AND SALES PROMOTION 
(ASP) BY THE OC.(ZSB) The minutes of a meeting between .the 
OC and the Department of Commerce form the basis of an agree-
ment governing ASP. The essence of the agreement is that ASP 
be. limited to emphasising economy, (as opposed to other f~ctors 
such as power), and that chance, or game type promotions be 
prohibited. It is suspected that the agreement also includes 
limitations upon ASP budget sizes. Within this environment, 
each OC has the incentive to increase its advertising effective-
ness, and also to police the others for transgressi.ons of the 
·agreement. 
. I 
Certain RSS were able to sell after hours; a motorist·prosecuted for speeding 
was acquittted because he had been going downhill at the time. 
Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 76, P.ll35. 
Sales promotion refers to direct selling methods to customers, whereas advertis-
ing refers to increasing the awareness of customers, in OC parlance. 
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7.2.17 Note that the Petroleum Products Act now empowers 
the Minister of Economic Affairs to control ASP. 
7.2. 18 PATRIOTIC APPEALS. Although this does not fall under the 
definition of regulation, it should be noted that the government 
has made numerous "patriotic" appeals to industry and the public 
to conserve fuel. The~e appeals therefore constitute a tool in 
the arsenal that the governme~t uses to control the OC/RSS. 
It is not known how effective these appeals are. 
7.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE DECISION GROUP (DG) .. 
7.3. 1 The objective of this section is to identify the DG 
controlling RSS/OC regulation, as required by the DG goal 
theory. (See 5.15). Particular care has been taken to 
attempt to. identify real, rather than nominal authority hier-
archies and communications lines, 
7.3.2 The cabinet, (consisting only of full, as opposed to 
deputy ministers), is at the pinnacle of the South African 
governmental decision-making hierarchy. (259 ) Its position 
is illustrated in Diagram 7A, which shows the major groups in 
this hierarchy. The cabinet, whose members are both heads of 
the various state departments, and who are also members of 
parliament, is " ... th~ real source of executive decisions".( 260 ) 
This executive is 
11 
• • • the s u p rem e pow e r n u c 1 e u s o f t h e who 1 e · s y s t e m o. f 
South African government and administration."(261) 
~sg) B. Raux, in P.7o of D. Worrall, (1975l. 
(260) Supra. 
(261 } Raux, in P.64 of D. Worrall, (1975). 





7. 3. 3 
(a) 
( b ) 
(c ) 
1 96 
Th f . f 't (262) e our pr1mary reasons or 1 s power are. 
The executive maintains a key role in the appointments 
of parliamentary and executive officials, and of judg~s. 
It initiates most legislation. 
It has the primary responsibility for the impl~mentation 
of most legislation. 
(d) The working procedures of parliament provide it with 
decision advantages. 
7.3.4 The prime minister is initially appointed by the leaders 
of the majority party in parliament -- a decision which is 
11 ratified 11 by the state president. The prime minister then 
. selects his executive councillors (ministers). The majority 
party therefore not only has a parliamentary majority, but it 
has a complete control of the cabinet. 
7.3.5 The prime minister is therefore 11 potentially the most 
important single political actor in the polity 11 .( 263 ) According 
to Schrire( 264 ) South African prime ministers have traditionally 
been strong figures unchallenged by their colleagues. He has 
numerous opportunities to influence policy, and where there is 
no strong opposition his views will usually prevail. He also 
has 11 ••• several means whereby he can delay policies that he d·oes 
not approve of but dare not openly oppose 11 • ( 265 ) Of particular 
importance is his role as chairman during cabinet meetings. 
He is not all-powerful, however, and whenever he is in strong 
disagreement with his cabinet, he will be overruled. 
7.3.6 Although the cabinet is in the supreme position on the 
decision hierarchy, it is obviously not the sole policy making 
body, particularly in matters requiring the evaluation and 
analysis of issues of great complexity. The expansion of 
modern government, and the number of complex decisions, has 
. I ... 
Supra. 
Schrire, (1978), P.179. 
Supra, P.177. 




led to the greater use of cabinet committees in critical 
areas such as defence and economic affairs. (See "Public 
Agencies", 7.3.15)·. The cabinet has remained the pre-eminent 
policy-making body however, although the policy ratification, 
rather than initiation and formulation aspect should be 
emp h. as is.e d. 
7.3.7 Cabinet ministers are very important influences on 
policy formulation, particularly within their areas of 
11 Specialisation 11 • Not only will they have a varying _say in 
the policy act~vities of the cabinet( 266 ) but also a decisive 
influence on policy matters falling within their departments. 
7.3.8 The South African parliament is the ~~ ... sovereign 
legislative in and over the Republic 11 • ( 267 ) It comprises 
a House of Assembly, and a Senate -- the House of Assembly 
being the more powerful of the two. (268 ) Membership is 







" ... in the house itself, the majority party is 
·the daminating force which is in turn dominated by 
the cabinet". (269) 
The powers of the house are, in order of importance:( 270 ) 
The passing of legislation. 
The control of the executive. 
Certain judicial decisions. 
The hearing of petitions. 
The Senate consists of members elected by the House of 
Assembly, the provincial councillors, and by the state presi-
dent. It has powers and procedures that are somewhat similar 
to, but restricted by, the House.(271 ) Roux maintains that: 
. I ... 
Supra., P.l81. 
(
2671 Section 59 (1), Constitution Act, No. 32, 1961. 
(268) 
Raux, in Pp. 48~58 of Worrall, (1975). 
(269). 
Raux, P. 51, ibid. 
(.270) Ibid. 









11 Jt has .clearly been ·used as an instrument to further 
...... 
the policies of the ruling party in the House 11 • ( 272 ) 
7.3.11 The State President is 
11 
••• a nominal, ceremonial head of state 11 ;( 273 ) and 
11 
••• an instrument of the executive council 11 .( 274 ) 
He is elected by the House of Assembly and the Senate, and 
will invariably be from the majority party. (275 ) 
7.3. 12 The central administration consists of the state 
departments, and of other 11 public agencies 11 • (See 7.3. 15). 
11 These institutions have been created to carry out 
governmental objectives but all of them also 
participate in various ways in the broad policy 
making process which eventually culminates in 
1 e g i s 1 at i on ... (2 7 6 ) 
7.3. 13 The ministers are the constitutional heads of depart-
ments. The prime controllers in the state departments are 
the administrators (secretaries and under-secretarie$) who 
are often delegated considerable powers by their ministers.( 277 ) 
7.3,14 The influence of the secretary on policy varies from 
department to department, as will the influence of senior 
bureaucrats. Schrire( 278 ) identifies three factor~ affecting 
this influence: first, the technical character of the de~artment 







Schrire, (1978}_, P.l82. 
th.e more technical and non-controversial the departr.~ent, the 
more likely the secretary and his delegates will be the de 
facto policy makers. On this score, the Secretary for 
.Comme~eis likely to have considerable powers, Secondly, 
the larger the department, the more delegation required, 
lessening the influence of the minister and secretary through 
necessary delegation, and through the administrative workload. 
The Department of Commerce is a relatively small ministry, with 
its budgetary vote comprising 38% of the mean 1977-78 Depart-
ment vote. (279 ) Thirdly, the character and involvement of 
the minister in his department are important. 
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} . 3 . 1 5 The 11 pub 1 i c age n c i e s" i. n D i a gram 7 A con s i s.t of t h.e 
following~280 ) 
(a) Department type state-owned and government-controlled 
commercial enterprises. (eg. the railways and post 
office). 
(b) Public corporations. (eg. T~e Land and Agricultural 
Bank of SA.: the Reserve Bank, the SA Iron and Steel 
Industrial Corporation). 
{c} Agricultural produce control boards, in terms of the 
Marketing Act, 1937. Bearing in mind the 11 ••• rural 
bias of the ruling political party ... "( 281 ) it should 
be noted, for the discussion on the DG matrix below, 
that " ... these boards were established to protect the 
interests of the producers first". ( 282 ) 
(d) Special purpose control boards consisting of specially 
qualified persons appointed by a minister or the state 
president. ·(eg. the National Transport Commission, 
the Board of Censors). 
(e) Advisory councils, generally created for the tendering 
of advice to senior political executives. There are 
a great variety of these boards, at both the national 
and the provincial level. (eg. Economic Advisory 
Council, Board of Commerce and Industry, Cabinet 
Committee on Energy Policy, Planning Advisory Committee). 
(f} Councils for particular trades and professions. 
These boards are presc~ibed limited self government by 
a minister, and generally work in close liaison with the 
state department concerned. (eg. the SA Medical and 
Dental Council, the Apprentice Boards). 
(g)_ Boards and Councils of a judicial nature. These boards 
are created when ".,.the ordinary courts are considered_ 
to be ineffective instruments for the realisation of 
certain ends .. ,"( 283 ) (eg. Unemployment Benefits Council, 
Industrial Councils). . I ... 
Raux, P.99, P.l09 in Worrall, (1975). 
Supra; P .104. 
(2821 Supra_, P.lo3. 
(283) 
B. Raux, P.l05 of Worrall, (1975). 
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( h ) N a t i on a 1 r e s e a· r c h i n s t i t u t i o n s . T he s e a r e s p e c i a 1 
institutions which have been established outside the 
public service. (eg. the SA Bureau of Standards, the 
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research). 
(i) Ad hoc committees and commissions. An increasing 
number of these committees and commissions are being 
used as policy advisory instruments, and for enquiries 
where illegal activities are suspected. 
7.3. 16 In 1975, there were 41 government departments, and over 
100 statutory boards, councils, commissions and corporations 
directly under control of the cabinet. Roux( 284 ) maintains 





the problem of executive co-ordination''. He also maintains 
that there is often duplication of work. The device of special 
advisors at the prime minister level was used to attempt to 
solve the problem, but has. actually aggravated it.( 285 ) 
7.3. 17 The SA constitution provides that the judiciary may 
only challenge the right of parliament to pass legislation 
when such legislation affects entrenched clauses of the 
constitution.( 286 ) However. the constitution provides it 
with the power of complete autonomy in its juridical function, 
protecting it from all outside interference. It has been 
suggested, however, that the cabinet has certain powers over 
the judiciary: 
"Curtailment of the judiciary's powers, decision-
making by commission, complete pragmatism in inter-
governmental relations, increasing participation by 
top officials in the policy making process •.. 11·{287) 
. I ... 
B. Roux, P.71, P.82, Op Cit. 
Supra_, P. 72 • 
Sections 59>108,118, Constitution Act, No. 32, 1961. 
B. Roux, P.29, Op Cit. 
(288) 
202 
7.3.18 There are four separate provincial authorities in SA, 
each wi~h ·a provincial administrator who is appoi~ted by, and 
is the agent of the central authority.( 288 ) He is r~sponsible 
for ensuring that central government policies are appli.ed in the 
provinces. i• ••• South Africafl provincial authorities have very 
little scope fo~ decision-making indepe~dent of the central 
government".( 289 ) The provincial administrator is chairman of 
an executive committee whose members are elected by the majority 
party. The executive committee i.s primarily a "cabinet" to 
assist the administrator. The provincial council performs a 
role not unlike that of the House of Assembly at the national 
level. The members of the provincial council are elected, and 
their power to pass legislation is limited to that which is 
..... of a merely local or private nature in the province 11 .( 290 ) 
Roux( 291 ) has noted the increasing financial dependence of the 
provincial authorities on the national exchequer. 
7.3. 19 The local authorities consist of bodies of various sizes, 
powers and functions, but are no real independent authority. {292 ) 
The local authorities are empowered to pass by-laws, but subject 
to the approval of the provincial administrator. However, 
" ... central government and provincial legislation has precedence 
over by-1aws".( 293 ) 
7.3.20 Each of the regulations and constraints governing RSS 
1 i s ted i n 7 . 2 w a s exam i ned w i t h the o b j ec t of i den t i f y i n g t h e 
groups who: 
(a) Did the actual negotiating with the relevant groups 
concerned with the proposed legislation. 
{b) Designed the regulatory proposals~ 
(c) Ratified or vetoed these proposals. 
{d) Controlled the implementation of the proposals. 
. I ... 
B. Roux, P.110 in Worrall, (1975). 





Section B4{1) L,m, Constitution Act, 1961. 
B. Roux, 0p Cit., P.33. 
B. Roux, ibid, P.116. 
Ibid., P.122. 
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7.3.21 The most impo~tant regulations governing the RSS and 
DC, the price controls and the rationalisation plan, were 
negotiated and designed primarily by the Department of Commerce. 
The Secretary for Commerce would have been directly involved at 
the "working" level, and he would have reported to the Minister 
of Economic Affairs, who presented the regulatory proposals to 
the cabinet. It is particularly important to note that these 
regulations were not promulgated as an act. Not only does 
this mean that the regulatory ·details are not available to the 
public, but also that parliament did not have the opportunity 
to use its normal powers to influence the regulations. Any 
special advisory bodies involved in the rationalisation pro-
posals would have been directly under the control of the 
Department of Commerce. 
7.3.22 UROTA was initially an act of parliament, but was 
repealed in 1955 (see 7.2). This suggests that various 
members of parliament were initially involved in the drawing 
up of UROTA, in addition to the persons suggested immediately 
a b o v e . Howe v e r , t h e fa c t t h a t i t w a s i n c 1 u d e d i n t h e ,. a t i o n a ·1 -
isation plan after 1955 suggests that it was amended, without 
the inclusion of the parliamentary group (an~ the attendant 
publicity) in the new regulations. 
7.3.23 Controls upon the siting of an RSS fall under the 
authority of the local authorities in all cases except when 
a policy decision has to be made. The guidelines which the local 
authorities may use for decisio~-making ar~ received from the 
Department of Commerce. Thus conditions governing RSS siting, 
in addition to reflecting local authority objectives, will _also 
adhere to national objectives which have been set. Initially, 
these national objectives would be set by the cabinet and by 
parliament through various acts, and thereafter would be en-
forced at a local authority level (with the provincial adminis-
tration ensuring that the ruling party's objectives were being 
adhered to). 
. I ... 
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7.3.24 Price and margin controls fall under two acts. (See 7.2). 
The fact that petrol price and margin changes are not gazetted 
(unlike many other price controlled commodities: eg. bricks, 
steel) means that the minister retains such decisions for him-
self, hi.s department, and ultimately of course, the cabinet. 
This is in contrast to regulations promulgated under the 
National Supplies Procu~ement Act which, although givin~ the 
minister wide powers to control the procurement, distribution 
and selling of a variety of goods and services, nevertheless 
requires him to allow parliament limited authority in the 
structuring of regulations which fall under it. 
7.3.25 The last major area of RSS/OC governmental control 
discussed in 7.2 was that covering advertising and sales 
promotion. Once again, there is no legislation involved, 
and the control is an "informal" one between the Department 
of Commerce and the OC. The DG would therefore be the same 
as that constructing the rationalisation plan. 
7.3.26 In summary, the major DG components involved in the 
construction of RSS/OC regulation are, in order of importance: 
(a) The Department of Commerce, under the policy direction of 
the Minister of Economic Affai~s. The Secretary f~r 
Commerce would appoint and guide groups for specific 
tasks, but such groups would have little independent 
decision-makin9 authority from him. 
(b) The cabinet, from which ·the minister receives broad· 
policy direction, and to which he submits major policy 
decisions. 
(c) Parliament, for those regulations in which it is i~volved. 
(Regulations which parliament has assisted in shaping will 
still reflect the objectives of the majority party, however). 
(d) The provincial authorities, in the light of power dele-· 
gated to them by the Department of Commerce. 











7.3.27 NOTE: There are allegations that the Afrikaanse 
Broederbond, a national society with membership re~tricted 
to certain elite Afrikaners, is a manifestation of the SA DG • 
. "The SA government today is the Broederbond and the Broederbond 
is the government".( 294 ) It is maintained that the majority 
of senior government posts, including the prime minister's, 
are held by Broederbond inembers( 295 ) and also that there are 
' 
close ties between the primary Afrikaans church (the NGK) and the 
Broederbond. ( 296 ) 
The Broederbond was formed in 1918; '' ... one of its most important 
aims ... the cutting of all cons~itutional ties with Britain and 
·the establishment of a free, independent, republic ruled by 
Afrikaners''.( 297 } Other objectives.were the promotion of the 
Afrikaans language and culture( 298 } (although it is not a cul-
tural organisation( 299 )), and the Afrikaans domination of SA! 300 ) 
primarily through economic control. ( 301 ) 
7.3.28 It is argued that today the Broederbond might not be as 
influential as before 1948; for the Nationalists to " ... hold 
the reigns of power is to hold all the power worth having"_( 302 ) 
. I . . . 








Harris in Worrall, (1975), P.262. 
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7.4 THE DG OBJECTIVES 
(303) 
7.4.1 The four ideals listed in 5.15 were intended to be 
broad enough to cover the more definitive objectives of most 
\ 
DGs. An attempt is made below to isolate the major objectives 
of the SA (governm~nt} DG: this list will be focused upon the 
oil industry. Although the four ideals below are probably 
broad enough to cover any DG objectives, the list of DG 
objectives presented below will certainly not be comprehensive. 
For example, the objective of community health( 303 ) does not 
have a direct enough connection with the oil industry· to 
warrant its inclusion in the list below. Each ideal has been 
cited, and then a likely list of objectives for the achievement 
of the ideal by the SA DG . 
7.4.2 In certain cases., the objectives are entirely logically 
derived from the ideal, but more often the objectives listed 
will be contentious. In such cases, an attempt has been made 
to obtain the consensus of various writers. 
7.4.3 Note that these DG-matrix objectives suggested below 
will be somewhat more 11 selfish and per·sonal 11 than the 11 tradi-
tional" governmen·tal objectives mentioned (along with other 
theories) in Ch.5, such as: 
(a) "Correcting•• the divergence between social and commercial 
costs and benefits, or between public and private risk 
preferences and time preferences~ 
(b) 11 Correcting" the profits made from the exploitation of a 
particular resource or commodity. 
(c) The redistribution of employment or wealth from one group 
to another. 
(d) The manipulation of infant industries, industries facing 
structural changes, or industries which substantially 
affect imports or exports. 
I ... 
van der Merwe, P.J., P.l88, in Lombard, (1972). 
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7.4.4 It is particularly important to bear in mind that many of 
the DG goals suggested below are mutually incompatible, and 
involve trade-offs with one another. These trade-offs will 
only be briefly mentioned below. However, they will be in-
cluded in the evaluation matrices of 7.15 and 7. 16. In 5.15.29-32 
it was shown that trade-offs in goals are accommodated by the 
model. 




7.5.1 The DG will wish to secure the tenure of the positions that 
it already holds. "The first responsibility of a government 
is to provide a secure life for all citizens".( 304 ) The 
priority of the state security goal is emphasised in this 
government publication. The independent development of popu-
lation groups (apartheid) at times seems to be emphasised as 
a security, rather than ideological goal. ( 305 ) 
7.5.2 Note: "State security" is a phrase ,on the lips of many 
white South Africans today. Essentially, it is a phrase which 
covers the security, indeed the survival, of the DG and their 
supporters. State security is not discussed as an ideal or 
objective because many of the objectives discussed below contain 
elements of it. It may therefore be defined as threats to DG 
goals. 
OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE DG IDEAL 1. 
7.5.3 The DG will wish to ensure th~t adequate defensive power 
. b h . . 1 d 1 . (306) ex1sts to counter ot 1ts 1nterna an externa enem1es . 
. I ... 
"South Africa 77", P. 321. SA Department of Information •. 
Supra, ·p. 9 42 • 
Barber in Leftwich, (1974), Pp.319-339. 
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11 The absolute essential minimal function that government 
must provide for any society is protection against 
external and internal enemies. The government is the 
group exercising dominant force; if the existing govern-
ment group flils to provide protection in a trial of 
strength, the newcomers will then constitute the 
government 11 • (307) 
This view is backed, in the SA context, by de Crespigny.( 308 ) 
he overthrow of the colonial governments in Angola and Mocam-
bique, and their replacement by black (marxist) rulers, and the 
severe pressures that the Rhodesian DG faces in the war with 
black dissidents, provide a crude barometer of the pressures 
upon the SA DG. 
7.5.4 An indication of the importance of the defence objective 
is provided in Table 7A. 
TABLE 7A. S.A. DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (Rm). (309 ) 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1971/2 72/3 73/4 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/8 
DEF. EXP. 39 
% of GOP 1,0 
38 192 272 
0,8 2,6 2,1 
317 335 472 692 948 1350 1654 
2~2 2,1 2,4 2,8 3,5 4,4 4,8 
Other defence related expenditures should also be examined, primarily: 
Pub 1 i c \vorks on mi 1 itary bases: 
Police and law buildings: 










(307 ) Hirsh1eifer; (1976}, P.480. 
{308) de Crespigny and Schrire, (1978}, P.221. 
(309) 







7.5.5 The imposition and maintenance of a legal framework will 
be an objective of the DG for two primary reasons. Firstly, 
it is an essential function of any government to provide a 
system of rights or property within which society may operate 
in a disciplined (and therefore more efficient) manner. 
Secondly, and more importantly, this legal framework is also the 
means by which the government will operate to achieve its goals. 
Several of these goals will even be achieved directly through 
the legal framework, for example, apartheid objectives (7.8) 
and controls upon the use of petroleum fuels (7.7.) . 
. 7.5.6 The DG will wish to provide adequate police power to 
enforce the law. Certain writers believe that the distinction 
between the .police and the military is at times blurred, with 
the police tending to play a military-type and intelligence 
role in dealing with certain groups hostile to the present DG. 
"An immense and all pervading security system has thus 
become an essential part and necessary buttress of 
the discriminatory policy of apartheid".(310) 
This view has been confir~ed by the government: "External 
security is maintained by the country's military establishment 
and, to a lesser extent, by its police force".( 3ll) 
Schlemmer implies that the police are an important tool of the 
DG in the achievement of their goals: 
"South Africa is an authoritarian society embodying · 
considerable formal powers of coercion, sustained not 
only by powerful and far-reaching laws against sub-
version but also by administrative action by the (312 ) security police outside the scope of the courts". 
. I ... 
Maud in Leftwich, (1974), P.302. 
"South Africa 1977", P.319. SA Departmen;t of Information. 
Schlemmer, in P.160, de Crespigny and Schrire, (1978) • 
(313) 
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7.5.7 The maintenance of peace, both within the productive 
sector( 3l 3 ) and betw~~n various groups,( 314 ) will be a DG 
sub-objective within the maintenance of a legal framework. 
According to van der Merwe 
11 The objective of industrial peace involves the pre-
vention and settlement of disputes between employers 
and employees and the prevention of inter-racial 
competition in the labour sphere ... (315) 
7.5.8 Industrial peace is desired by the DG to allow the 
attainment of others of their goals. The scope of police and 
law power in SA, according to Schlemmer( 316 ) reflects the "pre-
ventative" goal of the government. This is another phrase for 
"state security", mentioned at the be,9inning of this section. 
7.5.9 The DG will wish to ensure that supplies of "strategic"· 
resources, particularly oil products, are secured. " ... an 
effective embargo on oil deliveries to the Republic would ... 
cause economic hardship". ( 317 ) A shortage of oil could also 
endanger many of the OG objectives (for example, all those 
discussed so far, to some extent). 
I 
7.5.10 Up to the end of 1978, 90% of sA•s crude was imported 
from Iran.( 318 ) In the light of the (conflicting) DG goals 
of secure supply and balance of payments equilibrium (see 7.7), 
this was no doubt the most efficacious policy at the time. 
The. cessation of Iranian supplies has necessitated alternative 
supplies of crude at higher prices( 319 ) (thus negatively affect-
ing the balance of payments --.a secure supply is therefore 
desirable even from the point of view of this goal). 
. I ... 
P.J. van der Merwe in P.l59, Lombard, (1972). 
<
314
) Raux in Worrall, (1975), P.73. 
(315) 
P.J. van der Merwe, op cit. 
( 316 ) Schlemmer, op cit. 
(317) 
Petroleum Economist, (February 1978), P.56. 
<
318 ) The Economist, (20-26 January, 1979), P.54. 
(319) 
"SA is paying almost R20 per barrel for its present crude oil supplied". --The 
Economist, (10-16 March, 1979), P.82. This is almost 50%· above "world prices". 
On 25 March, 1979, BBC radio maintained SA is paying R21 per barrel. It is not 
clear, however, whether these are average or marginal prices. The Financial Mail, 
lst quarter, 1979, P.469, suggested that SA was paying Rl8 per barrel at that time. 






7.5.11 Certain policies followed by the DG to ensure security 
of supply are discussed below: 
(a) There is currently a large scale search for substitutes 
for imported crude oil. 
(i) The Sasol 1 and II oil from coal plants have been 
built by the government with the ultimate objective 
of providing 25-30% of SA's hydrocarbon demand by 
1980. <320 ) By 1982, it is estimated that SASOL will 
supply 30-35% of S~'s demand, ie. over 4Mt pa.< 321 ) 
In his 1979 budget speech, Senator Horwood maintained 
that the planned SASOL II extension will raise costs 
by R3 276m, to a total of R6b. Part of the finance 
will be provided by a petrol tax of 2 c/L since March 
1976 (raised to 4 c/L in January 1977). ( 322 ) 
(ii)It is logical to search for indigenous crude supplies 
a search which has been shrouded ,in secrecy. (323 ) 
(iii)There is currently much research into petrol substi-
tutes which could be produced in SA. For example, 
UCT is examining methanol-petrol mixtures (methanol 
could be produced from coal or wood). The possibility 
of using ethanol produced -from sugar cane by-products, 
or of using methane derived from sewage is also being 
examined. 
(b) There is considerable direct DG control over the oil 
industry. This is discussed in 7.6. 
(c) The DG will wish to ensure the continued operation of 
the six international oil marketing companies in SA. 
Considerable value is placed upon their expertise, 
particularly in the international· crude oil supply 
networks, and in their provision of high level technolOEY 
(for example, refinery operation and product development). 
. I ... 
Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1977, P.865. Also Petroleum Economist, op cit. 
Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1979, P.560. 
Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 1976, P.ll35; and 1st quarter 1977, P.562. 
(
323
) on 23 March, 1979, at 1315 hrs, Radio RSA announced: " ..• about R200m has. 




The main method of ensuring the continued operation of 
the OC in SA will be to ensure that they have a stable. 
ind luaPative level of profits being repatriated from 
SA as a result of their operations. Figures concerning 
profits and volume levels are not published. However, 
it ·is known that the rate of grO\>Jth of petrol sales in 
SA up to 1973 was 10-12% pa. (see 3.5). Because of 
the fixed GM, it is therefore likely that OC petrol 
profits were increasin~ at a rate close to this .estimate 
at that _time. In the last three years, petrol volumes 
have not grown. In addition, the OC have been recover-. 
ing 0,4 c/L less than they should have been since June 
1975, according to their 1960 agreement with the Depart-
ment of Commerce.( 324 ) On top of this, the OC GM was 
cut by 17% in 1977, (Table 3C), and there has been rapid 
cost inflation in SA. (See also Tabl.e BD). 
There are two deductions that can be made, in the· light 
of the fall in OC profits that must to a large extent 
have bee~ allowed by the DG Firstly~ it is possible 
that the DG believed that the profits being earned by the 
OC were "excessive .. ie. higher than required to ensure 
their continued operation in SA. The fact that no OC 
have ceased operations in SA since 1973 in spite of the 
profit fall tends to confirm this. It should also be 
remembered that·even if one or two of the OC did "pull 
out 11 of SA , the D G w o u 1 d s til l bene f i t from the o p e.r at i on s 
of the four or five remaining. It is also interesting 
to note that during this decade increasing political 
pressure has been exerted upon the international companies 
operating in SA, (for example, the_American Polaroid 
company ostensibly withdrew in 1978) and that no OC has 
yet bowed to this pressure. Rather, the OC have become 
very "community" and "change" conscious.( 325 ) 
I. 
Financial Mail, 4th quarter 1975, P.432. 
For example, see Shell's publication "Shell's Involvement in Social and 




imported. The second method of encouraging a South 
African located refinery is to prevent "extessive 
competition", and to raise the prices of refined 
petroleum products above world market prices. 
This is the normal route, he maintains. Adelman notes 
that some consuming country governments may have diffi-
culty with such· a policy because of the effects upon 
internal price levels, and therefore of international 
competitiveness; and also because consumers may be 
organised enough to resist such controls. Adelman•s 
suggestion is hypothesised and tested in 8.3.27. 
(e) Another method of insuring against oil supply cut-
offs will be the building up of stocks of oil products. 
The SA DG has built up .. large .. stocks (of unpublished 
size) of state financed crude oil. ( 329 ) The vote for 
the strategic oil fund in 1976/7 was Rl39m, in 1977/8 was 
R257,4m, and in 1978/9 was R271,5m.( 330 ) Consumers are 
currently paying 11 c/L into the strategic oil fund. (331 ) 
Apparently( 332 ) disused coalmines are used for storage, 
and the stocks are sufficient for two to three years 
consumption. The DG also requires the OC to hold and 
finance stocks of oil products.( 3321333 ) 
7.5~12 The DG will desire to develop harmonious international 
economic relations( 334 ) particularly from the point of view of 
) 
obtaining a high credit rating; promoting exports, and obt~ining 
imports of products she cannot produce herself. ( 335 ) Their 
major objectives, according to Barber( 336 )are: 
. I ... 
The Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1979, P.78, maintains that the strategic 
oil reserve consists of 45Mt. 
"RSA Estimate of the Expenditure to be defrayed from State Revenue Account", 
1977/78 and 1978/79. 
(331 ). Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1979, P.662. 
(332) 5 Petrolewn Economist, (February 78), P. 6. 
(3 33) 
P.R. Odell, (1974), P.l84. 
(334) 
"South Africa 77", SA Department of Information, P.942. 
(335) 
H.J.J. Reynders and J.C. van Zyl, P.72 of Lombard, (1974). 
( 336 ) J. Barber, Pp.319-320, in Leftwich, (1974). 
. . ' 
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" ... identificati6n and cooperation with the western 
powers; a leading role in Africa; an extensive 
network of economic contracts; military security with 
spetial concern for Southern Africa and the ~urrounding 
oceans; and the right to determine internal policies 
without external interference, and in particular to 
preserve white rule". · 
International trade represents a major portion of SA's economic 
activity.( 337 ) In particular, SA plays a major economic and 
military role among the surrounding less developed countries. 
"The SA Government believes that its activities in 
Southern and sub-Saharan Africa are directly related 
to ..• (undermining) the attacks of the Afro-Asian states 
and (restoring) friendship and mutual confidence with 
the western states".(338) 
7.6 DG IDEAL 2. 
7.6.1 To maximise DG political support and political power. 
Before the objectives under Ideal 2 are listed, there will be 
a brief discussion of the views of various writers on the 
subject of white power and wealth in SA. 
7.6.2 · The DG will normally adopt policies designed to please 
its supporters. However, the success of such policies in 
terms of further DG support wi11 ~epend NOT on the actuaZ · 
effects upon these people, but. rather upon their perception 
of the DG's role in producing these effects. 
7.6.3 The SA DG supporters are essentially the white, capitalist 
electorate -- primarily the Afrikaans-spe~king. (See below). 
It is. generally agreed( 339 ) that these groups wish to ensure 
the continuance of an economically powerful and prosperous white 
supremacy, although several writers( 340 ) believe that the 
emphasis is now on survival, rather than prosperity. 
(337) Ibid. 
(338) Ibid~ P.326~331,335,3}8. 
( 339 ) See Bromberger and Barber in P.65 and P.319, Leftwich, (1974). · 
Worrall,· (1975), P.348 1 and Moodie, (1975), Pp.x-xi. 
<340) See Bromberger and Maud in Leftwich, op cit~ P.69 and P.292. 
. I ... 
Also 
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7.6.4 There is also a controversy on the effect of growth 
and prosperity upon the economic and political position of 
the whites vis-a-vis the blacks. Writers such as Johnstone< 341 ) 
believe that white supremacy and general prosperity go hand in 
hand, whereas a "reformist" school( 342 ) maintains that they are 
alternatives, and not complements. 
7.6.5 Johnstone's essential argument is that the whites have 
used their political supremacy to ensure nigh wages for white 
workers by keeping blacks unskilled by limiting their geograph-
ical and occupational mobility, and have ensured higher profits 
.in the white-owned productive sectors by ensuring a cheap 
labour pool using methods such as pass laws, long contracts 
and a denial of trade union rights. 
Wolpe( 343 ) maintains that 
"The development of capitalism in SA was based upon 
an abundant supply of cheap black labour, the flow· 
of which was ensured by the underdevelopment of the 
limited land available to Africans 11 • 
7.6.6 Legassick( 344 ) argues that the white farmers and mine 
owners were instrumental in preventing the emergence of an 
African rural bourgeoisie. The maintenance/attainment of 
a prosperous farming community may be accepted as a DG 
objective.< 345 ) 
7.6.7 However, Bromberger< 346 ) {a "refor~istft) believes that 
Johnstone's allegation of legal and effective black educational 
bars is wrong. He prefers to lay emphasis on the inherent 
social and economic educational bar resulting from the average 
. I ... 
(341) Johnstone, (1970). See also Maud, supra, Pp.289-310. 
(342) 
For example, O'Dowd, Horwitz and Adam, discussed by Maud, op ait, Ch~ 9. 
<343 > In P.93 of Leftwich, (1974). 
<344 > Ibid. 
(345 > van der Merwe c. in P.l38, Lombard, (1972). 
<











black's circumstances and background. He also argues against 
·the legal wealth and income bars proposed by Johnstone, again 
suggesting that the causes of the relative black poverty, and 
. overall decreases in black incomes are of -a social/economic 
rather than political nature.( 347 > Bromberger notes that the 
real private earnings of blacks in urban areas have actually 
increased between 1950~1970, when the incomes of the African 
population as a whole were de~lining. 
7.6.8 There are other 11 reformist" writers in ad,dition to 
Bromberger who argue that the .dominant white group will 
eventually make political concessions to other groups . 
. O'Dowd( 348 ) believes that there will be a normal pattern of 
development 11 ••• from minority rule, through a liberal era, to 
a welfare state •. "< 349 ) 
Horwitz suggests that '' ... economic rationality urges the polity 
forward beyond its iedology 11 _{ 35 0) 
This view is backed by Adam.< 351 ) 
7.6.9 The reformist arguments are based upon the tenet that 
ideological racial criteria will eventually be superceded by 
colour-blind pragmatism. Maud< 352 ) strongly criticises this 
reformist view. He believes the 11 historical legacies 11 and 
social features of South Africa are not as flexible as 
suggested, and that the fight for white survival rather than 
prosperity also acts in favour of the status quo. 
7.6.10 Writers such as Sadie< 353 ) and Arkin< 354 ) believe -that 
the white trade unions have to a large extent been responsible 








In P.l62, ·worrall, (1975). 
(355) 
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for this black-white wage gap. The white trade unions operate 
within the framework provided by the Industrial Conciliation Act; 
they have not only been instrumental in.maintaining high white 
wages but have also ensured considerably higher levels of white 
employment than otherwise.< 355 ) 
7.6.11 Bromberger has agreed that Johnstdne's view is 
historically correct< 356 ) but that this relationship need not 
have, and in future will not b~ correct .. He sees today•s 
economic growth as requiring more semi-skilled labour, which 
will therefore create a demand for blacks to be further trained. 
This argument applies primarily in an urban, rather than rural 
~r mining context. He also argues that many whites will prefer 
security and stability rather than extra wealth, and will 
therefore trade off additional wealth against (a) a more 
settled and stable urban community and, (b) settled and stable 
rural black communities (independent homelands). (See 7.8). 
OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE DG IDEAL 2. 
7.6.12 The DG will wish to maximise the net present value of 
the earnings, profits and wealth accruing to its supporters. 
This will be done through the mechanisms outlined above. 
The redistribution of wealth and employment will also be done 
by more direct transfers: " ... white farmers have benefitted 
from an elaborate apparatus of ~tate subsidies and other supports~~57 
In addition to using taxes and subsidies, the government may, for 
example, exert its influence on the locational decision for a 
large new plant, or it may control prices in an industry. 
(See discussion on Posner's internal subsidies in 5.9). Ulti-
mately a government can directly intervene in the operations of 
an industry, controlling the sources, processing, storage, 
. I ... 
Supra. Also Leftwich, (1974), P.86; and P.J. van der Merwe in· Lombard, 
(1972} I P.l58. 
(JSG} In P. 106, Leftwich, (1974}. 
<357> Welsh, fn P.263 of Leftwich, {1974}. 
~ d =~"-'*' - .. _;a ... -·-··----....-.- .... ,__._. ________ _ 
( 3 58) 
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distribution and marketing aspects. The objectives of such 
a high degree of control will usually· not only be wealth and 
employment redistribution, but also the control of a strategic 
or developing industry, the manipulation of the balance of 
payments, or the provision of an essential commodity or ser-
.vice for economic devel~pment. 
7.6.13 It is suggested here that the RSS have been used by 
the DG as a transfer mechanism. It is a DG goal to ensure 
the widespread provision of petroleum products throughout 
SA. It has been seen in 7.2 how concessions have been made 
·to the rationalisation plan requirements in certain rural 
areas -- effectively therefore, a transfer of wealth to those 
areas. More importantly, price controls also act as a trans-
fer mechanism. The transfer of wealth to one group will, 
ceteris paribus 3 rouse the. opposition of all other groups --
this objective therefore involves a trade-off. 
7.6. 14 The DG will wish to minimise involuntary unemployment 
among its supporting groups. 
7.6.15 TheDG will attempt to maximise the value of its 
supporting groups' votes. There is widespread belief in 
South Africa that the Nationalist Government has structured 
the boundaries of several electoral constituencies to maximise 
Nationalist support-- an alleQation difficult to prove either 
way. Welsh maintains that: 
"The political strength of the farmers has been 
augmented by a feature of the electoral system 
which, in effect, makes a Qlatteland vote worth 
more than an urban one".{358) · . 
. I ... 
Welsh, in Leftwich, (1974), P.263. 




7.6.16 To gain the patronage of groups and individuals that 
·oppose the DG. The DG, as the group representing a white 
minority, could never hope to gain the support of the black 
majority. Their efforts to woo additional supporters will 
therefore be concentrated on the opposing whites.( 359 ) 
7.6.17 Kleynhans( 360 ) maintains that 
" •.• there has lately bee·n a growing stream of 
English-speaking voters who either apply for 
membership (of the Nationalist Party) or support 
the party at the polls 11 • 
He believes that much is being done to woo the English, 
including the appointment of English-speaking cabinet ministers 
and senators. Nevertheless, he maintains, only a minority of 
English-speaking voters support the National~st Party. 
7.6.18 To decrease the political power (and wealth and social 
status) of groups that continue to oppose the DGs. 
7.6. 19 The primary opposing group is that of the blacks in 
South Africa. The effects of white policies on them have 
already been discussed. The coloured people of South Africa, 
concentrated mainly in the Cape, have also been subjected to 
exclusion from the political process.{ 361 ) They have not 
identified with the vast body of Africans in SA in their 
opposition to the Nationalist government, but rather have .become 
a separate group.{ 362 ) Their language {Afrikaans) and culture 
have enabled them to establish themselves in a stronger economic 
position than most Africans, but they are still subject to a 
deprivation of political and social rights.(JBJ) 
. I ... 
Moodie, (1975), Pp.285-287. 
In P.llO, De Crespigny and Schrire, (1978). 
<361 ) Worrall, (1975), P.222. 
(362) . Ibid, Pp.222-223. 
(363 ) Rex in Leftwich, (1974), P.57. 
(364) 
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7.6.20 The Asians in· South Africa initially entered the country 
to work as indentured labourers on the Natal sugar plantations~ 
They built up " ... their own recognised occupational specialisa-
tion and consequentially social rights ... "( 364 ) but were sub-
jected to apartheid after the 1948 Nationalist government 
emerged. The Asian leadership initially saw " ..• little 
advantage in co-operation with other non-white organisations .. ,"( 36 ~ 
although in 1949 a formal alliance of objectives·was made between 
the South African Indian Congress and the African National 
Congress. 
7.6.21 De Crespigny( 366 ) believes that the interests of the 
whites on the one hand and the coloureds (particularly) and 
the Asians on the other are not irreconcilable within a common 
polity. Coloureds, he maintains, will increasingly make 
common cause with the blacks and even identify themselves as 
blacks, but if they enjoyed the same legal rights as whites 
they would soon become rather less concerned with advancement 
of the interests of non-homeland blacks. 
7.6.22 The fourth group opposing the current South African DG 
is a portion of the whites, notably from the English-speaking 
segment. Moodie( 367 ) maintains that it is from the 
" ... English-speaking South African elite who have 
equally vested interests in the status quo comes 
whatever meaningful liberal opposition to racism 
that continues to exist in white South Africa". 
7.6.23 The English opposition to apartheid poses a policy 
dilemma to the Afrikaans Nationalists. At the one extreme, 
it is suggested that ·. 
" ... all those who protest against or -violate the apart-
heid goals of Afrikaner nationalism are sooner or 
later seen as mort~l enemies against whom any measures 





) Worrall, (1975), P.227. 
(366) De Crespigny, (1978), Pp.210-211. 
(367) 
Moodie, (1975j P.xi. 
<
368
) Maud in Leftwich, {1974), P.294. 
-- .. - ~ ...... . . -- ~ --... ·- . --- - ~ 
(369) 
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And at the other extreme: " ... popular op1n1on since the 
Republic -- especially among younger Afrikaners -~ has been 
in favour of co-operation with the English". (369 ) 
7.6.24 The fifth major "group" opposing the DG may be con-
sidered as the various pressures outside South Africa which 
would-like to see the SA DG deposed. The main components 
of this external group will be (a) the blacks, particularly 
those in black-ruled countries, and (b) Communist, and to a 
lesser extent socialist powers, particularly those who actively 
support the black opposition to SA's DG. This group has been 
discussed in 7.5. 
7.6.25 The SA DG will have little ability to decrease the 
political power, wealth and social status of thes~ external 
groups. At present, there is rather more of an emphasis on 
compromise with them. Limited trade even occurs with SA's 
hostile black-ruled neighbours. 
7.6.26 To gain direct control of strategic areas of the 
country/economy, with the objective of increasing DG economic 
and military power. In the RSS/OC regulatory context, such 
strategic areas will include: major policy decisions regard-
ing imports of oil products, and their refining, storage, 
distribution and transportation; the power to set price 
controls; and the power to commandeer petroleum products 
for military purposes. There.will be an incentive to main-
tain secrecy concerning the extent of the controls, in order 
to minimise opposition to them. These controls are reviewed 
in 7.2. (See also the importance of local ownership to the 
DG, discussed in 7.5). 
. I ... 
Moodie, (1975), P.287. 
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7.6.27 To increase t~e number ~nd importance of policy 
decisions that the DG is able to make by reducing.the number 
of policy decisions made by non-ruling-party members, and by 
minimising the delegation of policy decisions (and where 
·delegation is made, by ensuring it is only to ruling-party 
compatriots). 
7.6.28 It will also be logical for the DG to ensure that 
the implementation of its policies is under its control, 
or in the hands of DG supporters. 
7.6.29 Several of the objectives designed to achieve other 
·ideals will also work towards the achievement of Ideal 2. 
For example, any policies followed by the DG to impo~e and 
maintain the Afrikaans culture (Ideal 4) are likely to lead 
to further DG support from the Afrikaans portion of the 
electorate. Because however, Ideal 4 is a DG goal per se, 
it is examined separately. 
7.7 DG IDEAL 3 
7.7.1 The DG will wi~h to ensure the net long term growth 
of the monetary and social benefits that it obtains from 
its position.( 370 ) This ideal is ranked after "state 
security 11 in "South Africa 77 11 • ( 371 ) 
OBJECTIVES TO ACHIEVE DG IDEAL 3:. 
7.7.2 Stable and long term growth and development of the 
economy (and therefore its tax base). Note, however, the 
discussion in 7.6, in which certain writers maintain that 
economic growth and white supremac~ are alternatives and not 
~omplements. If the views of such writers are correct, 
. I ... 
<370) Self interest may not only comprise a desire for high income and sweeping powers, 
but it may take such forms as competition for the best service, or a striving for 
professional status by means of excellent work. (See McKean, (1968), P.l3). 
(371) 
nsouth Africa 77", SA Department of Information, P.942. 
,--~~ ... _ .... -::· ~. 
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economic growth, if it is a goal, will be coupled with a 
stronger enforcement of the apartheid doctrines in order 
to maintain the dominant white position. 
7.7.3 Economic development is likely to be a goal because: 
(a) Such development is likely to increase the DG's own 
political support, particularly if the general popu-
lation fs able to ideriti~y its development with the 
ruling party concerned. (Conversely, if a group is 
able to identify its lack. of development with a ruling 
political party, this ·will fire its opposition). 
The Nationalist party, since it came to power in 1948, 
has " ... led South Africa through the greatest economic 
boom in its history ... white South Africans ... have reaped 
the main fruits of that boom". ( 372 ) Van der. Vyver 
maintains that an electorate will be reluctant to 
initiate radical changes in times of prosperity ~-
reform rather comes from hardship. Although the boom 
has com~ to an end, the white electorate is still an 
extremely prbsperous group. One method of maintaining 
such prosperity is to transfer wealth to them {7.6); 
a second is to promote general prosperity. 
(b) Economic growth is normally synonymous with the growth 
of the tax base. A larger tax base is of direct social 
and financial benefit to the DG, in addition to provid~ 
ing increasing finance.for the means by which the DG 
powerand security is maintained. (See 7.5). 
The DG will wish to use those revenue ra~sing or rent 
capturing devices which have the lowest negative 
effects in terms of DG goals. Th~re will be an incen-
tive to spread the tax burden widely, and also to ensure 
that the greatest tax incidence is on those groups which 
are least able and likely to oppose them. . / ..... 
<372 ) van der Vyver in d~ Crespigny and Schrire, (1978), P.245. 
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The low elasticity of demand for petroleum fuels, and their 
.tax structure have been discussed in Ch.3. Taxes on petrels 
raised the substantial sum of approximately R600m in 1978.( 373 } 
7.7.4 It is likely that the DG will wi~h to ensure that 
economies of sca'le and more 11 efficient" allocations of re-
industries, should their potential exist, sources in various 
are realised.( 374 ) The most. likely industries for such 
state intervention will be those which comprise a relatively 
11 large" portion of GNP, those \'Jith "few 11 firms, and those 
that are already under some degree of government control --
.normally because of their "strategic 11 importance. The oil 
industry is a prime example.( 375 ) 
7.7.5 It must be remembered that to ensure economies of scale, 
the required reduction in the number of firms can only be Ob-
tained at the expense of a reduction in the competition in that 
industry. The trade off between competition and economies of 
scale that the DG faces have been examined by Perry, and are 
discussed in 5.14. 
7.7.6 The DG believes in the maintenance of a free enterprise 
economy to ensure the continued creation of wealth and long 
~rm improvement of living standards. De Crespigny( 376 } 
believes that a restrained free enterprise economy (as opposed 
to a Zaissez..:..faire state) Hill achieve this. The r~inister of 
Economic Affairs was reported as saying( 377 } 
11 We believe strongly in the virtues of an economic system 
based on free enterprise and would like to leave as 
much scope as possible for the private sector ... " 
. I ... 
( 373) 5 500 ML (See 3.5.2) x 10,4 c/L (See Table 3C) = R572m. This excludes 
railage charges. 
(374 ) The efficient use of local resources- See S.J.Kleu, in P.98, Lombard, (1972); 
~nd "South Africa 77", Chapter 21. 
(375) The success of the DG in achieving this goal can be seen in a quote from The 
Financial Hail, 1st quarter, 1975: " ••• average (RSS) throughput in SA is already 
the highest in the world, .four times more than in UK, for example". 
(376 ) De Cres9igny and Schrire, (1978), Pp.214-216. 
(377) 
The Argus newspaper, 27/9/78. 
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7.7.7 There are various economists however, who believe that 
the "public interest" has a heavier weighting, and who remain 
sceptical of the govern~ent's avowed promotion of free enter-
prise.<378) 
7.7.8 lombard< 379 ) believes there is some confusion in the 
private productive sector as to the extent the government 
wishes to intervene. Kleu< 380 ) maintains that the govern-
ment will interfere with thos~ industries rendering "essential 
services", with"natural mono-polies 11 , and v1here "competition 
would be wasteful of resources 11 • 
7.7.9 The costs of ~egulation were discussed in 5.3. In 
ensuring an efficient allocation of resources in the economy, 
theDG will obviously wish to avoid high costs imposed through 
government interference. 
7.7.10 The balance of payments is of great importance in 
the determination of oil industry policy.( 381 ) 
"The growth opportunities of our economy are directly 
affected by the state of our balance of payments 
which, in turn, is to a large extent influenced by 
our foreign expenditure on crude oi1".(382) 
The balance of payments effects of oil imports are of concern 
to the DG; however, other aspects of 
help determine oil industry policy. 
and van Zyl,( 383 ) SA's foreign.trade 
foreign trade policy also 
According to Reynders 
policy embraces all 
measures involved in influencing and organising its economic 
relations with other countries. ·This will include areas 
such as resource allocation (often resource protection), the 
balance of payments, the changing of domestic consumption 
patterns and the exploitation of foreign markets. 
. I ... 
(378) Arkin in Worrall, (1975), P.l58. 
<379 ) Lombard, (1972) 1 P.237. 
(380) Ibid., P.98. 
(381) 
"SA 77•• I op ait., P. 951. 
(382) 
Minister Heunis, "Motorist", February 1976. 
(383) In Lombard, (1972) 1 Pp.63-64. 
(384) 
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"The maintenance of external balance or, equivalently, 
the maintenance of balance of payments equilibrium 
is generally regarded as one of the most important ( 384 ) macro-economic policy objectives of modern government". 
" ... it would appear that SA has been under almost con-
tinuous pressure to achieve short term balance in jts 5) external accounts throughout the post war period".t3H 
7.7.11 Major factors affecting balance of payments equilibrium 
have been the "level of gold and other foreign exchange 
reserves 11 , (vo~hich are to a large extent determi.ned by imports 
and exports), gold production {which is related to the external 
gold price, and the rate of exchange), capital inflows, and the 
.level of domestic spending. Policy has to a large extent been 
related to the level of foreign reserves, which the character 
of.the "open" SA economy requires to be kept at "substantial" 
levels. ( 386 ) 
7.7.12 Nearly 100% of SA's crude oil is imported; at an 
estimated cost of Rl 575m in 1978 (see 3.5.1) this represented 
16% of the total import bill; it is the largest single import 
item. Details of crude oil import growth rates for SA are not 
published, but the growth rates of crude oil prices (see Table 
7B) provide an indication of the strains that have been placed 
on the balance of payments after 1973. The fact that in early 
1978 the Ministry of Economic Affairs estimated that petrol 
con~ervation measures had resulted in a 22% savings,< 387 ) 
indicates the priority of the DG's foreign exchange saving 
objective. 
7.7.13 The maintenance of balance of payments equilibrium 
involves a complex interrelationship of DG goals and trade offs. 
Restrictions on petroleum imports will hav~ direct repercussions 
on SA's economic growth and development, and on the level of 
business confidence.( 388 ) Fuel restrictions will have a 
particularly adverse effect on the activities of many white 
South Africans, which the DG will wish to avoid. . I 
Ibid, P.85. 
{385 ) Ibid, P.89. 
{386) Ibid, P.85. 
(387} 
Financial Mail, lst quarter 78, P.7o. 
<388> Fuel restrictions and control mea~ures have so far fallen primarily on the private. 





TABLE 7B: CRUDE OIL PRICE ESTIMATES 
1945 1950 1957 1960 1965 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Market Price, Current $/barrel 1 ,05 1,65 2,08 1 '50 1 , 17 1,83 1,27 2,00 1 ,65 ls85 
Market Price, 1975 $/barrel 3,28 3,86 3,92 2,68 1,96 2,78 1,84 2,70 2,20 2,38 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
(June) (May) (Oct) (June) (June) (June). (March) 
Current $/barrel 2,70 9,55 11,51 12' 70 13,20 13,70 23,60 
1975 $/barrel (1975 ave) (6) (7) (7) (9) 3,26 10,62 11 '30 12,07 11 '66 10,12 16,67 
NOTES: 
(1) Prices up to 1975 are based on a Table on Page 46 of 11 Paying for Energyn, Twentieth Century Fund, Dec.75. 
(2) Based on the price of Arabian light 340 at Ras Tanura. 
(3) Based on long term, rather than short term tanker rates, where applicable. 
(4) The considerable price variations in this table are discussed in Pp.44-52 of "Paying for Energy 11 , ibid. 
(5) The figures up to 1975 exclude any premium which SA might have been paying. · 
(6) Financial Mail, 3rd quarter 1976, P.l136. 
( 7) See 3. 5. l. 
(8) See Table 38 for COL conversions from 1976 om·1ards. 
(9) See 7 .5.10. 
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7.7.14 The balance of payments goal will also be related 
to the DG security of resources goal (see 7 .5). The DG 
may be prepared to trade off a higher price for petroleum 
products against additional security of supply. "It is 
officially admitted that the price paid for Iranian crude 
is higher than that paid by other customers••.( 389 ) The 
building of the Sasol plants provides further evidence here 
at present they produce pro~ucts at a premium over world 
prices, although it is expected that in the future they will be 
competitive with OPEC prices.(390 ) 
7.7.15 Other DG goals that might be jeopardised by oil import 
restrictions are discussed in this section (an underutilisation 
of oil industry capacity, particularly of refineries, may 
occur), and in 7.5 (there may be pressures on the maintenance 
of an orderly trading environment). 
7.7.16 The DG will attempt to contain infLation. It will 
be seen that this objective exists primarily because of the 
negative effect that inflation has on other DG goals. It 
could therefore, have been included as a sub-objective of 
several of those mentioned above, but for the sake of a more 
explicit handling, it will be discuised separately. 
7~7.17 The primary objection to inflation by the SA DG is 
its debjlitating effect on economic growth and development{ 391 ) 
Monetary stability, far from being an alternative to ecoriomic 
growth, is a condition for it. Inflation has a distorting 
effect on the propensities to save and invest, and hence on 
resource allocation •. A policy of accepting inflation i·~ 
likely to lead to difficulties in c6ntrolling its rate. 
. I ... 
Petroleum Economist, (Feb. 781, P.56. 
Financial Mail, lst quarter 1979, P.662. 
tombard, (1972), P.28. 
Long term inflation will also affect certain groups in the 
economy more than others. Groups with "fixed" incomes 
(typically pensioners) will suffer, as will the incomes of 
those employees of large institutions who do not have the 
power {usually via trade unions) to maintain their economic 
positions. Inflation may also have a negative' effect on the 
balance of payments objective.· When inflation exceeds the 
rate experienced by trading partners, a deficit will be pro-
duced, or the currency will depreciate. This may lead to 
exchange controls, with a consequent misallocation of re-
sources,(392) or to rising import costs, which will further 
feed the overaZZ rate of inflation unless the export sector is 
able to achieve immediate compensating economies of scale 
(which is unlikely). 
7.7.18 The inflation containment goal particularly will in-
. valve a trade off with other DG goals. The objectives under 
Ideals 1 and 2 will, for example, tend to be inflationary as 
they are pursued with more vigour-- (See Table 7A). 
7.8 DG IDEAL 4. 
(392} 
(393) 
7.8.1 To fulfil ideological or other principles which the 
DG itself has. 
There is a 11 ••• duplication of the ethos of the Dutch Reformed 
Church amongst the undisputed rulers of SA".( 393 ) 
7.8.2 Afrikaans religious objectives. "The Calvinist theory 
of politics assumes in a very actual manner the subordination 
of all aspects of life to God's will ... "( 394 ) 
~ I 
Ibid, P.29. 
Harris in Worrall, (1975)_, P.262. 
(394 ) Worrall, (1975), P.207. 
(3951 
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"Calvinist principles at the bottom' of the 
Afrikaner's political conceptions, so setting( 395 ) Afrikaners •.• apart from the rest of society". 
7.8.3 The Afrikaners believed they were the 
" ... Calvinists of Western European origin and 
a nation in theif3 §~~ right before the arrival of the English".'- J 
7.8.4 Moodie outlines the pressure from England on the 
Afrikaners during the early 1800's.C397 ) "Bowed down under 
20 years of British oppression, the Afrikaners at length 
rose up and went out of the Cape Colony ... u( 398 ) --the 
Great Trek. He describes the fighting with the black 
indigenous on the trek, and thereafter the 11 pursuit 11 of the 
colonial office. The discovery of gold in the Transvaal, a~d 
the pouring of the "curmudgeons" of the empire into Johannes-
burg was another Boer setback. After the Jameson Raid of 
1895, negotiation failed in the face of continued British 
provocation, and the Boer War (1899-1902) was declared. 
There was tremendous Afrikaner suffering during this war, 
and 26 370 women and children died in British concentration 
camps.t399 ) Upon victory, the British adopted a policy of 
strengthening the English population in SA.l 400 ) 
7.8.5 The Afrikaners believe that their suffering in the 
Great Trek and the Boer War was not a sign of God's reje~tion, 
but rather of his testing ~- '' ... an honour to be accepted and 
glorified as the seal of God's election".C401 ) 
. I ... 
Ibid. 
(3%)_ Moodie; (1975)., P.3 
(397 ) Ibid, Pp.3-4. 
(398} 
Ibid, P.S. 
(3991 Ibid, P.18. 
(400}_ Ibid, P.10. 
(401) Ibid, . P.l3. 
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7.8.6 They also believe that ~s a group they will be rewarded 





"This hope transformed the suffering of the pre~ent 
by an exalted anticipation which sanctified them. 
Thus English speaking prejudice and discrimination 
proved God's election and at the same time ensured 
the separate existence of the Afrikaner consciousness 1402) Maintenance of this separation became a sacred duty".\ 
"Thus, in defence of its.sacred mission, all those who 
·protest against or violate the apartheid goals of 
Afrikaner nationalism are sooner or later seen as 
mortal enemies against whom any measures may be 
adopted to ensure their pacification ... build up of (40J) repressive forces ... eminently justified and rational 11 • 
7.8.7 It can also be seen from the above, how imperialism 
became linked with capitalism in the Afrikaner's mind. 
7.8.8 The question that arises is does the "bourgeoisie" 
Afrikaner today understand, and believe in his religious 
(and cultural) history? It is suggested here that many of 
the Afrikaner goals (see also 7.8.9 below) in addition to being 
ideological, are in fact more practical means of promoting 
Ideals 1-3. "In SA, the Dutch Reformed Church is undoubtedly 
more than a mere interest group".( 404 ) 
7 .. 8.9 Afrikaans nationalist objectives. Worra11( 40S) believes 
that the Afrikaners have evolved as a cohesive nationalist group 
because of their common historial background, language, reli-
gion, experience of military defeat and historical frustration 
of economic inferiority. He believes the two outstanding 
motor forces of Afrikaans nationalism are their languagei and 
economics. 
. I . 
Moodie, (1975), P.l4. 
Maud in Leftwich, (19741, P.294. 
Harris~ in P.256 of Worrall, (1975). 
Worrall, (1975}, P.l83. 
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7.8.10 The most important aspects of the development of 
the Afrikaner group will be briefly discussed below, in 
order to provide a framework for their present objectives. 
7.8.11 Worrall describes the first organised pressure to 
reorganise the Afrikaners as a group during the late 19th 
century, primarily in the face of the anti-Afrikaans laws 
promulgated during that ce~tury.C406 ) The Anglo-Boer War 
(1899-1902) -~~ ... exacerbated rural dislocation and decline, 
forcing many (whites) to move to the townsn.( 407 ) By 
tr~dition, the Afrikaners have been the farmers of SA, and 
by the beginning of the 20th century they were the noticeably 
poorer sector of the white society in SA. (408 ) This situa-. 
tion for the Afrikaner worsened up to the time of the great 
depression, when many rural Afrikaners had been forced to 
move into urban areas. In ]910, 20% of Afrikaners were 
town dwellers; by 1936 the proportion was 40%.( 409 ) The 
English, by contrast, had long been a highly urbanised group 
who dominated commerce and industry, and, until the 1940 1 S, 
the upper echelons of the public service. (410 ) 
7.8.12 A greater unification of the Afrikaans people 
occurred after the Anglo-Boer War,( 4ll) but it was not 
-until the 1930 1 S ·that a true Afrikaner ideology emerged 
over the prime barrier of geographical differences in 
po 1 it i cal and economic i nte.res ts. 
l406l Ibid. 
L40])_ Welsh, in Leftwich, (l974L P. 250. 
<-408 >- Worrall, op ait_, P.l84. 





) Ibid. In 1974 80% of white SA farmers were Afrikaners 
Welsh, in Leftwich, (19741 f P. 263. 
<..4w> ·a ·a - Welsh, 'Z- 1, , P. 251. 
C4lll Worrall, (1975), P.l84 •. 
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7.8.13 When the nationalist party came to power in 1924 
under Hertzog, they adopted the objectives of entrenching 
the colour bar in industry, and the realisation of a 
11 two stream" concept of SA nationhood. L412 ) Several 
important acts were promulgated at this time to augment the 
position of the whites vis-a-vis the blacks. Examples are 
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, the ~ages Act of 
1925, the Mines and Works Act of 1926, and the Land Act of 
1936.(413 1 In 1938, Hert;og announced Die Stem as the 
national anthem, among various moves to bolster the Afrikaans 
language in the face. of English opposition. (414 ) Worrall 
maintains that: "The progress of the National Party in 
successive general elections is essentially due to ... the 
hardening of political allegiances on language lines".( 415 ) 
7.8. 14 In 1939 the United Party came to power under Smuts, 
and it was not until 1948 that the Nationalists emerged as 
the ruling party. " ... the principle of language equality 
for which. General Hertzog had so dedicatedly campaigned was 
replaced by the advocacy of the supremacy of the Afrikaans. ( 416 ) 
Afrikaans educational, cultural and business institutions 
have actively promoted the Afrikaans language.( 417 ) . The 
great improvement in the Afrikaner's economic position has 
resulted in social and economic changes, and thus changes in 
the character of Afrikaans nationalism. Afrikaners have 
been reconciled to the free enterprise system, and their 
businessmen are less ethnically oriented although not 
. I ... 
{412 )_ Ibid, P.l98. 
(
4131 
The Land Act · d lS regar ed as a watershed in the apartheid process, 
(4141 
designed to ensure the continuance of group cultures. See N.J. Rhoodie, · 
(1969}, Pp. 49-50. 
Worrall, op ait, P.203. 
(
4151 Ibid, P.l85. 




.. specifically attempting to reconcile with the English group 
either. Certain of the Afrikaner unity, and church in-
fluence ·has disappeared.( 4l 8 ) SA•s becoming a republic 
in 1961 removed an important prop of the Afrikaner unity. ( 419 ) 
7.8. 15 It is likely that the Afrikaner objectives of white 
labour supremacy, the domi~ance of the Afrikaans language, 
ethnic and religious unity,· and a prosperous farming com-
munity are still rigorously followed today. But the em-
phasis has changed from one of consolidation and marshalling 
of support to one of surviv~l. The homeland policy attempts 
to ensure geographical segregation of ethnic groups, and 
d C · ( 420 } · t · ·t . DG b. t.. t e resp1gny · ma1n a1ns 1 1s a o JeC 1ve o ensure 
that they become independent and economically viable 
societies. Apartheid is essentially designed to ensure 
the continuance of the group•s own cultures.( 421 ) 
7.8.16 In May 1961, the prime minister Dr H.F. Verwoerd 
was quoted as saying: 
11 We do not only seek and fight for a solution which 
will mean our survival as a white race, but we also 
seek a solution which will ensur~ survival and full 
development -- political and economic -- to each of 
.the other racial groups. We want each of our popu-
lation groups to control and govern themselves ... 
the transition stage ... is our policy of separate 
development 11 .C422) 
. I ... 
Worrall, op cit. P.212. 
(419) .. . - Ib-z_d3 p. 216. 
(420) 
De Crespigny and Schrire, (1978), P.220. 
(421} 
Moodie, (1975), P.266. 
(422) 




7.9 SUMMARY OF DG 'GOALS, AND THEIR WEIGHTING$ 
7.9.1 . A summary of the DG objectives identified above 
is provided in Table -?C. In order to obtain the weight-
ing for each objective, a weight was first allocated to 
each ideal. These were obtained on a judgemental basis. (423 } 
DG Ideal 1 : Weight 45%. The DG will wish to 
DG Ideal 2 
DG Ideal 3 
DG Ideal 4 
secure the tenure of the positions that 
it already holds. 
Weight 28%. The DG will wish to maximise 
its political support and power. 
Weight 17%. The DG will wish to ensure 
long term growth of the monetary and social 
benef1ts that it obtains from its position. 
Weight 10%. The fulfilment of DG ideo-
logical and other principles. 
7.9.2 Note that Ideals 1 and 2, with 73% of the total 
emphasis of all DG goals, reflect its desire to entrench 
itself. 
. I ... 
i.e. The "indirect" approach to weight determination, as suggested 




















DG OBJECTIVES SUMMARY AND WEIGHTINGS 
OBJECTIVE 
Adequate defence 
Maintain legal framework 
Security of strategic resource supply -
Harmonious international economic relations 
Maximise DG supporters' NPVs 
Minimise DG supporters' involuntary unemployment 
Maximise DG supporters• votes value 
Gain additional support from DG opposition 
Minimise value of votes (and also NPVs) 
of DG opposition 
WEIGHTING 










Control strategic areas of country/economy 7 
Maximise number and importance of DG policy decisions 6 
Stable, long term tax base· growth 7 
Efficient use of local resources 1 
Maintain balance of payments equilibrium 5 
Minimise inflation 4 
Impose and maintain Afrikaans culture 10 
100% 
====== 
. I ... 
...... --- ... -- ----- ..... ---
237 
7.10 IDENTIFICATION OF THE RELEVANT GROUPS (RGs} 
(_424)_ 
7.10.1 An RG was defined in 5.15 as a group which must be 
taken into consideration by the DG in the formulation of 
its policies. It is closely related to, but more broadly 
defined than the interest group concept used in political 
science} 424 ) which is defi~ed as a number of people, or 
association(s), who are trying to influence public policy 
in their own direction, or affect the behaviour of society, 
while themselves not becoming involved in the governing of 
the country. ( 425 ) It can be seen that an RG is therefore 
broader than an interest group, in that it will include not 
only those who are actively attempting to affect government 
policy, but also those passive groups that the government must 
take into consideration in developing its policies. 
7. 10.2 Four major factors which are identified by Harris( 426 ) 
as affecting SA interest groups are discussed below. (They 
will obviously also affect RGs.) 
(a) Legal restrictions. In SA, some types of interest 
groups are restricted by law. The potentially 
powerful trade unions, for example, are restricted 
by job reservation and registration limitations. ( 427 ) 
Many other acts limit the political and social acti-
·t· f . . . "d f (428) v 1 ·1 e s o v a r1 o us groups 1 n a w 1 e range o are as . 
(_b) Race. In SA, many interest groups are based on 
race, a 1 though there is a surprising ..... frequency 
with which certain interests transcend race 11 .( 429 ) 
Because of the government 1 s racial objectives (7.8), 
it will tend to break down the broad RGs before it 
by racial classification. 
. I ... 
Harris, in Worrall, (1975), Pp.253-260. 








Harris, op cit. P.260. 




(c) The presence of certain unusual groups at the .. highest 
levels of the land ... " may result in 11 ••• pressures 
which are antipathetic to the norms and values of the 
ruling class in SA society (meeting} a reception more 
hostile than would normally be expected e~sewhere". 
These unusual groups are primarily the Dutch Reformed 
Church, and the Afrikaner ethos expressed through 
organisations such as the Broederbond.( 430 ) 
(d) The government's attitude. 11 South African interest 
groups need not expect government to react in a .whole-
hearted way to their efforts, unless the efforts of 
the group are in accordance with the policies of the 
cabinet 11 _( 431 ) Harris explains how the government 
tends to act aggressively, rather than passively, 
towards groups before it. 
7.10.3 The net effect of these four factors is that many 
interests that would 3 ceteris paribus, emerge as interest 
groups in the UK or USA, will remain submerged in SA. 
7.10.4 ·A vital factor to be considered in assessing the power 
of any interest group or RG is the aaaess of such groups to 
the government DG. It has already been ex~lained (7.3) that 
in the SA RSS context, the DG consists of a limited number of 
people, and at the hfgher levels of the DG hierarchy, there 
are problems of co-ordination and communication. This con-
centration of decision power in the hands of a limited number 
of people has be~n one of the factors shaping the "aggressive• 
character of the government mentioned by Harris above. 
It has also ensured that the DG has to rely on information 
provided by "outsiders .. for many of the decisions that it takes. 
11 Ministers find the help and advice of lobbies essential on 
matters in which interest groups possess particular expertise~~~ 432 
Harris, op ait., P.262. 
Ibid, P.263. 
Ibid, P.275. 
. . I ... 
(433) 
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However, these "outsiders" will not be the general "all and 
st,~ndry" of interests before them, but will consist of a limited 
number of groups which the ffi has had some part in influencing. 
For example, there are only three organisations in the private 
productive sector which have the privilege of special access to 
the parliamentary lobby in Cape Town.· They are the Federated 
Chamber of Industries, the Chamber of Mines and the Afrikaanse-
handelsinstituut. (See 3.3). Other ~roups with advantageous 
access are the SA Railways, which " ... clearly have the ear of the 
government .•. 11 ( 4 3 3 ) a n d the 11 pub 1 i c age n c i.e s " d i s c u s sed i n 
7.3.15. 
7.10.5 Typical channels of access to the DG might be: 
(a) Via MPs through parliamentary debates, petitions and 
discussions. 
(b) Via services to government officials; or the DG it-
self. (In SA such services are usually provided by 
the public agencies). 
(c) Via personal contacts with the DG. 
(d) Via court actions and legislative hearings. 
7.10.6 It can now be seen that in SA, the channels of access 
to the DG have to a large extent been commandeered by groups 
identifying with the majority party. 
7.10.7 The RGs, as they may be used in the rows of a decision-
matrix, are summarised in Table· 70. Groups from the black 
homelands, as well as the Republic, are included, because the 
homelands are supplied with petrol in essentially the same (DG 
controiled} structure as South Africa. This table includes 
columns for the estimated population of each RG, and also for 
a subjectively determined factor by which the population-based· 
weightings may be modified to obtain a final group weighting. 
. . I ... 
Harris, op cit., P.269. 
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7.10.8 The total population was divided using each of three 
methods: ·(a) racial/locational; (b) occupational; and 
(c) employer. One essential "group" referred to on occasions 
earlier in the thesis is the "RSS consumers 11 • . They have not 
been included explicitly because they are, in fact, included, 
to a greater or lesser extent, in each of the RGs mentioned. 
7.10.9 The external group has not been broken down because 
such analysis would serve little purpose in the present context. 
Its components will vary, depending on the problem under con-
sideration, and therefore no population figure has been attached 
·to it. Instead, its weighting has been subjectively determined. 
7.10.10 The black population was used as the base for weighting 
the RGs; black groups were assigned weights of 1. All other 
groups, being more important than the blacks in the eyes of the 
DG, were given a proportionately greater weighting. (Such 
groups have greater 11 relevance", in terms of the definition 
in 5.15). 
7.10.11 The non-white/white ratio in SA, the homelands and 
the newly independent black states is 5.1/1. (~able 70). 
It was therefore decided that the white groups, to be given 
an "importance" in DG policies exceeding that of the non-
whites, should be weighted by a factor of 6. The Afrikaans 
segment of the whites should be more ''important" than the 
English-speaking in the DG's eies, and the~efore their factor 
was increased by 50% to 9. In addition, it was decided that 
the white rural group's factors should be increased by a further 
50%, i.e. white English-speaking rural to 9, and white Afrikaans-
speaking rural to 13,5. (See 7.6). 
7.10.12 The Coloured and Asian groups have been allocated a 
factor of 2. They have been given this aibitrary figure in 
view of (i) the Coloured's language identification with the 
. / 
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white Afrikaners, and (ii) the possibZe future identification 
of these two groups with the whites in attempted survival in 
the face of the black mas~es.( 434 ) 
7.10.13 Because adjustments were made to the factors in the 
11 racial/locational" sector of Table 70, it is necessary to 
weight the ~ther sectors by a similar amount. A group-
weighted average for all white groups, and for all black 
groups was obtained as follows: 
White average = 9ER + 13,5AR + 6EU + 9AU = 8,3951359 
ER + AR + EU + AU 
"Others 11 average = 2C + 2As + Bw + Bb 
C + As + Bw + Bb 
' = 1,1437632 
where: ER is English rural, AR is Afrikans rural, EU is English 
urban, AU is Afrikaans urban, C is Coloureds, As is Asian, 
Bw is blacks in white areas, Bb is blacks in black areas. 
7.11 RELEVANT GROUPS GOALS AND WEIGHTINGS 
7.11 ~1 RG's goals can to a large extent, be derived from the DG 
goals. The main difference between the DG goals and RG's goals 
is one of emphasis-- the DG goals are politically oriented,· where-
as the RG goals are more p~rsonally, individually oriented. The 
DG is more concerned with overall, or macro problems that it faces 
for example, the more direct pressures of groups opposing it; 
international relations; and issues concerning the national economy, 
such as inflation and the balance of payments. The RG's however, 
will not be as concerned with many of these 11 high level 11 DG goals. 
They will be more directly concerned with their own individual well-
being. The highest level of goals that any RGs are likely to have 
wil.l be in the opposition of some of them to the current DG. 
. I ... 
Worrall, (1975), Pp.223-225. 
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TABLE 7D. SA, HOMELANDS, AND NEW BLACK STATE POPULATION (1977) 
Population Factor Population Weighting 
x Factor (as a %) 
1. White English speaking rural 97 429 9 876 861 1,41 
2. White Afrikaans speaking rural 498 900 13,5 6 735 150 10,85 
3. White English speaking urban 1 628 024 6 9 768 144 15,74 
A 4. White Afrikaans speaking urban ·2 138 647 9 19 247 823 31,02 
5. Coloureds 2 431 000 2 4 862 000 7,84 
6. Asians 765 000 2 1 530 000 2,47 
7. Blacks resident in white areas -a 670 000 1 8 670 000 13,97 
8~ Blacks resident in homelands and 10 365 000 1 10 365 000 16;70 
newly independent black states 
GRAND TOTAL: 26 594 000 62 054 978 100,00 
------------ ------------ ======= 
1. Agriculture \vh i te 113 000 8,39 948 650 1,53 
2. others 2 941 000 1 '14 3 363 808 5,42 
3. r1ining white 73 oop 8,39 612 845 0,99 
4. others 761 000 1 '14 870 404 1,40 
5. Commerce and finance white 467 000 8,39 3 920 528 6,32 
6. (Note 8) others 571 000 1 '14 653 089 1,05 
7. Services (Note 7) : white 365 000 8,39 3 064 225 4,94 
B 8. : others 1 501 000 1 '14 1 716 789 .2,77 
9. ~anufacturing, Electricity:white 639.000 8,39 5 364 492 8,64 
10. Construction, Transport : others 1 633 000 1 '14 1 867 765 3,01 
11. Tourist : white 11 000 8,39 92 346 0' 15 
12. : others 67 000 1 '14 76 632 0,12 
13. RSS (Note 6) : white 12 000 8,39 100 742 0 '16 
14. others 26 000 1 '14 29 738 0,05 
15. oc : white . 7 000 8,39 58 766 0,09 
16. : others 5·000 1,14 5 719 0,01 
17. Others (Note 5) : white 2 676 000 8,39 22 465 383 36,21 
18 .. others 14 726 000 1 '14 16 843 056 27,14 
TOTAL ~~HITE 4 363 000 36 627 977 
TOTAL OTHERS 22 231 000 25 427 000 
GRAND TOTAL 26 594 000 62 054 977 1 oo ,o·o 
=========== ============ ------.------
. I 
,_::_ ... _ ..... "" ... ·~-
c 
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TABLE 7D (continued) 
Population Factor Population l4eighting 
x Factor (as a %) 
1. Controlled directly by DG white 525 000 8,39 4 407 446 7,10 
2. (Note 1) . others 738 000 1 '14 844 097 1 ,36 ' . 
3. Private productive sector white 1 139 000 8,39 9 562 060 15,41 
4. (Note 2) others 5 684 000 1 '14 6 501 150 10,48 
5. Others (Note 3) white 2 699 000 8,39 22 658 471 36,51 
6. others 15 809 000 1 '14 18 081 752 29,14 
TOTAL tmiTE 4 363 000 36 627 977 
TOTAL OTHERS 22 231 000 25 427 000 
GRAND TOTAL 26 594 000 62 054 975 100,00 
=========== =========== ====== 
EXTERNAL GROUPS (VARIES) * * 
NOTES: 
1. Comprises central government, provincial administration, local authorities, 
Bantu authorities, SAA, SAR and H, GPO, and all other public companies. 
2. Comprises private employers and employees. 
3. Comprises non-profit organisations, private households, the unemployed, 
and the not economically active. 
4. Source: "South African Statistics 1978", Department of Statistics -
Sections 1 and 15.16. 14here figures for 1970 were provided, they were 
extrapolated, pro rata, to 1977. 
5. Includes the unemployed and not economically active. 
6. All RSS except company-owned RSS. 
7. Excludes tourist industry. 
8. Less all RSS except company-owned. 
. I ... 
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7.11 .2 Note that different goals have not been isolated for 
e~ch separate RG. This is because it is likely that most RGs 
have similar goals, with the major differences being on empha-
sis. Consistent differences will be found only in group ideo-
logies. (See below) 
7.12 RG IDEAL 1 
7.12.1 The RG will wish to allow each of its individual members 
to maximise their monetary 
the political power of the 
econdmic structure.( 435 ) 
and social benefits, (and consequently 
group) within the existing social/ 
The group's political power will then 
in turn bolster each member. 
7.12.2 The RG will wish to extend the economic development of 
its individual members. In the short term this will mean 
income maximisation through the numerous means by which a govern-
ment can affect the incomes of individual groups -- ie. economic 
regulation, see Ch. 5. In the long term, this will involve the 
development of the group to make i,t inherently more capable of 
being able to earn a larger slice of the national cake. Long 
term policies will include the education and training of the 
group, and the strategic manoeuvering of the group in terms of 
geographical, social and economic positioning. (436 ) 
7.12.3 The RG will wish to maximise its political power in 
terms of voting power, and in terms of rights in the legal 
framework of the country.( 437 ) RGswill often press the DG 
for specific. legal changes.( 438 ) 
. I . . . 
(435 ) Each RG will not only wish to maximise the monetary and social benefits accruing 
to its members in absolute terms, but also relative to other groups (particularly 
those groups which oppose the achievement of their goals, or which they regard 
as competitors). 
(436 ) See 7.6 for a discussion on the manoeuverings of SA's WQit~ groups. 
(437) See 7.5 and 7.6 for a discussion on voting power, and the legal framework., 
(438) The_essence of Stigler's theory discussed in ·s.a. 
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7.12.4 An RG will wish to have the maximum possible independence 
to make decisions concerning itself. 
7.12.5 The RG will wish to minimise involuntary unemployment 
among its members. 
7.12.6 The RG will normally desfre growth and development of the 
economy. Exceptions will occur when economic growth and 
development is not synonymous with the group's security (see 
discussion in 7.5), or when the group is able to gain more wealth 
or power by other means (for example, by going on strike). 
7.13 RG IDEAL 2 
7.13.1 The RG will wish to propagate any ideological beliefs which 
the majority of its members have. A list of objectives to achieve 
this ideal will not be given because of the variability of different 
groups' ideologies. Two essential methods of the propagation of 
ideological beliefs emerge however. First, an RG may try to 
extend its ideology by attempting to get other groups to accept 
that ideology, or possibly even desire it. This involves the 
provision of information, or of propaganda. Second, the RG may 
impose its ideology on other gro~ps. (A 11 Strong 11 group may. use 
legal power, a 11 weak 11 group might resort to te~rorism, for example). 
7.14 WEIGHTING OF RG GOALS 
7.14.1 Different RGs will obviously not agree on the weights to 
be placed on each of the above objectives. For nearly all RGs 
however, the major. emphasis will be on the more pragmatic objec-
tives of wealth and political power, rather than ideologies. 
Any group which is not the DG will aspire to some extent to the 
DG's position; non-DGwill also have less ability to propagate 
their ideological objectives. 
.. I ... 
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7.14.2 The weights suggested below will be for the average 
RG as perceived by the DG . (Don't forget that this theory 
of regulation is designed to simulate the DG'~ decision making). 
7.14.3 Because it is almost impossible to ascertain with any 
accuracy what the DG considers each RG goal weight to be, a 
computer model has been designed to evaluate a variety of 
weights, and thus provide a rapid method of testing weighting 
(and other) sensitivities. 
TABLE 7E. SUGGESTED STARTING WEIGHTS FOR RG GOALS 
7. 12.2 Individual's economic development 
7.12.3 Maximise political power and rights 
of the group 
7.12.4 Decision independence 
7.12.5 Minimise unemployment 
7.12.6 Maximise macroeconomic growth and 
development 
7.13. 1 Propagation of ideological beliefs 











7.15.1 The three methods of evaluating Hill's goals achievement 
matrices were discussed in 5.15. This chapter will evaluate 
the DG and RG goals, using a modified "weighted index of goals 
achievement" approach. Instead of using simply +1 ,· -1 or 0 
depending on whether the goals achievement is enhanced, decreased 
or unaffected, values of +2, +l, 0, -1, -2 will be used to indicate 
whe.ther the degree of achievement was "high" or ·"low", because 
. I ... 
{439) 
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it is felt that many of the cells in the DG and RG evaluation 
matrices can provide this additional information. Where they 
cannot, it will simply be assumed that only a low value has been 
achieved. It is the summation of costs and benefits which is 
shown in each cell. 
7.15.2 Rather than having a narrative for the derivation of 
each cell, {which could provide_ somewhat long reading in this 
chapter), each regulation will be described in terms of DG and 
RG goal achievem~nt, and the reader will be left to refer to the 
matrices for any specific results in which he is interested. 
7.15.3 Should the reader disagree with any of the values in-
serted in the evaluation matrices, he is asked to refer to Chapter 8. 
In this chapter, most hypotheses have been evaluated using methods 
other than the DG goals theory, and their results have also been 
used in the evaluation matrices. In addition, sensitivity 
analyses have been run in 8.3. 18 on the computer model. 
7.15.4 RATIONALISATION 
(a) The primary effect' of this regulation is that it provides 
a direct barrier to entry, and limit on the number of RSS. 
This provides a means of realising the potential economies 
of scale of the RSS (See 3.10) by increasing throughput per 
RSS, and therefore of increasing OC/RSS profits, and thus 
their attraction to SA. (439 ) 
(b) It allows the "swopping 11 of sites g1v1ng the industry 
some freedom to operate in the most profitable areas, and 
ensuring movement towards the efficient use of local 
resources. 
(c) It promotes the use of local capital and enterprise. 
This has positive effects on the security goal, the stable 
development of the economy goal, and the balance of pay-
ments goal. 
. I 
" .•. a~erage throughput in SA is already the high~st in the world, 
four times more than in UK, for example", Financial Mail, 1st 
quarter 1975, P.93. 
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(d) It itimulates the smaller, rather than larger OC. 
This reduces the {potential) monopoly power of the 
-
larger OC, and it also increases security of supply 
through the stimulation of alternative suppliers .. 
(e) It promotes the DG favoured country and Bantu areas 
through additional quotas. Again, this represents a 
transfer of income to DG supporters, and an attempt to 
make the homelands self-$ufficient within the DG apart-
heid policy. 
(f) It provides direct protection to the RSS from competition 
from general dealer stor~s. Thi~ therefore represents 
a transfer of wealth from the stores to the RSS. 
(g)· It prohibits restrictive clauses in non-fuel contracts. 
This reduces potential OC monopoly power, and encourages 
the efficient use of resources. 
(h) It increases direct DG control of the industry, and the 
number of policy decisions that the DG makes. 
(i) It has a negative effect on RSS customers through decreas-
ing locational convenience to them. (See Ch.8). 
(j) It has its primary impact on the private (RSS customer) 
sector rather than government, or the bulk supplied 
productive sector. 
7. 15.5 UROTA 
(a) The most important effect of this regulation is that it 
provides for compulsory supply of fuel to any RSS -- the 
objective being to reduce the potential monopoly power of 
the OCs over the RSS industry. It has the concurrent effect 
of promoting small businesses in the ·motor industry, and 
thus increasing the level of employment (and of security) 
of that particular segment of the population. It will 
also increase the proportion of locally-owned RSS. 
. I . . . 
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(b) The maintenance of minimum standards ensures that 
the applicable RSS also become repair garages. This 
means that ~ertain RSS, particularly in low sales areas, 
will be larger than otherwise. A stimulus to the eco-
nomy of those areas is provided, being an effective trans-
fer of wealth from the RSS/OC to such areas, (primarily 
to persons owning cars in such areas). 
(c) Minimum standards provide a form of barrier to entry. 
Limiting competition provides a means of achieving 
economies .of scale, it also enhances RSS/OC profits, 
and thus their attraction to South Africa . 
. (d) It directly increases the demand for qualified mechanics. 
This will increase their incomes, and decrease their unem-
ployment level. This therefore suggests that the majority 
of motor mechanics are DG supporters. 
(e) Relaxed UROTA requirements in 11 Country 11 and "Bantuu areas 
will entice more RSS to locate in them. This is effect-
ively a transfer of wealth to such areas. It is done for 
two reasons: firstly, the rural whites tend to be DG 
supporters; secondly, the DG is attempting to make the 
homelands self-sufficient within its policy of apartheid. 
(f) It increases DG direct control of a strategic industry, 
and increases the number of policy decisions made by the 
DG. 
7. 15.6 SITING CONTROLS 
(a) The prime objective of these regulations is to ensure that 
the RSS comply with the DG urban growth plan, which ~esires, 
inter alia, to ensure efficient use of local resources; 
and maintain standards of 11 character" within urban areas. 
(Of particular importance will be the maintenance of the 
11 Character 11 of the areas in which the rich live). These 
controls may be used to promote DG-favoured sites, and could 
conceivably be used to directly increase the wealth of DG 
supporters. 
. I ... 
. ..,. .. 
250 
(b) Siting controls can be used to ensure compliance with 
DG civil defence, safety and security goals. 
{c) They provide a form of barrier to RSS entry {and therefore 
economies of scale and increased OC/RSS profits). 
(d) They increase direct DG control in the industry, and also 
the number of policy decisions that they make. This has 
the concomitant effect of reducing potential OC monopoly 
power. 
{e) As with the rationalisation plan, these regulations will 
reduce RSS customer convenience. This will primarily 
affect the private customer, rather than government or 
productive sectors. {7.15.8). 
{f) They will obviously negatively affect potential RSS which 
have discovered high profit locations, but are prevented 
from doing business in them. 
7.15.7 PETROL PRICE/MARGIN CONTROLS 
{a) The primary aim of these controls is to ensure a high 
level of petroleum prices inside SA relative to world 
prices, in order to provide protection for locally-owned 
refineries, local coal production, the Sasol plants, the 
nuclear plant, and of course, to provide an "attractive" 
level of profits to the OC. (See 8.3.29). 
(b) They are used to create a·n 11 0rderly trading environment" 
with which to attract the OC into SA -- the OC place 
particular value on secure profits. (See 3.6.6). 
(c) The control of, and number of policy decisions made 
within the oil industry by the ,OG is increased. They 
. are provided with the tools to control the size and the 
distribution of the consumer surplus and the producer surplus 
in the oil industry. Profits of the OC are directly 
influenced, meaning: 
. I ... 
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(i) a limit on potential OC monopoly power; 
(ii) increased security of supply through the ability 
to attract OC to SA through stable and positive 
profits; 
(iii) the viability of SA-located refineries; (see Ch.B) 
(iv) a m~ans of.influencing the balance of payments. 
(d) Petrol prices tend to "l~ad" other petroleum product 
prices in SA, ie. the "sp~cial" petrol p~ices in the 
non-RSS markets, and the prices of oils, bituments, etc. 
DG petrol price control therefore ensures stability through-
out the economy among other petroleum produce consumers. 
(e) They mean that prices in low profit/volume areas (ie. rural 
and "black" areas, generally) will be lower than otherwise. 
Lack of price control would mean-that many "marginal" RSS 
would be forced to close, causing hardship within local 
communities. This represents a transfer of wealth to 
DG supporters, and also a supporting of apartheid through 
a contribution to homeland self-sufficiency. 
{f) Price controls are applied with the ancillary objectives 
of ensuring the efficient use of local resources and 
maximising economic growth and development, by providing, 
so the argument goes, an essential commodity at uniform 
prices in various price grids in SA. 
(g) Price controls will be seen by most RGs in SA as an a~tempt 
to minimise inflation. 
(h) They ensure a more stable base on which the petrol taxes 
in SA can be leVied. (See 3.5). 
(i} They negatively affect that group of consumers who are 
prepared to search (see 4.2) for low prices. 
(j) They negatively affect the more price efficient RSS/OC 
~hich might be able to exclude competitors under price 
competition. 
(k) The private RSS customer sector is negatively affected 
relative to the productive, and government sectors, which 
pay lower fuel prices. 
~ . I · .... 
:~ ... .... --··.•_........,... __ _ 
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7.15.8 CONTROLS ON PRIVATE STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION, 
TRADING HOURS, AND SPEED LIMITS. {CONSUMPTION CURBS). 
(a) The primary aim of these controls is at the total 
level of fuel consumption, and thus the DG balance of 
payments objective. 
(b) They increase direct DG control of the industry, and 
the number of policy decisions that the DG makes. 
Additional security is gained from this control over 
·a strategic resource. 
(c) Limited trading hours generally benefit the RSS in that 
approximately the same total volume is sold, but in a 
shorter period each day. 
fore better employed. 
Variable resources are there-
(d) Control of trading hours allows the DG to impose on SA 
its alleged belief in resting on the Sabbath, making a 
contribution towards DG Ideal 4. 
(e) The private RSS customer is the most negatively affected. (440 ) 
He suffers lbst temporal convenience, increased travelling 
time, and reductions in ability to travel, particularly 
on long journeys. The tourist industry, and rural 
travellers are also affected. .The private productive 
sector is affected, but not to as great an extent, primarily 
because many businesses have access to bulk supply sources. 
The government se~tor is relatively unaffected. 
(f) They have a negative effect on the DG growth and develop-
ment objectives, in that the productive movements of goods 
and people will be inhibited to some extent. 
. I . . . 
(440) 70-80% of the petrol consumed in SA.E used by private motorists 
Financial Mail, 2nd quarter 76, P.ll35. 
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7~15.9 ADVERTISING AND SALES PROMOTION CONSTRAINTS. 
(a) Their primary aim is to reduce "wasteful•• fuel consumption, 
particularly by the private sector. The only ASP allowed 
is informational, or that emphasising economy. This is 
once again aimed at the DG balance of payments objective. 
{b) They attempt to promote a more efficient use of local 
respurces through eliminating "wasteful" advertising. 
The largest {established) OC benefit through this reduction 
in competition • 
. (c) The private sector is denied information concerning improve-
ments in the power and performance of petrols. 
7.15.10 PATRIOTIC APPEALS 
These appeals are made primarily to the private sector, with the 
aim of reducing •'unnecessary" petrol consumption, and thus 
affecting the balance of payments. 
See Appendix 10 for DG and RG Evaluation Matrices 
7.16 EVALUATION MATRICES FOR REMOVAL OF PRICE CONTROL 
7.16.1 The proposal to drop the DG price and margin controls 
will be tested on the model. The expected result is obviously 
a strong rejection of such freedom. 
(a) The primary effect of dropping these controls will be that 
SA 1 s prices will no longer consistently be above world 
market prices (providing protection to SA's refineries 
and energy industries such as coal -- se~ 8.3.29). 
Prices in certain areas could well rise above such levels, 
but there would no longer be the aonsiste~t protection 
available under the present system. 
. I . . . . 
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(b) The dropping of petrol price and margin controls will 
mean a decrease in the 11 0rderly trading environment 11 
so desired by both the DG and the OC. The attraction 
of SA to the OC, and the oil supply security provided 
by them would be diminished. 
(c) The increased competition would cause marginal RSS to 
leave the industry -- resulting ultimately in a more 
efficient supply network~ but with a less thorough 
coverage of SA. The "rural 11 and 11 black" areas would 
be particularly hard hit. Certain DG support would 
therefore be lost, and black homeland self-sufficiency 
would be diminished. 
(d) The price leadership provided to non-RSS petrol consumers, 
and to non-petrol products, would be removed. The stabil-
ity throughout the oil industry based on the widely avail-
able yardstick of controlled petrol prices would fall away, 
affecting the whole economy. 
(e) The removal of price controls, and the consequent incentive 
for customers to search between RSS would likely mean an 
erosion of fuel consumption curbing measures (with negative 
effects on the balance of payments). 
Again, see Appendix 10 for the Evaluation Matrices. 
. I ... 
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8. . THE ·IFFECT OF THE · GOVERNMENT UPON THE RSS 
• r ) ) 
"The suggestion is sometimes made that the government 
in SA has favoured its own political allies and 
associates on every possible occasion". (441) 
11 0f course we would prefer to have an entirely free 
enterprise system, but as long as the opportunity 
to run one's business Rrofitably is not taken away 
we cannot complain 11 , (ll42) 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
(441) 
8.1.1 Chapters 5 and 7 of this thesis have developed the 
theory that regulation originates from the goals of the DG. 
The objective of this chapter is to test the following major 
hypotheses: 
(a) That the DG is able to effectively control all 
aspects of the SA oil industry. 
(b) That aZZ the controls and regulations over the oil 
industry make a substantial contribution towards. 
DG goals. 
(c) That competition is constrained in the SA oil industry. 
(d) That SA's petrol prices are considerably above world 
market prices. 
(e) That these deviations from the free market in the SA 
oil industry are primarily at the expense of the 
consumer. 
. I 
Harris, in P.270, Worrall, (1975). 
<
442 ) w. Beck, M D Mobil, Sunday Times, 26/11/72. 
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8.1.2 It is important to note that the peculiar character-
istics of today's oil industries, and in particular SA's oil 
industry, make them suitable as an area in which to apply 
the DG-goals theory. The reason, obviously, is that changes 
in any of the oil supply, price, distribution or other market-
ing aspects of the industry, whether endogenously or exogen-
ously determined, will more directly affect DG goals than 
most other industries. 
8 • 2 T H E r~ 0 0 E L 
8.2.1 The DG-goals model is a computer programme designed 
to do the calculations required by the formula in 5.15 in 
a neat, accurate, and most importantly, rapid manner. 
It provides a formatted listing of the input data for each 
regulation tested, and options on the amount of output 
required. The user is also able to select any input variable, 
and iterate the model over a user-specified range of the 
variable. 
8.2.2 Appendix ll provides a listing of the model, which is 
written in Fortran IV. Appendix 12 explains the input 
format required, and the options available, and Appendix 13 
provides a flow diagram. 
8.3 EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES 
8.3.1 HYPOTHESIS: The DG is able to effectively control all 
aspects of the SA oil industry. 
8.3.2 METHOD: An examination of the scope of the legislation 




8.3.3 RESULTS: A wide range of acts could theoretically 
be used to enforce various controls on the oil industry. 
The most important of these acts are mentioned below. 
The Petroleum Products Act, however, is now the legislation 
which will be used to control most aspects of the oil indus-
try {with the exception of the provisions of the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act). 
8.3.4 The Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act No. 24 
of 1955 empowers the Minister of Economic Affairs to prevent 
or control "monopolistic" conditions {defined in Section 2 
of the Act). It allows such conditions to exist if they 
are in the "public interest 11 (not defined). 
8.3.5 The Import and Export Control Act Ko. 45 of 1963 
gives the Minister of Economic Affairs power to control the 
import and export of goods, including control over their 
source, "channels 11 of import, final destination, their 
values, prices and any other conditions. 
8.3.6 The Price Control Act No. 25 of 1964 empowers the 
Minister of Economic Affairs to control the prices of goods 
and services in SA. 
8.3.7 The National Supplies Procurement Act No. 89 of 1970 
was promulgated to 
11 
• • • em pow e r t he t4 i n i s t e r o f E c o n om i c A f fa i r s to 
manufacture, produce, acquire, hire or import goods, 
to acquire, hire or supply services, and to exercise 
control over goods and services and the manufacture, 
production, processing and treating of goods ... 11 
where necessary for " ... the security of the Republic ... " 
It also provides for the establishment of a fund to enable 




8.3.8 The Trade Practices Act No. 76 of 1976 empowers 
the Minister of Economic Affairs to control advertising 
in the economy. 
8.3.9 The National Building Regulations and Building 
Standards Act, No. 103 of 1977, empowers the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, and the "local authorities" for various 
areas to control the location ~nd erection of all buildings, 
and gives them power to alter or remove any buildings accord-
ing to their assessment of the desirability of such buildings. 
8.3.10 The Petroleum Products Act No. 120 of 1977 gives 
the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Secretary for Commerce 
and the Controller of Petroleum Products power to regulate 
or provide for, 11 ••• as they deem fit .•. ", the use, purchase, 
sales, supply, storage and transport of any petroleum products, 
and to control the persons, outlets, movements, prices and 
standards involved. The Minister has power to make exemptions, 
and he also has power to prohibit the entry of new OC or RSS. 
i n t o t h e o i 1 i n d us t r y . I t e f f e c t i v e 1 y g i ve s h i m 11 • • • u n 1 i m i t e d 
powers to control the oil industryu.( 443 ) 
8.3.11 HYPOTHESIS: Regulations are imposed upon the oil 
industry in accordance with the DG-goals theory developed 
in 5.15 and tn Chapter 7. 
8 . 3 . 1 2 MET H 0 D : The ex i s t i n g m a j or reg u 1 at i on s govern i n·g the 
oil industry (listed in 7.2) were each evaluated in the model. 
It is expected that positive decision values would result for 
all of them. The model was also run to determine the · 
decision value of the proposal to remove an existing piece 
of legislation -- obviously, a negative value is expected. 
. I ... 
Financial Mail, 1st quarter 1977, P.373. 
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8.3.13 RESULTS: Table 8A summarises the results of 
the model's runs. The initial run used an a v~lue of 
1, which produced positive decision values for all the 
regulations except E. The ~ value was increased to 
1,75 to ensure that E'~ decision value became positive. 
All regulations were then rerun. 
TABLE 8A. REGULATORY MODEL'S INITIAL RESULTS 
a = 1 a= 1,75 
A. UROTA 1 ,2 1 '6 
B. Rationalisation pl.an 0,4 1 ,0 
c. Siting controls 0,5 1 ,2 
D. Price and margin controls 1,0 1 ,6 
E. Various consumption curbs -0,6 0,01 
F. ASP controls 0 '1 0,3 
G. Patriotic appeals 0 '1 0,3 
H. Removal of price and margin controls -1 '1 -1.7 
8.3. 14 The data input into the model to achieve these 
results is shown in Appendix 10. 
8.3.15 Table 8A indjcates that UROTA( 444 ) and price and 
margin controls have the highest decision values -- ie. 
the DG has greater incentives to implement these two regu-
lations than any others. It can be concluded from this 
result that the DG, in regulating the SA oil industry has 
placed a high priority on 
. I . ; . 
(444) As mentioned in Chapter 7, UROTA is now included in the Rationalisation plan. 
However, UROTA will be considered as a separate regulation for the purposes 
of this analysis. · 
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(a) minimising OC policy power in the industry; 
{b) propagating their own controls over the industry, 
particularly the price and margin controls .. 
8.3.16 These two goals are not desired for their own sake. 
Chapter 7 discussed a wider range of DG goals, and also 
mentioned some of their complex interrelationships. 
The minimisation of OC monopoly power, ·and the extension 
of DG price and margin controls will positively contribute 
towards other DG goals such as: 
(a) Increased DG security of tenure through their 
effective control of a strategic resource; also 
through their use of price controls as a taxation 
mechanism (see 7.7). DG security is also bolstered 
through the stabilisation of a strategic industry 
the OC are a.ttracted by stable margins (7.5). 
(b) A diversion of producer surplus from the OCs to 
various consumers, and ultimately, to some extent, 
to the DG. 
(c) An extension of DG control over the economy generally, 
and particularly the oil industry. 
(d) The DG control of the oil industry provides an 
additional policy tool to be used for the achieve-
ment of certain macroeconomic objectives -- prim~rily 
the areas of balance of payments, inflation, and 
efficient use of local resources (7.7). 
8.3.17 It can also be concluded from Table SA that there is 
no evidence of regulatory mismanagement, or gross regulatory 
inefficiency. This negates the proposals of Lindblom and 
Wilson (5.7) and Chant and Acheson (5. 13). 
. I . . . 
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8.3. 18 It is possible that the reader may disagree with 
some of the goal and group weightings that have been used 
to achieve the results in Table SA. A sensitivity ana-
lysis has therefore been conducted on some of the weights 
thought likely to be the most contentious. The procedure 
was to vary the selected weight through a range of increases 
relative to all the other weights. Note, however, that 
after each of the individual weight changes, all weights 
for the vector under scrutiny must be readjusted to enable 
them to sum to unity. i.e.: (using a set of weights from 
the model) 
initially 
for OGGOAL(I), I= 1,2,3 ... IDGO 
IDGO 
E DGGOAL (I) = 1 . 0 
I= 1 
Let us increase DGGOAL(l2) 
Then, 
IDGO 
E DGGOAL(I) > 1 
I=l 
In order to enable the vector to sum to unity, 





I DGO · l 
I:l DGGOAL(IJ· F = 1. 0 
The 11 actual increase" on the model's printout is DGGOAL(l2) 
after all adjustments, divided by the input DGGOAL(l2). 
The results of a series of runs are summarised in Table 88 . 
. I ... 
: _ .... -. ;;;,.,.' - • ... .'!< 
262 
TABLE 8B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR SELECTED WEIGHTS 
Ratio: increased/original weight 1,000 1 ,25 1,50 2,00 . 5,00 10,00 
UROTA 
DG Goal Height 12 (growth) 1,608 1 ,624 1,639 1,670 1,856 2 '166 
14 (BOP) 1,608.1,596 1,584 1,560 1 ,413 1,169 
15 (inflation) 1,608 1,599 1,589 1,570 1,454 1,261 
RG Goa 1 ~4ei ght 4 (unemployment) 1,608 1,596 1,584 1,560 1,423 1,221 
. 5 (macro growth) 1,608 1,603 1 ,598 . 1,589 1,533 1 ,444 
RG l-Jei ght 1 (Eng. rural) 1,608 1 ,609 1 ,609 1,609 1 '61 0 1 ,613 
2 (Afrik. rural) 1,608 1,609 1 ,610 1 ,612 1,623 1,642 
8 (Black/black) 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608 
PRICE AND MARGIN CONTROLS 
DG Goal Height 12 (growth) 1,642 1,647 1,655 1,665 1,739 1,869 
14 (BOP) 1,642 1,647 1 ,651 1,660 1 '712 1,800 
15 (inflation) 1,642 1,664 1 ,686 1 '729 1,989 2,423 
RG Goal ~lei ght 4 (unemployment) 1 ,642 1 ,643 1,644 1,646 1,656 1 ,672 
5 (macro gro'.'tth) 1 ,542 1,646 1 ,649 1,657 1 '701 1 '777 
RG Weight 1 (Eng. rural) 1,6.42 1,644 1,645 1,648 1,663 1,689 
2 (Afrik. rural) 1 ,642 1 ,652 1,661 1,680 1 '798 2,014 
8 (Black/black) 1 ,642 . 1 ,649 1,656 1,670 1 '757 1 '912 
VARIOUS CONSUMPTION CURBS 
DG Goal ~Jei ght 12 (growth) 0,015 0,021 0,027 0,040 0 '115 0,240 
14 (BOP) 0,015 0,042 0,070 0,124 0,4!?3 1 ,001 
15 (inflation) 0,015 0,001 -0,015 -0,044 -0,222 -0,517 
RG Goal ~Jei ght 4 (unemployment) 0,015 0,027 0,039 0,062 0,205 0,444 
5 (macro growth) 0,015 0,018 0,022 0,030 0,077 0' 154 
RG ~veight 1 (Eng. rural) 0,015 0,015 0,015 0,014 0,012 0,009 
2 (Afrik. rural) 0,015 0,016 0,017 0,018 0,032 0,081 
8 (Black/black) 0,015 0,011 0,007 0,001 -0,044 -0' 116 
. I ... 
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8.3.19 HYPOTHESIS: Competition within the oil'industry 
is re}ra i ned by the DG. 
8.3.20 METHOD: Restraints on the two primary methods by which 
economic bodies compete (price and quality) will be examined. 
There are other forms of interference in the oil industry by 
the DG which have the effect of~ erecting barriers to RSS 
entry. It will be shown that (in a test area) the number 
of RSS is below a free market equilibrium. 
8.3.21 RESULTS: 
{a) Price controls{ 445 ) place a near complete limit 
on price competition -- it seems (3.9) that there 
are certain circumstances in which price variations 
are allowed by the DG, but these remain confidential. 
(b) The scope for quality competition in petrol selling 
is limited. The product itself is often viewed by 
customers as homogeneous (see 3.4, 4. 1). The 
benefits obtained from increasing competitive costs 
such as service, advertising and additional facilities 
are limited by somewhat inflexible sales areas sizes. 
(See 6.7). Advertising is constrained. (7.2). 
(c) The number of RSS, generally speaking, is fewer than 
that which would be obtained in a free market equili-
brium situation.( 446 ~ The rattonalisation plan; the 
controls on the siting of RSS, and the limitations on 
trading hours tend to limit the RSS capacity available 
over time. ' That trading hour limits constrain RSS 
competitive activity today becomes clear when SA's 
RSS are examined prior to the 1973 "crisis" ~- virtually 
all RSS were open longer hours, and a large portion of 
the urban and national route RSS provided a 24 hour 
service.( 447 } . I ... 
(445) . 
Discussed in. 3.5, 3.9, 7.2. 
(446) Average RSS throughput in SA is the highest in the world-- See 7.15.4; 7.7.4. · 
(447 ) See Table 8E. 
264 
8.3.22 The effects on the number of RSS resulting from 
the rationalisation plan and siting control_s ara difficult 
to quantify. However, a regression of the data from 
Table 3E indicates that the ''average"( 448 ) Cape suburban 
RSS has a break even volume of 98kl pm. The actual volumes 
of the five RSS i~ Chapter 6 1 s survey were: 1 :146; 2:156; 
3:136;. 4:178: and 5:149kl pm. This is a total of 765kl 
pm in the test area. It could therefore support 7,8 
hypothetical b~eak even RSS -- or possibly more if the 
increased locational convenience to customers solicited 
additional sales. 
8.3.23 This figure of 71 8 may be increased even further 
if t~e minimum standards required by UROTA and the siting 
controls are removed. Table 8C is a repea~ of Table 3E, 
except that building costs have been reduced by a half, 
and the equipment, overheads and rates and taxes costs by 
a third. These reductions are an untested estimate of the 
amounts by which regulations have increased the above costs 
(through requiring minimum standards and through interfering 
with optimal resource allocation, especially with regards to 
land). A regression similar to that above was applied to 
Table 8C,{ 449 ) and a break even volume of 64kl pm was cal-
culated. This increases the hypothetical number of RSS 
that could exist in the test area to 11,95. 
8.3.24 Note that neither Tables 3E nor 8C explicitly include 
an allowance for profits. However, a required rate of return 
of 12% pa for all fixed assets, and management costs at a 
market rate have been used in the tables ~-.the objective 
being to include an allowance for "normal" profits. Varia-
tions by actual RSS from the figures in the table indicate, 
ceteris paribus, positive or negative pure profits. 
. . I 
(448) The . . logs of the volumes of the forty RSS in the larger survey were regressed with 
the log of c/L costs as the IV. An r2 of 0,98 was obtained for the equation· 
Log(Vol)= -1,9~240 Log (cpl)+5,8056~. See Table 3E's notes. 
{449) . . 




8.3.25 In summary, the test area contains five RSS; however~ 
under the following conditions eleven RSS could be supported: 
(a) Resource prices remain constant. 
(b) All interference with the free market mechanism 
is removed. 
(c) Adequate time is allowed for the establishment of 
the new RSS. 
(d) The possible effects of unrestrained competition 
in reducing RSS numbers are ignored. 
8.3.26 It is likely that even more than eleven RSS could 
emerge under the above conditions if the sales of the area 
increased because of the improved customer convenience 
resulting from the greater RSS numbers. (450 ) 
8.3.27 HYPOTKESIS: SA's petrol prices are above world -
market prices. 
8.3.28 t·1-ETHOD: An analysis of effective protection provided 
to SA petroleum refineries. 
8.3.29 NOTES: The SA DG will attempt to achieve several 
objectives by raising internal petrol prices: 
(a) The provision of protection to locally-owned and 
located refineries. ·There are four crude oil 
refiners in SA, primarily owned by the oil major~.( 451 ) 
Although the ownership is mainly external, the loca-
tion is local, and foreign exchange savings result 
(equal to the difference in price between crude 
imports and refined imports, for which figures are 
not available), An additional foreign exchange 
saving and local export industry exists in that there 
is a " ... sizeable surplus for exports to 6ther African 
countries ... (452 ) 
. I ... 
Especially as the figure is already almost 12, ie. 11,95. 
Petroleum Economist, (Feb.78), P.58: Sapref owned by Shell/BP; Mobil refinery; 
Natref owned by Sasol (52,5%), Total (30%), and National Iranian OC; 
Caltex refinery. 
(452) . · Petroleum Econom~st, {Feb.78), P.58. 
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TABLE 8C: RSS ECONOMIEs· OF SCALE 
. RAND/~~iONTH ATTRIBUTABLE TO PETROL SALES. WITH. NO . REGULATION 
Site Costs 
Buildings 
Pumps, tanks, canopy, sign 
Pump attendants 
Other personnel inc. manager 
Overheads 























100 150 200 
100 150 250' 
100 120 140 
120 160 193 
320 480 640 
450 500 600 
200 220 240 
. 107 120 140 
1 397 1 750 2 203 
1 40 











(b) The DG wishes to provide protection to SA energy 
industries, namely coal, the Sasol plants, and 
nuclear power. SA meets three quarters of its 
energy requirements from indigenous coal -- with 
minimal hydro-electrtcity production, the balance 











view of the SA DG goals isolated in Chapter 7, there 
will be a very strong incentive to fully exploit and 
protect coal as an energy source:( 454 ) The fact that 
SA has the only large scale, operational oil from coal 
plants in the world is derived logically from this. 
. . I ... 
(453 ) loid~ P.56. 
(454 ). In many democratic, coal-producing countries, with large numbers of coal 
indu.stry voters, .there are additional political reasons for protecting 




Again, there will be a strong incentive to protect 
the Sasol investments from imported oil's competi-
tion. Lastly~ SA is emerging as a nuclear power 
producer, with the first power station due for com-
pletion in the early 1980s. . Protection from oil 
will again assist this industry. 
(c) High internal petrol prices (as mentioned in 7.5.llc) 
will provide the DG with the means to ensure that the 
DC in SA can be guaranteed a high and stable enough 
level of profits ~o ensure their continued operation 
as desired by the DG. 
(d) High internal petrol prices, combined with extensive 
DG control of the oil industry, enables the SA DG to 
raise large tax revenues (see 7.7). There is no 
data available on the direct taxation of the refineries 
in SA. 
8.3.30 Two potential constraints to the ra1s1ng of internal 
petrol prices have been suggested by Adelman~ 455 } First, 
large price increases may have a considerable negative effect 
on the general inflation rate {7.7.16). However, the rapid 
petrol price increases illustrated in Table 38 indicate that 
the DG has to a large extent compensated for the crude price 
increases shown in Table 78, in spite of the negative effect 
on the i n f 1 a t i on go a 1 , ( 4 56 ) a· n d the macro -growth go a 1 . . 
(The OC are also bearing some of the weight of the crude price 
increases-- see 7.5.llc). With nearly all of SA's crude oil 
being imported at the time of the. oil crisis, the DG had no 
alternative but to let internal petrol prices rise. Even so~ 
it is interesting to note that Tables 3B and 78 show that crude. 
prices have increased faster than SA's petrol prices. Table 
80, based on Table 3C, shows the changing price "cuts". 
. . I ... 
'Adelman, (1972), P.231. 
The DG policy of price controls in a large number of· industries throughout the 
the economy no doubt is designed, inter alia~ to mitigate the effects of 





TABLE 8D: PETROL PRICES BREAKDOWN BY % 
I 19 71 1978 
Costs ex Refinery 23% 44% 
OC margin 23% 5% 
RSS margin 10% 7% 
Taxes 44% 43% 
NOTES: 
(1) Source-- See Table 3C. 
(2) The percentages above are for December, 1978. 
During March, 1979, the petrol price was increased 
by 6c/l. It is not known how this increase was 
allocated, except that the RSS GM was increased from 
1,86 to 2,51 c/L, virtually restoring the RSS to 
their position in 1971. 
8.3.31 The second constraint to internal price increases 
suggested by Adelman is consumer resistance. The consider-
able economic control by the DG, and lack of cohesive 
resistance to it, have been discussed inCh. 7. The results 
of the DG goals model runs in Table SA indicate tha~ such 
resistance is not significant' in SA. 
8.3.32 RESULT: Du Plessis( 457 ) has estimated the nominal 
rate of protection of the SA "petroleum refineries" industry at 
56,2%, when excise duties are ignored. ·If they are included, 
the nominal rate is closer to an estimate made by Holden and 
Holden( 458 ) of 71%. Du Plessis estimates effective tariff 
protection for the petroleum refineries at 93,5%, and if 
excise duties had been included in his calculations, his 
estimate would probably be over 100%.(459 ) 
~ I . . . 
S.P.J. duPlessis, SAJE, (1976). 
M. Holden and P~ Holden, SAJE, (Sept. 75). 
These rates. are calculated from 1963/4 data • 
. . . 
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8.3.33 Du Plessis warns of certain dangers in the inter-
pretation of effective tariffs. A comparison of effective 
rates for different industries should be used with caution, 
because thereaction to the growth stimulus of the tariffs 
may vary from industry to industry, and 11 ,, .it is generally 
speaking not permissible to conclude that an industry with a 
higher effective tariff ... necessarily benefitted more ... than 
an industry with a lower effective tariff".( 460 ) He also 
mentions that quantitative import restrictions will distort 
the conclusions that can be drawn solely from an examination 
of nominal and effective rates. Unfortunately, the oil 
industry is one that is subject to considerable and effective 
intervention. 
8.3.34 In spite of these problems, the "petroleum refineries" 
industry had both the highest nominal and effective tariff 
rates for all 79 sectors calculated by du Plessis. Such 
protection is to the immediate and direct expense of petrol 
consumers (ignoring the benefits that such consumers may 
obtain through the concomitant achievement of DG goals that 
might occur). 
8.3.35 HYPOTHESIS: The effects of government interference 
i n the SA o i 1 i n d u s try are p r i mar i 1 y at the ex pen s e of o i 1 
product consumers, particularly RSS consumers. 
8.3.36 METHOD (1): An examination of the price premium paid 
by SA oil product consumers. 
8.3.37 METHOD (2): An estimate of the inconvenience to 
RSS consumers as a result of the limits on numbers of RSS 
~11 be made. The method will be to examine changes in 
weighted average customer deterrence from the "actual 11 
. . I . · .. 
(460) 
D.u Plessis, (1976), P.l62. 




~ituation in the Rondebosch test area when six additional 
RSS are placed in the area. The locational model has.been 
modified to generate the additional RSS at random locations 
in the test area. A large number of "sets 11 of new RSS will 
be generated, and the range of the results examined.( 461 ) 
8.3.38 METHOD (3): The effects of the National Supplies 
Procurement Act and the Petroleum Products Act upon the 
customer convenience will be examined. 
8 • 3 • 3 9 RE S U L T ( 1 ) : Nominal tariffs indicate the extent to 
which domestic tariffs in a country have been increased above 
free trade world prices. It must be borne in mind that 
nominal tariffs are not the only distortion on free trade --
quantitative restrictions will affect tariff protection( 462 ) 
and may also distort internal price levels (and therefore 
nominal, and again, effective tariff protection}. 
8.3.40 Ignoring the effects of quantitative restrictions on 
petroleum product imports into SA, du Plessis has estimated 
the nominal protection of the "petroleum refineriesn to'be 
over 70%. This calculation was however, for 1963/64. 
It is suggested that the figure of 70% grossly underestimates 
the rate of nominal protection today, for which figur~s are 
not available. Holden and Holden estimated nominal protect-
ion for the 11 petrol and coal 11 • industry to be 40,4% in 1956/57; 
and 71% in 1963/64. If the rate of i.ncrease between 1956/57 
and 1963/64 is continued up to the present, today•s nominal 
protection for the industry would be a little over 200%. 
. I ... 
Data input to the model is described in Appendix 2. A program listing is 
provided in Appendix 15. The "Actual Sales" required by the model were 
obtained as follows: actual sales for the area was divided by 11 -- the 
result was used for each random RSS. The difference between the total for 
· the random RSS and the actual RSS was then allocated to the actual RSS in 
proportion to their sales. 




8.3.41 RESULT (2): When the RSS locationa1 model was 
set up as in Ch. 6, and it was calibrated using "live" 
composite attraction values; actual and synthesised sales 
for each of the five RSS varied by less than 0,2%. 
In this case, the average customer deterrence{ 463 ) cal-
culated by weighting with synthesised sales was 13,7719, 
and by weighting with the numbers of customers a figure 
of 14,2820 was obtained. 
8.3.42 The number of RSS in the model was then increased 
to eleven. The 11 actual" five RSS were retained in their 
original locations, and a set of six additional RSS were 
introduced. These six RSS were placed randomly in the 
study area, and the model was run in simulation mode. 
The six new RSS were then assigned new random positions, 
and the model was rerun. This procedure was repeated sixty 
five times. (464 ) 
8.3.43 The minimum and maximum average deterrence functions 
resulting from these runs were: 
Customer weighted 
Synthesised sales weighted 
MINH1UM 
8, 1 0 
7,69 




Note that deterrence used in the model was not distance, but rather a 
rank-distance ratio developed for the model in equation E79, Ch.4. 
Essentially, this measure is the distance multiplied by the ratio of. 
equation E78. Distances were input into these two equations in 500m 
units. Therefore a very rough estimate of customer to RSS distances 
in.km can be obtained by dividing the deterrence figures above by 2. 
A random number generator was programmed into the RSS model. 
numbers IR and JR were selected such that 
1 ~ IR ~ 36 
l .~ JR ~ 5 
Random 
There are 36 customer zones and five RSS in the "live" model: the random 
numbers IR and .JR are therefore able to randomly pick. deterrence figures 
from this matrix. These random figures were used as deterrence figures 
for the "new" RSS. The programming required to do this is shown in 
Appendix 15. Attraction figures of unity were used for the new RSS. 
272 
8.3.44 Minimum customer average deterrence figures will 
tend to coincide with optimal RSS locations, because an 
RSS will desire to locate itself as conveniently as 
possible for its potential customers, in view of the 
importance customers attach to convenience (see Ch. 6). 
However, there is no reason why optimal RSS location MUST 
coincide with minimum averige customer deterrence. 
For example, it may be advantageous to an RSS to relQcate 
using the competitive logic of a Cournot or Bertrand model. 
8.3.45 Assume, however, that the optimal locations for the 
new RSS coincide with the minima calculated above. This 
means that, depending on the method of weighting used, 
average customer deterrence in the Rondebosch test area 
was i~creased by government regulation as follows: 
(Synthesised sales weighting) 13,7719/7,6925 = 1,79 
(Numbers of customers weighting) 14,2820/8,0983 = 1,76 
Bearing in mind note (463) on the previous page, this 
means that the average distance a customer had to travel 
in the test area to fill his car has increased by 76% 
because of governmental regulation. 
8.3.46 RESULT (3): The primary effects of the promulgations 
under the National Supplies Procurement Act and the 
Petroleum Products Act since mid-1973 are summarised in Table 
BE. Note that there are benefits that may offset some of 
the costs resulting to RSS consumers from these regulations. 
Maximum speed limits may reduce accident casualties, and 
limited trading hours may mean better utilisation of RSS 
capacity, for example. 
. I . . . 
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TABLE 8£. "CONSUMPTION CURBS" THE IMPORTANT CHANGES 























16/11/3 Maximum speed reduced to 80 km ph. 
No racing, water skiing. · P~ivate 
carriage of lOL max. Selling hours: 
0600 t1onday to 1800 Saturday. 
30/11/3 ·No private carriage of petrol. 
10/12/3 Selling hours : 0600-1800 Monday 
to Friday 
25/1/4 Private carriage of lOL maximum. 
18/4/5 Easing on racing and water skiing 
restrictions. 
19/5/5 Speed .limit increased to 90 km ph. 
Additional selling on Saturdays 
0800-1300 allowed. 
24/9/6 Selling hours : Monday-Friday 0700-
1800, Saturday 0800-1300. 
22/10/7 Maximum fuel tank size of SOL on 
passenger vehicles, 200L on other 
vehicles. Selling hours : Monday-
Thursday 0600-1800, Friday 0600-1200. 
No private carriage of petrol allowed, 
maximum possession 5L. 
3/3/8 Selling hours : Monday-Saturday 0800-
1800. Maximum private possession of 
petrol lOL. Sales of petrol on 
credit prohibited. 
12/l/9 Private possession of petrol only with 
a permit. 
16/3/9 Selling hours Monday-Saturday 0700· 
1800, except Wednesdays, which close 
1200. Lorries exceeding 9000 Kg --
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APPENDIX 2: LOCATIONAL MODEL'S INPUT AND OPTIONS. 
Instructions for the input of data on punch cards are listed 
below .. The cards must be arranged in the sequence in which they 
are described. The model's various options are outlined_as they 
appear .. 
An additional card is required by the program when the 
random position generator is used (Appendix 15); it is shown· 
below. If the standard locational program is being used (Appendix 
1) simply ignore this additional card (marked*-). 
The description belovt for each card or group: of cards comprises: 
a heading,. the applicable columns, the variables used, their 
FORTRAN format, and a short explanation. 
CONTROL CARD #1 • 
1-3 N I3 
4-6 M I3 
7-8 NA I2 
9-16 CONS F8.6 
CONTROL CARD #2. * 







· DETERRENCE CARDS #3 ... 




POPULATION CARDS #4 .. 
1-10 P(I) 8F10.0 
11-ZOetc .. 
Number o"f I zones .. 
Number of J (including the additional 
random RSS if such a run is being made). 
0 specifies a simulation run, 1 a 
calibration run .. 
Consumption constant - ie the proportion 
of income spent at RSS in the study area. 
If this field is left blank it will be 
calculated automatically, thus providing 
a useful check on the model's results. 
Four digit seed for the random number 
generator - must comprise positive 
·intigers .. 
Number of iterations required. 
The actual number of RSS in the study 
· area9' ie the number for which deterrence 
data will be input. 
Deterrence cards •. First card for I=1 ,_ next 
card for I=2, etc .. The first 10 columns 
of each card are for J=1 , the second 10 
for J=2., etc .. 
Number of consumers in each I zone~ 10 
columns per zone,. maximum 8 zones I card~ 
APPENDIX 2 Cont~ 
INCOME ·cARDS #5. 
1-8 Y(I) 10F8.2 
etc 
ACTUAL SALES CA..!tDS #6. 
1-·1 0 · A( J) ?F1 0 .. 0 
etc .. 
ATTRACTION FACTOR CARD #7· 
1-10 ATR(J) 7F10 .. 7 
etc. 
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Average annual income (Rand) per capita 
in I.. 8 columns per zone, maximum 1 0 
zones per card .. 
Actual sales for each J .. 10 columns 
per J, maximum 7 fields per card. · 
Attraction factors for each.J. 10 columns 
per J, maximum.? J per card. 
DISTANCE TO NEXT OPPORTUNITY CJI..RDS #8. · 
1-10 ATRA(I,J) 7F10.4 First card for 1=1, next card_,for I=2 etc. 
The first 1 0 columns are for J=1 , ·the 
·next 10 columns for J=2, etc. (Note: 
the program will only read this data for 
the actual RSS) .. 
THE FOLLOWING C ..ffiDS ARE REQUL!(ED BY THB CALIBRATION OPTI~N ONLY. 
CALIBRATION PARA~mTER CARD~ C1. 
1-10 A.LHIN F10.8 Lower alpha value. 
11-20 ALMA X F10.8 Upper alpha value .. 
21-30 BEMIN F10.8 , Lower beta value. 
31-40 BEMAX F10 .. 8 Upper beta value. 
41-50 AAMIN F10.8 Lo1.r1er lambda value. 
51--60 AAMAX F10 .. 8 Upper lambda value. 
CALIBRATION CONTROL CA..!(D # C2. 








Number of overall iterations. 
Calibration method selector: 0 to use 
coefficiant of correlation~ 1 to use the 
sum of squares ... 
Parameter •twideningn factor on overall 
iterations. 
THE FOLLOWING CARDS ARE REQUIRED BY THE SIMULATION OPTION ONLY •. 
SIMULATION PARAMETER CARD # Sl. 
1-·10 ALPHA · FlO. 7 Input alpha value. 
11-20 BETA F10 .. 7 Input beta value. 
21-30 LAMBDA F10.7 Input lambda value. 
281A 
APPENDIX. 3.. SIMPLIFIED LOCATIONAL HODEL FLOW' DIAGRAM •. 
start 
read and print data and control cards 
calculate consumption constant if 
it has not been in~ut 
calculate RSS exuenditure out of 
income for each I 
calibration 
read ~~d print parameter and control 
cards, print headings 
multiply each upper 
and divide each 
lower parameter 
estinate by F 
::--;;-ye_s -----7" (JI) 
yes 
calculate golden sections for the 
input maxima arid minima for alpha 
calculate means for the maxima and 
minima of the.other parameters 
set alpha :: the lower golden section 
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Appendix 3 cont. 
call subroutines for gravity formula 
and goodness of fit indicators 
;print results 
uuuer golden section 
call subroutines for gravity formula 




use lo~er CJlden 
section as lower 
parameter estimate 
use upper colden 
section as upper 
parameter estime,te 
>----~(() 
repeat the procedure from for 
beta, and repeat again for lambda 
calculate total average deterrence 
weighted b'\r synthesised sales 




Appendix 3 cont. 
yes 
/ read parameters for a simulation t_ CID only run ' 
1 
D I print headings and parameters L. /-t 
call sub~outines for gravity formula 
and goodness of fit indicators 
t 
calculate matrix of customer flows 
from T to J, a.TJ.d then total customers 
to each J 
l 
calculate average deterrence to 
each J v1eighted by number of 
custor:1ers, and then total average 
deterrence v:eighted by number of 
customers 
t 
calculate total average deterrence 
rreighted by synthesised sales 
~ 
calculate total number of customers, 
total synthesised sales, and total 
actual sales 
t 
calculate the % of customers, synthesised 
sales and actual sales going to each J 
from the respective totals 
1 
calculate actual/synthesised 
for each J as a ~ 
sal.es 
~ I print headings, output vectors and 
their totals RSS spending by I 
zone, a.TJ.d matrices giving flows from 
I to J of: synthesised sales, cash 
flO\'JS, and input deterrenc·es 
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APPENDIX 8: RSS ;ATTRACTIVE ELEMENTS FROM SURVEY. 
RSSl RSS2 RSS3 RSS4 RSS5 
AMenities within 500m.: (note 1) 
Appeal. of area within 500m.: 
- No of driveway attendants~ 
Wo of mechanics:: 
Total no of staff: 
Attendants/equipment clean/neat? 
. Accounts available? 
Credit cards accepted? 
Courtesy vehicle available? 
Dealer's service (years) 
Average customer stop. (seconds) 
Brand (note 2) 
Cheapest polish per litre: (cents) 
Price 51 of brand's oil (cents) 
Price to balance 1 wheel (cents) 





Motor car franchise? 
Car Wash? 




Pump layout (square/long) 
Diagnostic bay? 
Mul.tigrade octane? 



























































































































Note 1 : s = Shopping centre; P = Post office; c = Cin@ma; 
L = Library;. 0 :::: Large o.pen area; VI = Schools. 

































APPEN"DIX .9: A LOW COST RSS LOC"ATIONAL l-10DEL ... 
The gravity models developed in Ch 4 are all based on some 
form of cost or deterrence function. It is costly and difficult 
to obtain reliable data for these functions, and sometimes, as in 
Ch 6, it is not available in the form required. The RSS model 
developed-inCh 4 has been modified to accept traffic flow data 
in place of the deterrence data. The model. is set up as normal, 
except for a few program changes, which have been given below. 
It would not be accep.table to. develop a general shopping 
model using car counts at shop sites in place of the deterrence 
function. Customers may well go out of their way to visit a shopping 
centre - ie have a positive general shopping AVD. A.variety of 
attraction factors which may cause such AVDs are discussed :i.n 4.5 .... 
It has been shown however, (Chs 4, 6) how location is the prime factor 
affecting RSS customer allocation. The fact that petrol prices 
are controlled in SA, and that there is no reason to believe that 
RSS size and attraction are closely related, also enable the RSS 
model to accept car count data. Few SA customers are likely to move 
far off the major traffic flows specifically to visit an RSS, and 
especially to buy petrol. The car count will probably provide a 
good measure therefore, of the RSS potential in an area. 
Most OC ~dll already have car count data for any RSS under stu~. 
Indeed, car counts are at present one of the most important tools 
used by the OC in the analysis of sales potential. This should enable 
the build up of considerably larger study areas than that attempted 
in this thesis .. 
When using this new approach, it becomes important to take 
account of "externaltt RSS, especially if the study area is small. 
The critical point to examine is whether the. external RSS have a 
higher or lower average AVD than those in the study area~ If the 
external AVD is lower, this may cause the car count figures in the 
study area to be optimistic in their predictions. 
It is also important to.obtain an "ease qf access" attractive 
element for each RSS under examination, to be included in the 
composite attractive variable .. Once again, car count figures may be 
somewhat optimistic if an RSS has poor driveway access. Of course. 
all attractive elentents may be subjected to the multiple regression 
described in Ch 4~ 
Although it is not done in the program changes below, it is. 
suggested the distance to next opportunity factor included in the 
293A 
APPENDIX 9 cont ... 
Iocational model could profitably be removed. It would simplify the 
program, its setting up, and cut down on computer time. It is unli-
kely to have much affect, if at all, on the model's predictive 
ability.-
T.he following program changes are required; refer to Appendix 1. 


















DIMENSION C(20) ,3(50,20), YC(50) ,SUH3(50), T(20) ,ATR(20) 
S(I,J)=(EXP((ATR(J)*ALPHA)+(ATRA(I,J)*BETA)+(C(J)*LAMBDA))) 
The model is now set up as normal, except that in place of the 
deterrence matrix, the vector of car count figures is read in, in 
7F10.2 format. It will do the necessary calculations, and print 
zeros where deterrence based data was previously output. 
.uMBER Of: 0~ UtiJS; ~G OHJS; NG:i i · ALt'tiA VA LUI:.' 
lb 32 
FULL PRINT:t,PARf PRINT:O, VALUE: 0 
lTERATE:t,ONE RUN:O. VALUE: 0 
1.7~0 
~0 ITERATluNS: 10 CUMULATIVE CHANGE: 1.100000 
uG GOAL ~EJGHTS 
1 2 3 4 S b 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 ta 15 16 
.2o :12 ,o9 ,04 ,o3 .o3 .o• .ot .o• .o1 .ob .o7 .01 .• o5 .oa .10 
rlG ,GOAL "WflGHTS 
J 2 ' 3 II 5 6 
.6o .12 .os .10 .o3 .to 
KG WEIGHTS 
APPE"JDIX 10. 
2 3 5 7 8 9 10 . 11 12 13 14 1 s 16. 1 7 18 19 20 
,01 .11 ,16 ,31 ,08 .02 .• 14 ,17 .02 ,OS ,01 .OJ ,06 .DI .05 ,03 ,09 .ol .00 .00 
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ~8 29 30 31 32 
,00 .DO .00 ,00 ,36 ,27 .01 .01 .15 ,10 .37 .29 
' DG EVALUATION ·! 
1 2 3 .• 5 6 7 8 ·9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 































. 1 2 3 5 
1. o. 1. 1.· 1. 
1, O. I. I, 1. 
1. ·o. u. 1. ,o. 
1. o. o. I. o. 
l. 1. u. l, o. 
I, 1. O. I, o. 
I. 0. u. 1. o. 
I. O. I, 0, I, 
1. o. o. ·o. o. 
1. 0, u. O. O. 
I. 0. U. O. U. 
1. o. o. _o. u. 
I. I. I, 0, 0, 
I, 1. 1. o. O. 
I. 0, O. 0, D. 
l. o. o. o. o. 
1. o. o. o. o. 
I. 0. u. o. 0, 
1. o. o. o. o. 
1. 0. 0. D. o. 











0. -I. 2. 
o. -2. ·0, 
a. -c.. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
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o. -1. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. ~. o. o. 
o. . o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. . o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o •. o. o. 0~ o. 
o. ;0. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. ·o. o. o. 
o. u. o. u. o. 
0. 0. 0. U. I)• 
u. o. O. v. I. 
o. u. o. o. ·t. 
o. -1. tl. u. o. 
o. -1. o. u. o. 
(). o. o. u. o. 





































































































o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. -1. o. 
o. o. -t.· o. 
o. o. -1. o. 
o. o. -1. -o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. •1. o. o. 
o. -t. o. o • 
o. -1. o. o. 
o. -i. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
0. u. o. I. 
o. o. o. 1. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. u. 
o. u. o, o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. 















































o. u. 296A 
2 3 











2 3 ~ 5 0 
o. -2. -1. -r. -1. 
o. -2. -1. -1. 2. 
o. -2. -1. -1. •!. 
o. -2. -1. -1. 2. 
o. -2. -1. -1. -1. 
0 -2. o •. •2. -·· -1. -1. 
7 -2. o. -2. •1. -1. -1. 
6 -2. -t. -2. -·· -1. -1. 
q -2. o. -2. -1. o. o. 
tO •2. o. -2. •1. o. 0~ 
tt -2. o.· -2. -1. o~ o. 
12 -2. o. -2. -t. o. o. 

































































-2 •. o. -i. -1. -1. 
-2. o. -2. -t. -1. 
-1~ o. o. o. o. 
-1. o. o. o. u.· 
-<!. o. -2. -1. -1. 
-2. o. -c. -1. -1. 
-2. o. -2. -1. -1. 



























1. 1 • 









2 5 7 H 








-2. -1. -1. 












































o. o. o. 2. o. 
o. o. o. 2. -1. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 1. o •. 
o. o. •2. -2. o. 
o. 1. -1. o. o. 
























-1. o. 1. o. o. o. 
-1. o. 1. 
-1. o. o. 
•1.· o. o. 
•1. 1. 1. 
·-1. 1. ·1. 
-1. 1. 2 .• 
-1. 1. 2. 
-1. o. o. 
-1. 1). o. 
-I. o. o. 
-I • o. o. 
o. I • 1 • 
o. 1 • 1 • 
0. (J. . 0. 
o. o. o. 
I, 7'::iO•JOO 
o. o. . o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o •. o •• o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 












1 • 0. 
1 • 0. 
o. o. 
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o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
1. o. o. 
1. o. o. 
1. o. o. 
1. o. o. 
1.. 0. 0. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
·o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
1. o.l o. 
1. o. o. 
1. . o. o. 
1. o. o. 
2. o. -1. 
2. o. -1. 
2. o. -2. 
2. o. -1. 
o. o. o. 
o. 1), o. 
(J. 0. u. 
o. o. u. 
1. 0. 0. 
1 • 0. 0. 
0. 0. 0. 













o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
1. 1. o. 
1. 1. o. 
1, 1. o. 
1. 1. o. 
f. 1. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
o. o. o. 
1, 1. o, 
I, 1. 0, 
1. 1. o. 
1. 1. o .• 
1. o. o. 
1. o. o. 
1. o. o. 
1. o. o. 
0, I , 0. 
0, I. 0, 
u. 1. o. 
(I. 1 • 0. 
1 • I • 0. 
l • 1. 0. 
0. I • 0. 
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o. 1 • 






















o. .' 0. 
o. o. 
o. o. 
o.. o. -2. 
o. o. •2. 
o. -1. -2. 
o. o. ~2. 
0. I). (). 
o. u. u. 
0, o. \), 
u. o. o. 
o. i), u. 
o. o. o. 
o. o.· o. 




1.1 I i:" 1 j 
2, l. c, 
Ill 











































































































































o. o. o. 1. 
o. o. o. 1. 
o. u. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. o. o. . o. 
0~ o. o. o. 
o. o. o. o. 
o. -1. o. o. 
o. -1. o. o. 
o. -2. o. o. 
o. -2. -1 •. o. 
o. -2. o. o. 




















































I} • Q • 





















































;:> 1 • 
?2. 
~5. 










35. --6. .,.,_ 
1)!;1. 
v~. 




Ill~ • ·. 
ll5. 

























7 1 • 
72. 
7 ~. 




Pf(TNT 'iOO, TIJl,(), !RGO, lf<G, AV''HA 







RE:.AI) 10S,(nGGOAL(I),l:1 ,T11r.0J 
PRTNT S41 
PRJNT Sill! 
PRTNT SOh,([ l=l lnGO) 
;PfHNT sue;, WGGOAf.n), r=t, I"Gnl 
00 1023 T:t,TOGU 
1023 (UPY(ll=~G~OALfl) . 
t1EAD105, (RGGOAI.(J} ,J:t, II1Gfl) 
PRTNT 541 
PRINT 507 







PM TNT 5111 
PHTNT <;Oh,(K,K=l7,1RG) 
PRINT c;o5,(RGW(K)jK:I7,J 









no 1 ooo K=t TRt, 
READ 1?0, (RGEVAL(K,J) ,.1:1, TN 
1000 PRINT '52\,K,(RGEVAL(K,J),J::J, 
PRINT 541 
PRINT 541 
-lOUt SUMA : 0.0 




no 1010 I<:I,IRG 
no· 1010 J:t,TRGO .· 














nu 1015 K::l,tRG 
101~ PRINT S40,K,(H(K,J),J:I,TRGUl 
























































PI< T H T "> 0? 
l t- LJ .J • F •.J • I l r.; ll T 0 1 (11 6 
f.' •n r.r c; 11-1 
Pf~IIIT ')~II 
PI<J l'IT ')~ <; 
.1 J::".' ~ 1 . 
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APPENDIX .12:· THE REGULATORY HODEL'S INPUT AUD OPriOUS. 
Instructions for the input of data. on punch cards are listed 
below. The cards must be arranged in the sequence in which they 
are descr~bed~ The model's various options are outlined as they 
appear. The description below for each card or·group of cards 
comprises~ a heading, the applicable columns, the variables used, 
their FORTRAN format, and a: short explanation. 









I2. Number ·or DG goals .. 
I2 Number of RG goals. 
I2 Number of RGs~ 
F10.4 Alpha value .. 
CONTROL CARD #2. 
1 KP Il 
2 KI I1 
CONTROL CARD #3. 
1-3 NIT I3 
4-13 PERIT F10 .. 6 
DG GOAL WEIGHT CARD t/4 .. 
1-·2 DGGOAL(I) F2 ... 2 
3-4 
etc. 
RG GOAL WEIGHT CARD #5. 
· T-2 RGGOAL(J) F2 ... 2 
3-4 
etc ... 
RG WEIGHT CARD #6 ... 
1-4 RGW(K) F4 ... 4 
5-8 
etc~ 
Print indicator. Punch 1 for a. full print-
out, or 0 for a limited print-out. 
Iteration indicator. Punch 0 for a single 
run, or 1 if a routine has been inserted 
in the program, and it is desired to use 
it within a series of iterations (see App 
11 for an. example) .. 
Number of iterations. required .. 
Factor to be used for the increment/decrement 
in the iteration procedure •. Insert a blank 
card here during single runs. 
DG goal weights: goal 1 in columns 1-2,. 
goal 2 in columns 3-4 etc.. Maximu.m. 36 
goals per card .. 
RG goal. weights: goal 1 in columns 1-2, 
· goal 2 in columns · 3-4 etc. Maximum 36 
goals per card. 
RG weights: group l in columns 1-4, group 
2 in columns 5-8 etc. Maximum 18 groups: 
per card. 
APPENDIX ·12 cant. 
DG EVALITATION CARD t/!l .. 
1-2. DGEVAL(I) F2.0 
etc. 
RG EVALITATION CARDS #8 .. 
1...;.2 RGEVAL(K,Jl.F2.0 
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DG evaluation vector.. Goal. r in columns · 
1-2 ,. goal 2 in columns 3-4 etc .. 
RG evaluation ma.trix· .. For RG 1, its goaJ. 
l evaluation will be in columns 1-2, goal 
2 in columns 3-4- etc.. (Maximum 50' goals 
per card) .. RG 2 will be repeated on a new 
card, etc. 
It is po·ssi ble that the user· may wish to evaluate more than 
o'ne set of matrices on a single run .. In this case, cards #9 and#10 
will follow the deck #8 described above. #9 is analogous to #7, and 
#10· is analogous to #8. Similar data may be added ad infinitum. The 
program has been. written so that it will terminate with an attempt 




-·-- ------ ·· ·3o6A 
APPENDIX 13.. SIHPLIFIED REGULATION HODEL FLOW DIAGRAH. 
start 
r.ead and print control data 
read and 0rint live data 
multiply each element of the DG 
evaluation vector by the appropriate 
DG goal weight to obtain vector A(I) 
sum the elements of the vector A(I) 
multiply each element of the RG 
evaluation matrix by the appropriate 
l{G goal weight, and by the appropriate 
HG wei.:;ht, to obtain matrix B(IC,tJ). 
ensure weight vectors aluays sum to 1. 
sum the elements of the matrix 
m~ltiply vector A(I) by alpha 
~dd the result to tho sun of matrix 
B(K,J) to ~~ tho decision value 
print the weighted DG 
and RG evaluation 
matrices 





itoratiJn procedure - see 
appendix 11 for an e:·G3.i.!l'9le 
Gnsure· all r;eit;hts are iden ticc-,l 
to tl10se j_nput 
end 
308A 
APPENDIX 14: TRADING AND PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT AND BALANCE SHEET 
FOR THE AVERAGE NON' COHPANY OWNED SA RSS IN 1970 (Rand) .. 
Opening stocks 
Purchases and transfers 
Closing stocks 
Cost of sales 
Gross. profit c/d 
Salaries and wages. 
Other expenses 









15 004 Gross profit b/d 
8 942 Revenue on services 
Other trading revenue 











5 918 Fixed assets: 9 128 
1 359 Land and buildings 
Profit and loss a/c: 3 521 5 754 
Furniture/equip .. 
3 374 
Opening bal 123 
!.fet profit b/d 3 398 
Loans and debentures 
Reserves 






Debtors 8 941 
Stock, other 12 017 
30 086 
1. Total number of non company-owned RSS in 1970 = 2 573. 
2. Total number of proprietors ~ 1970 =- 1 964. 
3. Tota~ number of employees in 1970: 21 068 black, 8 451 white .. 
4 ... Average· black empl.oyee· 1s wage in 1970 was R672. 
5 ... Average white employee's earnings in 1970: R2 892. 
6 .. Source:"South African Statistics 1978tt, Section 15.16. 
}. • C J.t 5 S U H A V I f Y ¥ 00 t. L i' r' U :W ·"A·"" "'v 4J i J: 1 !.. .... ... ... t... L.:.. • ... "-1 ... \. >~. .. .t ... J n .. 1 - - 1 ... • 
). C ON~ MILL[RS roRMULATICN •hO PROGR••MihG VERSION OCTOBER 7R 
-------------~• COM~ON/AA/T,r,N/fD/CoSoALPHA,e(TA,LA~60A,YC,ATR,ATRAtSUM3/ 
s. ICC/R/00/0SQ/EE/A 
l:o• Dl"ENSION PISOI,Y(SQI,YCC':>OI,SISO,:ZOI,AI201 1 TC20l 1 
7. IAVTCS0,201,COISO,ZOI,SU.'qL(201 ,ATRI20l,SUMTC20l,FRTMK 1201, 
____ ___a_. .LS.I'IIC 120I .. ASL5!'11C I 2.0L,.H'JU I 20.l ,SUMJ (50J.,AJI\A t50.o ZO L 
q, 3oCIS0,2CI,PERC201 . 
10• REALo~LAMBOA 
II • C 
·-----1..2.o-----· READ J.QOO,N,K.,NA,COI!IS.- ' APPT'i• -NDIY,, 
13· PRINT IOSO,t.,M,NA ,CONS "!.. • l_?, 
lifo READ IOOI,IZ,IK,L 
ISo PRINT IOI~oiZ,O:,L 
------l-6-o ....t.L-=L•··l·--------~---------------------------·--------
17• IY"I Z 
IS• 00 20 I=I,N 
19. 20 READ 1007, tC t I.~~.~,. LJ -------20:.. (AO-l.OQ'f.,..U'...Ll.J,I.•l,.,.iJ _____________________________ ..;_ ____________ _ 
21• PRINT IOS'fo!Ptl I ,1= ,N 
22• READ IOOS,IYCII,I:I,Nl 
23• PRINT IOSS,(YIIIol•ltllll 
------~~ EAO_.I006 0 t..At.J.l-o~J?..t...,.n..L--------------------------------------
2So PRINT IOS6 ,CII CJl,~cJ,III 
26• READ IOII,IATRI~J,Jcl,Ml 
27• . PRI"'T IOS7,CATRI~I,J=I,Ml 
----~------c~4---------0.0-JO-J•l.~.~~~~~~~~~~-----------------~-----------------------------------------------
29o REAO 1002,CATRAII,~I,~•I,LI 
30• 30 PRINT IOS6,CITRACI,~l,JKI 1 LI 
31• IF CCON$1~0,~0,70 
33• DO SO I=I,N 
I: l~• SO SUM! = 5UH1 + YCJ)o~Cil 
lSo SUM2 • OoO 




~1· 80 YCIII=YCII•CONS*PCII 
~2· 
lf3• KK=O ·. 




90 READ 2000,ALMIN,aLMAX,BEMIN,BEMAX,AAHIN,AAHAX 
. --~------~~--------~.~~~-----------------------------------------------------------------------~9. PRINT 200I,ALHIN,BEHINtAAMIN 
SO• PRINT 2001f,ALMAX,BEHAX,AAMAX 
Slo READ 2002,MGSIT,MOIT,MGF,F 
~-------~~d~----~-2-RlNT 2003 ,MGSIT .~~GE~.~--------------------------------------------S3o . 92 PRINT 1008 
S~• PRINT 1023 
SS• PRINT 1009 
~--------~~~~~~-------------------------------------------------------------------51• PRINT 1009 
SBo PRINT 1012 
59• PRl.NT l07S 
60• K=O 
bJo K6"'0 
--------6.2 • 2!JO_U: .. <.K..E<:oMOJ LL...GO-T.O_U6___ ----
b3• IFIKBoEQoOl GO TO 210 
6~. AL~IN~ALM!N/F 
bSo AL~AX:ALMAXOF 
·-------66·---... -·--BE:-!.!N:OUIJN./F - _ --------· ___ .. ·-. 
. 67o BEMAX•D[MAXoF 
68o ~AMIN•-AM[N/F 
b9o AAMAX•AAMAX•f 
·-----.. __70•-- -----21.0-CCNLl.'<U.E.-----· ------·--·----. ---------· -------------. 71• KB I 
72. KC=O 
73• PRINT 1070 
_______ 7_'!, ___ 212-CO~U.NUL----· -----
75. VMIN•ALMIN•!Oo38 
7 b • V"' A X= A L M I N • I 0 ,-.Q I 
77, ALPHA•VMIN 
·-----7.S.~------B£.ll_;.t!l.E.Y..l!H.3.E~.AXl./2. .•. 0 ... 
79o LAMBDA~CAAMJNoAAXAXI/2•0 
SQ. CALL CALC 
81• CALL DlfFSQ 
--------........62-·------- CAL.t.. .. CO!Hl. ___ ..... 
83. COCOR=R 
e-.. cs~R ~oso 
e~.. KC=KC•l 
! ~~ l l I 
IN I l I 
-----------·-- --- ·-
·-----"-0•. .RlNT 1G71f,.KC .... C.SQ.R..,.C.O.C_O.E ... ~LEJ·tA.o.El.tLA.. .. L.Al~JlJ)_~-------------------------
67• ~LPHA=VMAX 
86. CALL CALC 
89. CALL OlfFSQ 
·---"":.0..• CA.LL....C.OfiR. --- ---· 
9lo PRINT 107'1 0 KC,OSQ,R,ALPHA,BETA,LAMBOA 
92. IFIMGF.EQ,QJ GO To 220 
93· IFICSQRoLToOS~I GO TO 230 
-----------2~~ L~I.N=~~J~~------------------------~----------------~------95• GO TO 2'10 
96o 230 ALMAX~VMAX 
97. GO TO 2'10 ____ ______.!i_a. ___ 2.2.o.....Lf.J C.O.C Ofi.• GL • .R..l_C.O_T.0.....2.2..£..... _________________________________ _ 
99o ALMIN=VMIN 
100· GO TO 2'10 
101• 222 AL~AX=VMAX 
--------'1 g ~·:·-- . .2. 'I 0 -i~~ t;~T:-MG-s-I_T_l_G 0- _1_0_2_1_2--
10'1· PRINT 1071 
lOS• KC•O 




------'1 o .u .. L...-CA.L.l.-------------------
111· CALL OlfFSQ 
112. CALL CORR 
113• COCOR:R 
-------------,~r~·: ~~~~~~~~------------------------------------------------------------------~---------------------
,ll:o· PHINT IC7~ 1 KC,CSQR,COCOR,~LP~A,BET~,LAMBOA 
117. BETA=VMAX 
~--------~·~: CA~~1~r~F~S~Q~--------------~----------~~------------~~------------------------------~-----
120o CALL CORR 
l'- I fi\.HJT 'o14, Lt c, b\<1:1 B,.1):U.,9tj~....\~~ET~b~·;t:L..7.A;M:.!.&~M~--::::-;:---;:-:::--:-:-~~~:-:------.:...... 
t'l-.').;. H·(MG-f.·Ea.1o) (; .. c:f• -ro-"1;''l.a· ............. , ........... -· ""-- ·-'" · .... ,. 
l3· trCc~Qi.~T.DSQ) 60 ~0 ~30 
.Z.~ •·· -··---· . SEMI~; VM 1 ~ 
25• GO TO 3~0 
126. 330 B[~AX•VHAI 
127• GO lO 3~0 
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--------128. 320 .lf.ICOCORoGT..Rl. GO lO 322.. 
129. OEHI~=VMIN 
130o GO TO 3~0 
131• 322 B(MAX•VMAX 
--13Z•-------3-'10 .CON! 1NUE---·. 
133. lfC~C.LT.MGSIT) GO TO 2~5 
13~. PRINT 1072 
13s. ~c-o 
-----~.3.c._-------l'I5.. .. VM1.!\i '!'A AI'! ll'H l.O • 3 82. •..I AElS.l.AAM AX.-AAMJN l.Ll ____ _ 
137. VMAX=AAI'II!Ii+l0o6!80IA8SIAAHAX-AAMINlll 
i38o LAMBOA=VMIN 
139. BETA =IBEHIN•BEMAXl/2.0 
---------1-'10.. LL--C-Al.-C----------
I'IIo CALL OlffSQ 
1'12. CALL CORR 
1'13. COCOR•R. 
--------!-~ -'1- C-S.Q R:.O.S-Q 
1~5. KC=KC+I 
l'lbo PRINT I07'1,KC,CS8R,COCOR,ALPH-,SETA,LAHBOA 
1'17. LAMBOA=VMAX 
---------1~~ _CALL-LALC==--------------------------------~--------------------------~---
1'19o CALL DlffSQ 
ISO. CALL CORR 
IS1• PRINT 107'1,KC,OSQ,R 1 ALPHA,BETA,LAMBOA 
--------+--:>-«-•-----......t.E..LI!.GL..f_.Q_.1JJ G 0 I 0 't.<..2u.D_-,--
IS3o lfiCSQRoLToOSQl GO TO '130 
IS'Io AAMIN•VMIN 
ISS. GO TO '1'10 
------~·~~~~·:--~"~~~~~4---------------------------------~------~----------
ISS. '120 lfiCOCOR.GT.Rl GO TO '122 
159. AAMIN=VMIN 
---------~~o-.~----~--~~~~~-------------------------------------------------------------------------------lct. '122 AAMAX=VMAX 
lb2• '1'10 CON 
lb3o If( Tl GO TO 3'1S 
------------~-6~- JX.+~--------·-~-----------------~--~------------~------------~------------------------------------lbS. SUM'I=O•O 
lob• SUMSzO.o 
lb7o 00 10'1 ..I= I ,M 
-l------1-1 .ooa.. .O-----l.O.!I---1-J=-1-•N----------,--~· 
2 169· SUM'I=SUMq+IS(l,.Jl•CCI,.Jl) 
2 170. 10'1 SUHS=SUMS+5(1,.JI 
17lo ASTL=SUH'I/SUMS 
------~--~~~ P~-t--11l1l~--------------------------------------------------~-------------------------173o PRINl 1023 
17~. PRINT 1013 . 
17S. PRINT 1015,K,OSQ,R,ASTL,ALPHA 1 8ETA,LAHBOA 
----------l--1-6 . ;!.JW.N-l-l-O-l-o-~4\-I...M-UI-~a.£1U.N-..A-AK-U1.------------------------------------
177. PRINT 1017,ALMAX,BEMAX,AAMAX 
178o PRINT 1009 
179. PRINT 1023 
~----------~~ PRJNI--l.OJ~-~--------------------------------------------------------------
181· GO TO 200. 





I.!S READ 1021,ALPHA ,BETA ,LAMEJDA 
126 FRI NT 1022 
PRINT 1023 
P.R!NJ_J 0.1.1 .. ------ -----"-----. 
I DO 21. I I,,N 
188• DO 21 J=LL,M 
2 189. 16 ll=IZ•lY+IS•JR•(JXX41331 
__ _____z__ _______ j'IO. IZ..=IZ-•LZ/'1 _____ ..... 
2 191. lXX IZ/100 
2 192. IIX=IIXX/10014100 
2 J'IJ. li<=IXX-IIX 
_____z_ ________ J_9.!L.__ _____ j_l :c~.Ll.XXLI..DQOO L~J OD.OJL ___ -----------------------
2 195. IZ=UX-IIX . 
2 1'16• IFIIRoLT.Jl GO, TO lo 
2 197. . lfC!R.GToNl GO TO 16 -
·----2----....I--9.B_. ______ l~ .. J l.'=.l Z.• I Y •.I F. +.JIH U XX.~.l.3.3 .. l . -----· _ 
2 199. IZ=IZvlll~ 
2 ZOO. IXX=IZ/100 
Z 201• IIX=IIXX/!Ol•IO 
____ ,2_____ __ __2,02 •. _________ ..JiV•.l.X X_, Ll X-------- -- -----
2 Z03· IIX=IIXX/100001•10000 
2 20~· lZ=IXX-llX 
2 lOS· IF!.JR.LT.tl GO TO 17 
--2------.ZOo. !f LJR~Gr..:,_) __ C,Q .. T.O. J] _______ ------
2 207• 21 C!!,..ll=CI!R,~RI 
208. CALL C~LC 
209. CALL DlffSQ 
_______ ..Z.LQ. ________ CALL .. C.ORR __ 
21 PRINT IOi~ 
21 • PRINT I02S,DSQ,R,ALPHA,BET~.LA~BDA,N,~,CONS. 
I• SG.J:I,M 
------<-·J..-'I'~------~''~51L.I.= .. L,f:l.....: _______________ ------~-----------------------------------
,Jl•Sil,.Jl/IYII)q(OhS.l 
I NUE 
16& S\11"5::S\IM;tS('1, "J) 
2~7. AS!L•SUM~/SU~5 
-- ------2'ill.o PRit. t. 1009 
2'i9, PRINT IO~O,ASTL 311A 
250• PR I"T 1009 
251• T'l"O•O 
··-----252· -·--··-·---l5=o.o 
1 •' 2S3o T6•0o0 
25'1. T9=0·0 
2SS• TIO•O.O 
.-- ---.-.ZSbo .... ----111 :OoO.·------ .. ···---- ·-·-··- ..•.. 
257o DO 167 J=I,M 
· I 258• T'i,.T'IolMKT IJJ 
1 2S9o TS=T5•TIJI 
---J----2U>60 o -----...J'.Ozlb • A.( .J )....:,. __________ _ - -----------
l I 2bl• 167 CONTINUE 
262• 00 170 J•l,H 
263o FRT~KIJI¥THKTIJJ/T'ioiOO.O 
~---1.-----'b..'i.-.. I9.t.T.9.•FJUMLLJJ_ 
It 1 265o SlSMKIJI,TIJ)IT5•lOOoO 
l 266• TlO=TIO•SLSHKIJl 
.. I 267. ASLSHKIJJ•ACJI/Tb•IOOoO 
~----z.oa,. --f-1-l :J-ll-•J.SLSI'...O:.C J.J. ----
1 269• 170 CONTINUE 
270o 00 171 J:J,H 
'' 271• 171 PERIJI=OIJl/TIJII•IDC·O 
1'--'-----,--':1.2.-- R lJ\l.T-...1.0.3.~---------------------:-----------------------------
'• 273. PRINT 1023 
27'lo PRINT 1026 
27S. PRINT 1027 
____ _.:._.L7..0... f>.IUJ,i.1_1 02B....t .J.,SUltll.JJ .•• .llUU ... I.J l. • F.R TJ11U.JJ . .,.A5l...S.MX.LJ l .. .S.LSl'!JU...J.L.J.i.JJ__. ___ ~---------
;, 277o IA(JJ,ATRIJl,PE'II.Jit.JeJ,Hl 
J 278 • PRINT 1009 
279. PRINT 1029,TI2,T'i,T9,Til,TIO,T5,T6 
~--------~~ PRI~--LOa~-------------------~-----------------------------------------------1! 281. PRINT 1032 
282• IKl=lKl+l 
283• IFCIKloNEoiKI GO TO 126 
28!!... PR.t.NJ--10.~-----------------------------------------
285• PRINT 1030 
286• PRINT 1009 
2 8 7 • P R I N.T I 0 31 , C I , 'f C I I ) • I= 1 , N) ; ' 
2 a a • M A.!t'-'----· 1; 289. 118=12 
t 290o lFIHB.GToMIMB=M 1: 291• I 172 CONTINUE 
J 
1-1 ------~2~9.2... PRJ...NJ--l.O..l.!!.o..1...l .. .J.=H.A.,ll8.J ______________________________________ _ 
293• PRINT 1009 




29So' 118=1'18+ 12 
1 1 299. IF IHS.GT .IOMS•d'l 
. 300• G0-$.~~~------------------------------------------------------------------------------11• 301• 17S CONTINUE 
302. MA=l 
I 303. MB~:JS 
l r.------~3n~~ ~~.G~jlf.A=~-------------------------------------------30S· 176 CONTINUE ) I 301>· PRINT 103b,(.J,J .. MA ,HS) 
I 
307 • PR !NT 100'? 
.3os. oo 111 l=J,N . 
3 0 9 • 17 7 P R H• l I 0 3 7 ,I , I C 0 11 , ..1 I , J""' A , M B I 




-- 31 ~. GO TO .I 76 __ _ 
31S• lSI PRINT 10'11 
Jib· MA=I 
317• M9=9 
--31.1:!.... -·-- -.IF !~8.GT.IUMB=~-
J1 'i • 182 CONT 1:-.IUE 
320• PRII\1 IG09 
321• PRJNT !0'12,CJ,J=MA,~Bl 
·--- -----.32 2-•--~·-- ___ p R.l N 1 1 0 0 9. --- ., 
323. ·oo tBJ 1 =I.~~ 
32'1· 183 P"'!'JI 10'13.1.CCI!,Jl,..I"MA,MEJI 
325• IFI~B.E~.Ml GO TO loS 
32!>..• -·--MA=MA•'?-- ---· ----------------·---------· 
327• Me=M~•<? 
328• IF<Me.GT.MIHOcM 
329• GO TO I tl2 
. --.330 .~-------ISS. CON T DIU£.. ... _ ----------
331. 186 PRI"'T lGZO 
332• 1000 FORMAT 12l3,12,f8o6l 
333. 1001 FOP.~PTC31'11 
---------3.3,'1~. ,_.Jn02.J~ORMA T I 7F 1 
33So 1003 FORMAT 17F 10.0 
33c· 100'1 FOR~<AT carto.o 
337. !OOS FORMAT I IOFa. I 
--·------..331h ~-1 OOb f_OR!'"~-T UF.LO 
339. 1007 FORMAT 17F10·2 
3~0• 1008 FORMAT I' I' ,50X,'CALIBRAT10N FUN" I 
3'flo 1009 FORMATI'D'I 
------>~'1,2,• 10 UL.f..ORY.JI. U.!.Cl!_,.Ut ,.!,.CON.S.Ul'tP..TJ.ON. .. CO!>:.SlAtiT •. ~ .. l..X,F I!L•l.)J ___ _ 
3'1.), lOll FORMAT 17F10.71 
3~~. 1012 FORtiATI'O',bSX,'PA~AI'IETERS'I 
'3'lS. lOll FORMATI'O','ITER',bX,'OIFF SQ',!IX,'CORR 0 ,7X,'TRIP AVCOST', 
---------3.~<>.•----------1 .. 1.X, '.ALPJ-iA.' . .o9X.....'BE.T.A!.,.SJl,_!LAI''.BD.A.! .. I ---·---------------------------
~ 3'17. IOI'l FOR:-!ATI'O','SEEO,RANOOM ITEfiATIONS,LIVE RSS',::ll101 
3~9. lOIS FORMATC'O',IJ,JX,FIS•o,8X,Fl0.6,3X,FIQ.o,SX,F9.6,5X,F9.6,5X,F9obl 
3'1'?o IDle FORMATI'O','i5X,'MIN!MUM',3X,F9oo,21:>X,F"9.611 
_______ _350•-- .1017 .FORMAT I '0' ,'!SX, 'M.lLXJ2'!1JJ11.!.>3X,>y •6o2,<5X oi'.'L• .. c U -------·---------------------------
351. 1020 FORMATI'l'l 
352• 1021 FORMATC3FJQ.71 
3S3o 1022 FORMATI'J',SOX,'51~ULATION RUN'l 
--------l5"l,e ___ l.02 3 ... fOR.~,_A_T.l 1 , .!_,"fOX_, • 0''*' V ~ cu_~v.o 0 o oc c c4_C 0 0 ~ bb 0 0'6 0 o • o 9 4 4 '0. o o ~ ~.) __________ ;__ ________ _ 
JSS• 102'i FORMAT<'0",7X,'D1FF SQ 1 ,'?X,'CORR',<?X, 1 ALPHA',7X,'BETA", 
3Sb• 18X,'LA~BOA',7X,'l' ,b~,'J',IOX,'C'I 
3 · 357• 1025 FORM.ATC'O',FISobo2X,F1l•9,~X,F9.b,'fX,F9oo,'IX,F9oc,'fX, 
--- -------3 5 & • 1.1..3., 'I.JL..J.3., !IX .. , F..9 • .b.)- -·--·- --- -·-- -·. -------
; 359. 1026 FOPMATC'O','S!TE','l, TRIP','lX,'I<O or•,sx,•y, OF', , 
360• l'i or ACT',JX,'I OF SYN ,3X,'S'fNTHESlSE0',7X,'ACTUAL',JX, 
3bl• 2'ATTF!~CTION',3X,'!!. ACT/STNTH'l 
.-------3.b..2----1.02.7..J.OilMA.LI..!.O.!..._l.2X . ._!..C..05J..!.,..SX •. '.CUS'I. '_..SX • ~.C.U.S_T_'_,.6X.,.!.5A.LEs.!...oJL..._ ___ ...:_ _____________ _ 
~.~ 363. I'SALES',9X,'SALES',SX,'SALES',9X,'OF J',9X,'SALES'I 
, Jo~. 102s FORMATI'0',2x,J2.2X,FJ0.6,Jx,re.o,'lx,rs.2,ox,rs.2,ox,r5.2,3x, 
3bSo IFII•0,2X,FlloO,'lX,r9.o,bX,f9.~l 
L'l \-\ --------~~t~:---1-029~~7~~~-~~fi~~~.!..,J.X ,f.l.O. b,LX . ._F.B .• .0.,3X.,U .. 2..,..S.X...f.h •• 2.oS.X...Eiuo.2...3·JL._ _____________ ;_ 
368o 1030 FOR!UTI'O','ZONAL RETAIL j;PtNDING'I 
"l 
... 312A 
369o 1031 f0RMATI 1 --;-;J'X;J2-,~X,ri·o:2i-·----
370. 1032 FOR!<ATI'O','NOT~:AVE TRIP COST:Cil,JI ~~IGHT(O BY NO or•,• 
371. ICUSTO~ERS'I . 
t-------~·.1..2..L--1D..l3._f.ORM.A..I .l'll!..,.:U.JL,.'.AIS.!_, .7 X •• '.AT R A. • ,t3X, .~c • 
37)o 103'1 FORMATI'I',JX,'CASH flO~S TO'II~X,I211 
)7*• 1035 FORM~TI'O',J2,2l,l2fl0•2l 
375. 103o FOR!<ATI'l'tiX,'CUSTOMER flO~S TO'//qX,ISISl 
~-------..s7t...---t037.F:DR11AH ·c~Li!,z.x.tsra.a.J __ . . --------- ______ -·----------
377. 1039 FORMATI'O'oSOX,'SUMHARY ~ITE )NfORMjfJON 1 1 
37eo 10*0 FORM~li'O','AVE OF Cll,JI WEIGHTED BY SYNTH _SALES',IX,FIOool 
379o IOql fORMATI'I'.'INPUT OETERRE~CE fUNCTION'! 
'---"----->.8 J • I 0'1.2-.J-OR..IIA T.L'..D.!... tJ.:L, 9 I.!...J,...!.,.I2 • 9.lOJ ------------'------------------------
381~ 10'13 fORM~TI'O','I"'•12oiX,'1FI3ool 
382. 1050 fORMAT r•o•.•N,H,~A,C,e 1 ,213,12 Sobl 
383o 105'1 FORMAT 1'0 1 , 1 PCI1"~•8fl0•0 
1-------3"'8~'1__.., ___ 1~QS.s.-E.OR.M.Al-'.!.!L!_, 1 Y I I IJ•..!....J..CfJl.o.2 
38S• !OSo fORMAT 1'0',' AIJl,.',7F10oOI 
38o• 1051 fORMAT 1'0',' lTRIJl= 0 ,1X,7FIOo7l 
387. 1058 FOR:-!ATI'O','ATRA!Ii.JI r',1X,7FIO.ql 
~------~~a. J070-F~~~LJ-·~1~~·~--------------------------------------------------------~-------------------3B9. 1071 FORMATC'O'o'BtTA'l 
390• 1072 FORKATt'O','LAMBOA'J 
3~1• i07q FOR~ATI'O',l3X,13,3X,Filo5,2X,F13.llo312X,Fl0o7ll 
;-------..ol9..2-+--1~.7-S--F..OR.IU.T-~9.X.• !. Lr.t: . .RA.T-tDIL!.,.S X.,..!O 1 £.F_$ Q!. ,_<t:t,!..CORR£.1.-A IJ.a.N!..,.2.x .. ..!AL.e.HA.!.....------------
393o 18Xo'BETA',oX,'LA~BOA'I 
39'1, 2000 FORMATIBF10·8l 
395, 2001 FORMATt'O'•'~INIMA','tfl0·61 
i----------...).Jt~----2D.a.2-.E.QP.M.A J...(.J.I 1..0 ,fJllo.L.Ji.-----......... -,...-----------------------------------------
397o 2003 fORMATC'0', 1 HGSIT,~OIT,MGf,F',lllO,FI0.11 
398. 200't FOR!<ATC'0'o'MAXIKA 1 ,'1FIO•ol 
399~ 2005 fORMAT C'Q',11X,'ALPHA',~X,'BETA',cX,'LAMBOA'l 
MOO· SIDP-'--------------------------------------------------------------------------------.. ot. END 
q02• SUBROUTINE CALC 
't03• COMMON/AI/T~H,~/BB/C,S,ALPHA,BETA,LAMBOA,YC,ATR,lTRA,SUM3 
---------!W.':I..o -ll!t.EJ>15..I.ON .. C l 50,.201 o.SJ.S0 ... 20 .I ,.YC.JS.O.J.,.SUM.3 .. tSO} _.j_I2.D t,AJJU 20J----,..--------------
't05• I,ATRA 150,201 
'lOb• REALo'ILAMBDA 
.. 01. 00200 I" I ,N 
'----"----!!OS• .U~'-ll.".O.•..o__ ___ ------- -· -----~----------------1 '109o 002QOJej,M 
2 'tlO• SCI,Jl=IEXPIC~TR(J)OALPHAI+IATRACI,JloBETAI•(Cil,JloLAMBOAlll 
2 'Ill• 200 SUM3<1l=SU-'13!l,.SCI,JI 
---·--'~ 12 ·~-------00.2ill..Jl'-l,.JL_ ___ -- --·-------------- -----
1 .~13· TCJI•D·O 
I ~J'i, 002011.-1,'1 
2 'll!:.• SCI,JI=YCClloSII,.Jl/SUM31ll 
.2- _. !:11 f>• --~-- 20 1-l C .J.I = 1 I .J_J t S tJ ,...t.L·----·-· --~--------·-··------- ----·-- -- --·-
~17• RETU~N 
~!!!• (NO . 
~19. c 
~20• SUSROUTI~E DJFrsc 
411• CO~MON/~ft/T,~,~/DC/DSQ/EE/A 
-----·42.2.• ----· --- 0 l..ML'\.5 l ON . .A l.2.G.J , I l2 0 I----· ·---· --- ---· ------
'123. DSQI=D·G 
'l2~· 00300J=I ,~ 
( 'l25. 300 DSQI=OS~I•CA8SIA(Jl-TCJlloczl 
__ 'l2b.• .OS~ =OS Q 1/1 QOO.O JO • 0 






( 2: ~29o SUBR~UTlNE COR~ 
-------'~L.l.::i.• CO~I".O,O,;J.AA.IJ.,~N.!_CC./JVEE../~. _ 










-----"""''t ~-------~e"·~s~~~ i: ~ :-:-:--·-------------------------------------------------
1 '1'10. SUMY = SU~Y+ Jl 
( 33 l __ _J 
ss I 
'1~1· SUMXX= SU~XX+ IJI4¢2 






------'~:ct'~.t>b...,, :_I.S.U.I'U.YJ..x.:l.::-.1 xeABX.•.XIl..\.B.l'JJ I ·- ______ ----- -··-
'1~7. 1SQRTIISUMXX/lM-~BAR~oo2l•CSUMYY/XM-XBARYoo2)) 
'l~8• RETURN . 
'l'l9o END 
2 7.: Jt.!! 1S80 -
I. 
